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Abstract 
College professors in the nineteenth-century South lavished a great deal of attention on the issues 
of slavery and constitutionalism, and they paid careful attention to the connections between these 
issues and the idea of natural rights. In this dissertation I offer an analysis of the lives and 
writings of three generations of college professors in nineteenth-century Virginia, focusing 
especially on St. George Tucker and his descendants. As a contemporary of Thomas Jefferson 
and as a delegate to the Annapolis convention, Tucker can rightly be considered as one of the 
founding fathers. But he is best known for inaugurating the academic discourse on the issues of 
slavery and constitutionalism in his capacity as professor of law at the College of William and 
Mary. His sons, Henry and Beverley Tucker, and his grandson John Randolph Tucker kept these 
academic traditions alive for three generations. Members of the Tucker family continuously 
espoused a modern theory of natural rights based upon a contractual understanding of how 
people come to exist in society. By the 1850s, however, some professors such as George 
Frederick Holmes had abandoned the philosophy of modern natural rights in favor of a re-
articulation of classic or ancient natural right: a non-contractual conception of the right to rule. 
This recovery made possible the “positive good” defense of slavery, but it put a strain upon the 
orthodox theory of constitutional interpretation that had been at the center of Virginian political 
thought. This dissertation examines how the Tuckers and others strove to keep the philosophy of 
the founding generation alive throughout the various political upheavals of the nineteenth 
century. 
 1
 
Introduction 
 
The people of the United States are proud of their democracy. Indeed they sometimes even try to 
export their type of government to other parts of the world. But they would do well to remember 
that without individual rights, and without the rights of groups, democracy can be dangerous. 
Unfortunately, human rights advocates often scoff at states’ rights advocates, and states’ rights 
advocates often return the favor. Although these two ways of protecting the rights of political 
minorities have been at odds at various times in the history of the United States, it is possible for 
them to exist in harmony. Indeed, they both stem from the same philosophy, the philosophy of 
modern natural rights. 
My dissertation examines the lives and writings of three generations of college professors 
in nineteenth-century Virginia and reveals a remarkable shift in the idea of natural rights held by 
these men. They began by espousing a modern theory of natural rights based upon a contractual 
understanding of how people come to exist in society. By the 1850s, however, some professors 
had abandoned these ideas in favor of a re-articulation of classic or ancient natural right: a non-
contractual conception of the right to rule.1 This recovery made possible the “positive good” 
defense of slavery, but it put a strain upon the orthodox theory of constitutional interpretation 
that had been at the center of Virginian political thought. 
The dominant figure in this dissertation is St. George Tucker. As a member of Thomas 
Jefferson’s generation, Tucker understood the doctrine of equality expressed in the Declaration 
of Independence in a very restricted sense. To members of this generation equality meant 
                                                          
1 The distinction between modern natural rights and classic natural right finds its fullest development in: 
Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950).  
 
 2
equality in the state of nature.2 According to this understanding, a hypothetical state of nature 
preceded the entrance of the individual into the state of society. In the state of nature, one had 
complete freedom, but everyone else possessed complete freedom as well. Such a situation 
produced considerable danger, and humans usually left the state of nature in order to survive. By 
entering society, the individual gave up some of the liberties that would otherwise have been 
enjoyed, but thereby secured self-preservation.3  
As chapter one demonstrates, the violent slave revolt that produced the modern nation of 
Haiti made it possible for St. George Tucker and other members of his generation to justify the 
continuance of slavery while still maintaining allegiance to the modern natural rights philosophy. 
In their defenses of slavery, members of St. George Tucker’s generation merely argued that 
premature abolition would produce a threat to their self-preservation. This early proslavery 
argument put less strain upon the modern theory of natural rights than has generally been 
supposed. A properly historical understanding of what the founding generation meant by equality 
makes this point clear, and chapter one aims to correct popular misconceptions of this issue.   
Chapter two offers an analysis of St. George Tucker’s constitutional thought. Working as 
a law professor at the College of William and Mary at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
Tucker wrote a seminal series of essays in which he set forth his theory that the Constitution of 
the United States is a compact between free and sovereign states. Tucker espoused what I call a 
                                                          
2 Pauline Maier American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence (New York: Knopf, 1997), 
esp. 155, 192. 
 
3 There exists an immense amount of scholarship on the question of social contract theory and the 
American founders. I have found the following works useful: Andrew C. McLaughlin, “Social Compact 
and Constitutional Construction,” American Historical Review V (1900): 467-490; Thad W. Tate, “The 
Social Contract in America, 1774-1787: Revolutionary Theory as Conservative Instrument,” William and 
Mary Quarterly XXII (1965): 375-391; Ronald J. Pestritto and Thomas G. West, eds., The American 
Founding and the Social Compact (New York: Lexington Books, 2003).  
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Whig theory of politics: because he feared the power of the state, he argued that constitutions are 
necessary to keep the state in check. 4 He based this argument upon the philosophy of modern 
natural rights. Chapter two also describes St. George Tucker’s  involvement with the events 
leading up to the drafting and adoption of the United States Constitution. It then carries forward 
with an explanation of Tucker’s views regarding the Virginia Constitution of 1776, his critique 
of the English legal theorist William Blackstone, and an analysis of how his opposition to the 
Alien and Sedition Acts led him to oppose a common law jurisdiction for the federal 
government. 
 St. George Tucker’s sons, Beverley and Henry, would later become professors in their 
own right, and chapter three describes how they, and other professors of their generation, 
analyzed the issue of slavery. The pressures of an increasingly democratic society led the 
professors of this era to doubt the orthodox view of modern natural rights. This generation of the 
Tucker family flirted with the older theory of classic natural right but never fully abandoned the 
modern natural rights philosophy of their father. As chapter four demonstrates, they needed this 
philosophy in order to defend their father’s conception of the Constitution from interpretations 
they regarded as heretical. These interpretations included not only the nationalistic views of 
Joseph Story and Daniel Webster, but also the nullification doctrine of John C. Calhoun.  
Indeed, no one in the Tucker family ever went so far as to adopt the philosophy of classic 
natural right. In Virginia, the modern natural rights philosophy of slavery manifested in St. 
George Tucker’s writings received no fundamental challenge until the 1850s, when a philosophy 
professor at the University of Virginia, George Frederick Holmes, put forth a new defense of 
                                                          
4 My understanding of what the Virginians of Tucker’s day meant by a Whig theory of government has 
been aided by David N. Mayer’s The Constitutional Thought of Thomas Jefferson (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1994). 
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slavery based upon classic natural right. I analyze this development in chapter five. Holmes 
called for a “new system of political science” based upon the ancient understanding of human 
nature, and writers such as George Fitzhugh and professors such as Albert Taylor Bledsoe 
responded to his call. These men developed a new type of slavery defense: a defense to which 
they continued to appeal, even after the end of the Civil War.  
Scholars have conventionally referred to this defense of slavery as the “positive good 
argument.” As early as 1935, William Sumner Jenkins placed the origins of this argument in the 
controversies surrounding the admission of Missouri as a state in the early 1820s. This 
interpretation has proven controversial, largely because it conflicts with a consistently popular 
view that the positive good argument emerged in response to the challenge of uncompromising 
abolitionists, which did not come to the public attention for another decade. More recently, 
historians have attacked the idea of a positive good defense of slavery in various ways: arguing 
that southern evangelicals did not make positive good arguments; that such arguments never 
became popular in Virginia; or, perhaps most controversially of all, that the differences between 
the two forms of proslavery argument are superficial and misleading.5 
These studies demonstrate that the search for a positive good defense of slavery can 
quickly become a pursuit after a red herring. Often, when southerners called slavery a necessary 
evil they were doing little more than putting a rhetorical flourish upon what was substantively a 
positive good argument. Nevertheless the distinction between the necessary evil and positive 
good defenses of slavery remains useful, for it represents a surface manifestation of a deeper 
                                                          
5 William Sumner Jenkins, Proslavery Thought in the Old South (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1935), 77; Anne C. Loveland, Southern Evangelicals and the Social Order, 1800-1860 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980), x, 186-218; Alison Goodyear Freehling, Drift 
Toward Dissolution: The Virginia Slavery Debate of 1831-1832 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1982), 248 passim; Larry E. Tise, Proslavery: A History of the Defense of Slavery in 
America, 1701-1840 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1987). 
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transformation in the political thought of nineteenth-century Virginia. Thinkers in the tradition of 
modern natural rights could be quite vehement in their defense of slavery; however, a positive 
good defense generally requires the abandonment of modern natural rights in favor of a 
resumption of classic natural right or of scriptural literalism. Although the workaday politician or 
the man in the street might not have concerned himself with such changes in political thought, 
many college and university professors not only noticed the changes, but indeed worked to make 
them possible. Thus a study of academic discourse in nineteenth-century Virginia reveals aspects 
of southern intellectual life that have suffered from comparative neglect by historians.6 
Some will protest that I do not devote enough space to the racial aspects of the proslavery 
argument. Although I do not address the issue in this dissertation, it is my belief that the 
increasing democratization of the nineteenth century caused many Americans to interpret the 
equality clause of the Declaration in a new way. Believing that everyone should be equal in a 
literal sense, and holding that no one should be any better off than anyone else, Americans began 
to have a more difficult time explaining why some people, specifically black people, often lived 
in slavery. In order to explain this apparent anomaly, some Americans inaugurated a new form of 
racial discourse, in which they formalized and justified the idea of black inferiority.7 Yet even 
among Virginian academicians of the 1850s, strictly racist arguments for slavery were less 
                                                          
6 Other scholars of the period have noted that the academicians of the antebellum South did more than 
simply abandon modern natural rights, but few have developed this insight at any length. Drew Gilpin 
Faust, A Sacred Circle: The Dilemma of the Intellectual in the Old South, 1840-1860 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1977), 94, 119-120; Eugene Genovese, The Slaveholders’ Dilemma: Freedom 
and Progress in Southern Conservative Thought, 1820-1860 (Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1992), 48-54; Michael O’Brien, Conjectures of Order: Intellectual Life and the American South, 
1810-1860 (2 vols., Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), II: 960-965, 975, 987. 
 
7 Despite a great deal of recent scholarly work on the evolution of racism, the classics on this topic remain 
unsurpassed: Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968); George D. Frederickson, The Black Image in the 
White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American Character and Destiny, 1817-1914 (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1971).   
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common than arguments that attempted to return to the ancient idea of natural right: a non-
consensual, non-contractual view of wisdom as the right to command. A leading scholar has 
recently argued that “the key to the proslavery argument was race.” 8 This statement probably 
holds true if one looks at the views of slavery held by the general population of the antebellum 
South. In explaining academic discourse in nineteenth-century Virginia, however, it is necessary 
to focus more on rights discourse and less on racial discourse. As I demonstrate, Virginian 
academicians of the period simply wrote more about rights than they did about race. 
I also show that, at root, southerners had to choose between constitutional orthodoxy and 
classic natural right. Attempts to square the circle on this question have never been fully 
satisfactory. One twentieth-century scholar has argued that: “Society does not rest on a contract. 
But the Constitution of the United States does.”9 While true in a limited sense, to understand the 
Constitution requires understanding it as it was understood by the men who wrote it and ratified 
it. And those men adhered to a conventional understanding of modern natural rights theory. As 
chapter six demonstrates, some Virginian academicians, including St. George Tucker’s grandson, 
continued to uphold the constitutional orthodoxy of the framers throughout the Civil War and 
beyond into the latter years of the nineteenth century. St. George Tucker’s legacy survived the 
end of slavery and the imposition of the Reconstruction Amendments. Indeed, his legacy remains 
available even today, to anyone who seeks to understand American constitutionalism. His legacy 
teaches that the rights of humans and the rights of states should be partners, not antagonists.  
                                                          
8 Paul Finkelman, Defending Slavery: Proslavery Thought in the Old South (New York: Bedford/St. 
Martins, 2003), 39.   
 
9 M. E. Bradford, Remembering Who We Are: Observations of a Southern Conservative (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1984), 14. 
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Chapter One: Natural Rights and Slavery in St. George Tucker’s Virginia 
I. 
Although a native of Bermuda, where he was born in 1752, St. George Tucker would come to 
establish one of the leading academic families in the history of Virginia. His sons Henry and 
Beverley, his cousin George, and his grandson John Randolph all became professors at Virginia 
colleges and universities. As a youth in Bermuda, Tucker had grown up hoping to attend law 
school at the Inns of Court in London. His two older brothers had received their education in 
Scotland, where they trained to be medical doctors at the University of Edinburgh. Unfortunately 
for St. George, his brothers’ training had proven expensive. When it came time to leave the 
island to pursue his education, Tucker found that his family had little money left to finance such 
an adventure.1  
Hearing that the College of William and Mary could provide affordable legal training, 
Tucker’s father, a prominent merchant, rushed at the chance to plant down some family roots in 
the Chesapeake. Leaving the island in 1771, Tucker began remedial work with George Wythe in 
Williamsburg. Wythe was one of the foremost legal minds in the state, and in 1787 he would 
serve as a member of Virginia delegation at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. 
Although nominally a part of the William and Mary faculty, Wythe still taught lawyers through 
the traditional apprenticeship method. His curriculum consisted of three chief components: close 
reading of the classics of legal thought, non-stop abstracting of the leading law cases occurring 
                                                          
1 In composing this sketch I have relied upon: SGT to Richard Rush, 27 Oct. 1813, in “Randolph and 
Tucker Letters,” Virginia Magazine of History and Biography XLII (1934): 211-221; Phillip Hamilton, 
The Making and Unmaking of a Revolutionary Family: The Tuckers of Virginia, 1752-1830 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2003), and Charles T. Cullen, “St. George Tucker and Law 
in Virginia,” (Ph. D. diss., University of Virginia, 1971).  
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throughout the English-speaking world, and general reading in those disciplines closely related 
to the law, such as philosophy and history.2 
In 1779, Thomas Jefferson, then governor of Virginia and himself a former student of 
Wythe’s, pushed through curriculum reforms that established the first legal professorship in the 
United States at the College of William and Mary. Wythe accepted the chair, and in this capacity 
worked to create a new academic discipline. Moving beyond the old apprenticeship methods, he 
established moot court and mock legislative exercises to accompany the more traditional 
lectures, tutorials, and, as before, supervised reading and abstracting of cases. By the time Wythe 
brought forth this new approach, Tucker had already graduated, but he would take up Wythe’s 
professorship in 1790. A war for independence had to be fought in the meantime. 
Tucker gained admission to the Virginia bar by 1775, but the burgeoning conflict with 
Britain made it impossible for him prosper as a lawyer at that time. He left for Bermuda in June 
of that year, vowing to return to Virginia eventually, perhaps after acquiring further legal 
education in England. Soon after arrival in the islands, Tucker discovered that his pro-American 
sympathies rendered him suspect in the eyes of the island’s governor. The governor had good 
reason to be skeptical of Tucker, for the young man soon became involved in a successful plot to 
ship the royal gunpowder stores from Bermuda to Virginia and South Carolina, netting himself a 
profit in the process. Once word arrived that the Chesapeake was again open to travelers, Tucker 
disembarked for Virginia, picking up some salt along the way, which he also managed to sell at 
                                                          
2 My portrait of Wythe is based on: M. E. Bradford, Founding Fathers: Brief Lives of the Framers of the 
United States Constitution, 2nd. ed., (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 157-161; Susan 
Godson, et. al, The College of William and Mary: A History (2 vols., Williamsburg: King and Queen 
Press, 1993), I:136; Robert Bevier Kirtland, George Wythe: Lawyer, Revolutionary, Judge (New York 
Garland, 1986); E. Lee Shepard, “George Wythe,” in W. Hamilton Bryson, ed., The Virginia Law 
Reporters Before 1880 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1977), 90-95. 
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profit. Inspired by his own performance, he began to make a career of smuggling indigo into the 
Caribbean where he traded it for arms to support the revolution.  
In 1777, Tucker married a young widow, Frances Bland Randolph, thereby joining the 
Virginia gentry, and beginning one of the Old Dominion’s most remarkable family dynasties. 
His wife had three children from a previous marriage, one of whom, John Randolph, would 
become one of the more controversial figures in the political history of Virginia.3 Tucker and his 
wife had six more children. As he would later recall, “[m]y life from the period of my marriage 
until the year 1781, was entirely domestic.”4 The domesticity ended in 1781 when Tucker 
abandoned his home life in order to join the Virginia militia. Beginning as a major of volunteers, 
he soon progressed to become a lieutenant colonel. A recent biographer argues that Tucker opted 
to join the militia for three reasons: for reputation, for adventure, and from a genuine belief that 
all men are free and independent by nature and that they therefore deserve a government based 
upon the recognition of this truth.5 
II. 
In his essay of 1796, entitled A Dissertation on Slavery: With a Proposal for the Gradual 
Abolition of It, in the State of Virginia, St. George Tucker attempted to understand slavery in the 
light of this truth. In doing so he inaugurated the academic discourse on the question of slavery 
                                                          
3 Randolph’s fame is perhaps exceeded by two of his early biographers: Henry Adams, John Randolph 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1882), and Russell Kirk, John Randolph of Roanoke: A Study in American 
Politics (1951; repr., Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1997). The standard contemporary biography is Robert 
Dawidoff, The Education of John Randolph (New York: Norton, 1979). 
 
4 SGT to Richard Rush, 27 Oct. 1813, in “Randolph and Tucker Letters,” 216. 
 
5 Hamilton, Making and Unmaking, 44. 
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and natural rights in Virginia.6 In this essay, Tucker made manifest his belief in the natural 
equality of man by appealing to the Declaration of Independence as an example of the American 
political philosophy. In this document Thomas Jefferson argued that “all men are created equal,” 
thereby making one of the most famous expressions of modern natural rights thought. This 
philosophy of natural rights does not, on the face of it, seem hospitable to slavery. Tucker and 
Jefferson both owned slaves, and they have both been accused, in their own era as well as in each 
succeeding one, of violating their own principles.7 These principles, however, have often been 
insufficiently appreciated or more generally misunderstood.  
Ancient and modern political philosophy begin with different premises about man and 
reach different conclusions about the proper role of authority in society. The most influential 
political philosophy of the modern era conceives of societal relations as being in a large part 
contractual; it posits man as originally existing in a “state of nature,” a state that humans leave in 
order to join society. The ancients, by contrast, viewed humans as incapable of developing 
properly outside of the city, and therefore argued that only beasts or gods could so live. The 
ancients would say that insofar as there could be such a thing as a state of nature, it would be 
humans existing to their full potentiality inside the city. At the base of this distinction lies the 
choice between wisdom and consent. According to the modern view, consent must take 
precedence over wisdom, but for the ancients, wisdom took precedence over consent. Both sides 
                                                          
6 SGT, A Dissertation on Slavery: With a Proposal for the Gradual Abolition of It, in the State of Virginia 
(Philadelphia: Matthew Carey, 1796); repr. in Clyde Wilson ed., View of the Constitution of the United 
States: With Selected Writings (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999), 402-446. 
 
7 Essential works in this tradition include: Robert McColley, Slavery and Jeffersonian Virginia (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1964); Winthrop Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the 
Negro, 1550-1812 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968), 429-81; John Chester Miller, 
The Wolf by the Ears: Thomas Jefferson and Slavery (New York: Free Press, 1977); Paul Finkelman, 
“Thomas Jefferson and Antislavery: The Myth Goes on,” Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 
CII (1994): 193-228. 
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have their advantages: no one wants to be ruled against one’s consent, just as no one wishes to be 
ruled by a fool. The issue of what the Virginia professoriate conceived of as wisdom functions as 
a sort of pivot in the general transformation of their political thought.8  
Neither Thomas Jefferson nor St. George Tucker invented the modern conception of 
natural rights. The first premise of such a conception, the idea of a state of nature, has its own 
peculiar history. Thomas Hobbes, an English philosopher who published all his works in the 
seventeenth century, was the first to employ the idea of a pre-social state of nature as a major 
premise in an extended philosophical argument. As a monarchist and thorough-going 
reactionary, it is ironic that Hobbes would originate what would later become the founding 
premise of so much revolutionary thought. He used his state of nature idea in an effort to 
convince his readers of the natural equality of man: nature makes all men equal, thus all the 
inequalities that exist in the world, including those of  “wealth, power, and nobility of birth,” 
must be the creation of  “civil law.” In an example of the startling honesty that pervades his 
writings, Hobbes states that he has arrived at this understanding of man’s “natural state” by 
looking at humans as if  “they had just emerged from the earth like mushrooms and grown up 
without any obligation to each other….” Of course, this is not the way that humans come into the 
world, but Hobbes rather impatiently told his readers to forget all that they know on this score.9  
 Hobbes asked his readers to conceive a world in which equality consisted fundamentally 
at the level of life and death. Counseling them to imagine “how easy it is for even the weakest 
individual to kill someone stronger than himself,” Hobbes noted that even the strongest and most  
                                                          
8 Aristotle, The Politics, trans. Carnes Lord, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 1253a2-5; Leo 
Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 140-141. 
 
9 Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen, trans. and ed., Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 22, 102. 
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skilled warriors could be surprised and murdered in their sleep. In setting forth this argument, 
Hobbes began with a rather restricted notion of natural equality, one based upon nothing more 
than any individual’s ability to kill another individual. According to this interpretation, the 
natural state of man is a state of war, “and not simply war, but a war of every man against every 
man.” Since the contestants in this war are equal, it “cannot be brought to an end by victory” and 
it is thus perpetual. Branding those unwilling to follow his argument as disturbers of the peace, 
Hobbes set forth his thesis: “If then men are equal by nature, we must recognize their equality; if 
they are unequal, since they will struggle for power, the pursuit of peace requires that they be 
regarded as equal.” Like a schoolteacher dealing with recalcitrant students, Hobbes reiterates his 
lesson: “everyone should be considered equal to everyone. Contrary to this law is PRIDE.” Thus 
he quickly moved from his restricted notion of equality to one embracing equality as a general 
principle.10 
In putting the necessity of self-preservation at the center of his conception of what  
he called “natural law,” Hobbes made a radical break with traditional political philosophy. Both 
ancient philosophers (with their conception of natural right) and medieval philosophers (with 
their conception of natural law) based their philosophy upon an ideal of human flourishing. Both 
traditions posited a telos, or a goal for man. What is a telos? The simplest explanation would be 
an example: an oak tree is the telos of an acorn. The development of man to his full potential, 
indeed the perfection of man, represents the telos of man. The ancient philosophers believed man 
to be a reasoning, indeed a philosophizing being, and they argued that the perfection of man must 
be found in this direction. They knew that such a creature could not arise outside of an organized 
society. This ancient conception influenced the medieval philosophers, who set their goal even 
                                                          
10 Ibid., 26-30, 50. 
 
 13
higher, by viewing man as the image of God. Hobbes, in the words of one prominent scholar, 
“tried to maintain the idea of natural law but to divorce it from the idea of man’s perfection.” 
Hobbes started with a project of radical skepticism, a position from which he could doubt all 
received truths. Then, using reason, he attempted to construct the world anew. The unmoved 
mover in Hobbes’s philosophy is the necessity of self-preservation. In Hobbes’s philosophy, 
“[d]eath takes the place of the telos.”11  
Knowing that his chief enemies would be those who side with traditional philosophers, 
Hobbes moved to attack the greatest and most influential of their number: Aristotle. Aristotle 
argued that outside of society man could not develop to his full capacity, and that, therefore, man 
was by nature a political animal. Hobbes disagreed, accusing the Greek of having a “superficial 
view of human nature.” Men do no seek out the company of other men because nature tells them 
to, “but by chance.” Men do not care about friends, but only about the “honor or advantage” that 
can be accrued from them. According to Hobbes, friendships all take place because people 
pursue other people for ends: for business deals, for political deals, or for the pleasure of making 
fun of members of an out group. Hobbes did not think that philosophers were any different from 
anyone else in this regard; their pleasures, like the pleasures of everyone else, were related either 
to glory, or to physical sensations. He defined glory as “a good opinion of oneself,” and physical 
sensations as mere sensuality.12 
According to Hobbes, in a conflict between the wise and the strong, the strong usually 
win. In his universe strength triumphs over wisdom. Here again Hobbes went against Aristotle 
who believed that wisdom represented a title to rule, and that nature dictated rule by the wise. 
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This difference marked the fundamental conflict between ancient and modern views of political 
science. According to the modern view, consent must take precedence over wisdom, but for the 
ancients wisdom took precedence over consent. Disagreeing with Aristotle, Hobbes found 
wisdom to be a poor criterion for leadership: “I know that in the first book of The Politics, 
Aristotle asserts as a foundation of all political knowledge that some men have been made by 
nature worthy to rule, others to serve, as if master and slave were distinguished not by agreement 
among men, but by natural aptitude, i. e. by their knowledge or ignorance.” Hobbes labels this 
argument as “not only against reason but contrary to experience. For hardly anyone is so 
naturally stupid that he does not think it better to rule himself than to let others rule him.”13  
Hobbes delineated three ways by which one person could acquire dominion over another: 
through a consensual agreement made in the interest of common defense; through capture in war, 
whereby, fearing the inability to fight further, one makes an agreement to serve in order to avoid 
death; and finally, “by generation,” such as the right that parents have over their children. Not 
every captive of war agrees to become a slave. Their captor can then either kill them or keep 
them bound and in chains. Such a captive would never have an opportunity to strike at their 
captor or run away. Hobbes called this kind of slave the “workhouse” slave. He focused less on 
this variety of slavery, and more on one in which the master trusts the slave sufficiently to give 
him enough physical liberty to enable not only running away, but even the potential to murder 
his master. Hobbes argued that this variety of slave had consented to his slavery. Workhouse 
slaves, by contrast, only labored in order to avoid beatings, not on the basis of an agreement.14  
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Hobbes’s argument for the master’s power over the slave represents a microcosm of his 
argument for the dominion of a king over his subjects. As Hobbes conceives it, a king’s realm 
can come in any size, for “to be a King is simply to have dominion over many persons, and thus 
a kingdom is a large family, and a family is a little kingdom.” A king earns his sovereignty 
because he provides security, and this security leads men to congregate, for without it they revert 
to a state of nature. Finding security impossible except through penalties, Hobbes thought 
agreements alone to be insufficient. In Hobbesian terms the king has the right to punish. Indeed, 
his very sovereignty comes into being when a group of subjects agreed to side with him against 
the person who breaks his codes.15  
According to Hobbes, the sovereign makes the laws, thereby deciding the difference 
between right and wrong. Theft, murder, adultery —none of these are crimes in the abstract: they 
only become crimes when the sovereign declares them to be such. As sovereign, the king should 
invent laws for everyone, making them openly visible, “so that each man may know by them 
what he should call his own and what another’s, what he should call just and unjust, honorable 
and dishonorable, good and bad; in summary, what he should do and what he should avoid doing 
in social life.”16  
Anticipating those critics who find the delegation of absolute power unsavory, Hobbes 
asserted that all founders of commonwealths, even those who instituted limited commonwealths, 
possessed this power. In every commonwealth, some person or group of persons must have 
power “which is to be limited only by the strength of the commonwealth and not by anything 
else.” The power of the sovereign, whether slaveholder or king, can only be limited by someone 
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with a greater power, for “the one that sets the limits must have greater power than the one 
restrained by limits.” Thus the master can do no wrong to the slave, for the slave has submitted 
to the master’s will, and therefore, whatever the master does, he does with the consent of his 
slaves, “and no wrong can be done to one who consents to it.” The case of the “workhouse slave” 
is somewhat different, and Hobbes gave him the right to revolt against his master to whatever 
extent he finds available. Yet slaves of either class could possess no property if their master did 
not want them to do so. Hobbes thus compared slaves to the citizens of a commonwealth, who 
can possess no property against the will of the commonwealth.17  
In the Hobbesian discourse, the defense of slavery depends upon the master’s need to 
protect himself from violent death, and the slave’s implied consent not to murder his master. 
Without recourse to the fear of violent death, it would be impossible for a strict Hobbesian to 
defend the practice of slavery. The reality of slave revolts made possible the creation of a 
proslavery argument within the Hobbesian tradition. The person wishing to defend slavery could 
make rhetorical appeals to equality, but then refuse emancipation on the grounds that such action 
would lead to the death of the emancipator. Nearly all proslavery arguments in the modern 
natural rights tradition resort to this technique. There are, however, thanks to the emendations to 
the Hobbesian philosophy made by another English philosopher, John Locke, other ways of 
defending slavery from within the modern natural rights tradition.  
III. 
A Hobbesian wolf in sheep’s clothing, Locke made changes that covered over the fundamental 
radicalism of Hobbesian thought. He spoke of natural law as if he meant the tradition of natural 
law that had existed before Hobbes, but a close examination reveals that Locke based his 
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philosophy on Hobbesian principles. Locke refused to mention Hobbes, but he continually 
referred to “the judicious Hooker,” thereby implying that he approved of the philosophy of 
Richard Hooker, another English philosopher. Hooker (1553-1600) was an important 
conservative thinker who opposed the attempt made by some early Protestants to strip the 
tradition of reason and natural law out of Christianity in favor of a religion based solely upon the 
Bible.18 Hooker’s conception of natural law built upon a tradition going back to the ancients. In 
taking up the state of nature as fundamental premise, Locke sided with Hobbes against this 
tradition. Locke did, however, make some changes to Hobbes’s concept. He began a process of 
historicizing the state of nature, that is to say, of acting as if such a state had actually existed in 
the past and could be returned to at any time.19  
Locke began his presentation by depicting the state of nature as somehow Edenic, with 
peace and plenty available to all, but this pleasant veneer quickly fell away as he  
progressed, until one notices only superficial differences between the Hobbesian and the 
Lockean state of nature. Locke appealed to the goodness of the state of nature because he 
believed in a right of revolution. According to Locke’s articulation of this right, the people 
should overthrow despotic rulers, even though doing so would throw society back into the state 
of nature. The people would then remain in a state of nature until they formed a new 
government.20  
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If one only takes into consideration what Locke explicitly said about slavery, he does not 
seem to say anything different than what Hobbes had said. Like Hobbes before him and Jefferson 
after him, Locke seems to have been rather conflicted in his opinion of slavery. For instance, the 
opening line of the first of Locke’s Two Treatises of Government reads: “Slavery is so vile and 
miserable an estate of man, and so directly opposite to the generous temper and courage of our 
nation, that ‘tis hardly to be conceived, that an Englishman, much less a Gentleman, should plead 
for’t.” These sentiments seem directly opposed to the provision Locke inserted into the 
Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina that he wrote for the Lords Proprietors of that colony: 
“Every freeman of Carolina shall have absolute power and authority over his negro slaves, of 
what opinion or religion soever.”21  
In the second of his Two Treatises, Locke followed Hobbes in arguing that a state of 
nature exists between the master and his slave. Based upon this premise, Locke stated that a 
slave had a right to disobey his master, even if such disobedience would compel his master to kill 
him. Following Hobbes’s distinction between the workhouse slave and the slave with whom the 
master has an implicit agreement, Locke stated: “if once compact enter between them, and [they] 
make an agreement for a limited power on the one side, and obedience on the other, the state of 
war and slavery ceases, as long as the compact endures.”22 
Defenders of slavery did not quote what Locke explicitly said about slavery. Instead they 
drew out the implications of a radical innovation in Locke’s political thought: his 
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conceptualization of property rights. Some scholars see a semblance of law and duty in Locke’s 
version of the state of nature, particularly concerning property.23 Locke originated a labor theory 
of value, according to which objects draw their value from the work one does to them, not from 
any intrinsic value that an object possesses. Deducing from this premise a natural right to 
property, and believing that the sovereign cannot take property away from a subject without the 
consent of that subject, Locke broke with Hobbes.  
The earlier thinker had argued that without the command of the sovereign there could be 
no such thing as property, or even any such thing as right and wrong. Locke stayed within the 
Hobbesian tradition insofar as he gave the sovereign the right of life or death over his subjects, 
but he refused to give the sovereign the right to take a subject’s property without the subject’s 
consent. For instance, Locke stated that though an officer may have the right of life or death over 
his men, he could not take even a single penny from them. Locke asserted that the right to self-
preservation must not infringe on property rights. For instance, a person has a right to kill an 
attacking robber, but no right to take the robber’s money and send him on his way.24  
With Locke it became possible to defend slavery on the grounds that abolition would lead 
not simply to a loss of life, but to a loss of property. Locke’s theories concerning property 
thereby added another tool to the repertoire of the proslavery theorist. As one scholar has pointed 
out, this combination of natural equality and property rights contained “an uncomfortably large 
opening for slavery.” Already with Hobbes, the slave owner could limit justice by appeals to the 
necessity of self-preservation, but Locke’s political philosophy made it possible “for self-
preservation to be defined as self-interest, and for self-interest to be defined as what is 
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convenient and achievable.” Thus, the American planter went from keeping his slaves in 
bondage from fear that if he set them free they would kill him, to keeping his slaves in bondage 
“in order to protect his plantation, his children’s patrimony, his flexibility of action, on which his 
preservation ultimately depends….” Finally the slave-owner could go so far as to decide “that he 
is entitled to keep his slaves in bondage if he finds it convenient to do so.” According to this 
reading of Lockean principles, the defense of slavery in the United States was “a radicalization 
of the principle of individual liberty on which the American polity was founded.”25   
Although Locke’s teaching concerning private property made possible a defense  
of slavery based upon more than just a simple fear of violent death, without such a fear the 
believer in modern natural rights generally opposed slavery. The philosophy of Thomas 
Jefferson demonstrates this principle in action. Jefferson further altered the natural rights 
philosophy of Hobbes and Locke. Disagreeing with Hobbes’s idea that morality exists by 
convention only, Jefferson argued that human beings possess an inherent moral sense. This sense 
differs in strength from individual to individual, but Jefferson believed that all people shared it to 
some degree. On the basis of this principle, he thought that the best way to instill morality in 
young people would be to cultivate their natural sentiments. In giving educational advice to a 
young man, Jefferson suggested that he avoid lectures in moral philosophy as a waste of time. A 
“ploughman” can confront moral issues with as much if not greater facility than can a 
“professor,” because “he has not been led astray by artificial rules.” Jefferson thought young 
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people would be better off simply by reading good novels, “because they will encourage as well 
as direct your feelings.”26 
Thomas Jefferson altered Locke’s philosophy as well. Jefferson believed that the rights 
that Locke claimed existed in the state of nature should continue to exist civil society. For 
Jefferson, natural rights had become civil rights. Scholars have had some difficulty in 
determining what specific rights Jefferson believed fell under this heading, but it certainly 
included those enumerated in the Declaration of Independence: life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness. In addition, Jefferson probably would have included those rights he emphasized in his 
A Summary View of the Rights of British America: the right of expatriation, the right of religious 
freedom, and the right to the fruits of one’s own labor.27 
 In those instances where the issue of self-preservation did not easily present itself, 
Jefferson’s opinions were uniformly antislavery. For instance, in his Notes on the State of 
Virginia, Jefferson seemed especially concerned with the deleterious effect of slavery upon the 
master. He voiced his thesis right away: “There must doubtless be an unhappy influence on the 
manners of our people produced by the existence of slavery among us.” Finding the relation 
between slave and master to be “a perpetual exercise of the most boisterous passions,” Jefferson 
asserted that passions are an unsuitable centerpiece for a young master’s education. He feared 
that a young man in such a situation would learn that he need not control his passions when in 
the company of slaves: “The parent storms, the child looks on, catches the lineaments of wrath, 
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puts on the same airs in the circle of smaller slaves, gives loose to his worst passions, and thus 
nursed, educated, and daily exercised in tyranny, cannot but be stamped by it with odious 
peculiarities.” According to this interpretation, slavery destroys the morality of the white 
population. Only a “prodigy” could “retain his manners and morals undepraved by such 
circumstances.”28  
For Jefferson, the injustice of slavery made it impossible for God to side with the master 
against the slave. Given the number of slaves in Virginia, Jefferson conceived the possibility that 
the slaves could be brought to rule the masters. Indeed, he believed that such an event would 
become “probable” if one took into account “supernatural interference….” Jefferson could not 
but “tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just.”29 He feared an uprising among his 
slaves that would put them into a position of leadership. Until he arrived at this fear of slave 
insurrection, Jefferson had no means by which to justify slavery. For most of the eighteenth 
century, western intellectuals such as Jefferson were in favor of modern natural rights theory. 
This consensus, coupled with the lack of any large–scale slave uprisings, assured that well-read 
southerners thought of slavery in a manner comparable to Jefferson. The revolution in Saint 
Domingue changed this consensus.  
Saint Domingue was the French name for the western part of Hispaniola, the first island 
in the new world explored by Columbus. It became a French possession in 1697. By 1789, the 
island had become the single most important colonial endeavor for France, encompassing nearly 
two-thirds of that nation’s foreign investments. The island produced all the staples one would 
expect from a slave-driven colonial economy: sugar primarily, but also coffee, cotton, and 
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indigo. It had a population consisting of 500,000 slaves, 32,000 whites, and 24,000 freed blacks. 
In 1791, the slaves of Saint Domingue revolted, and shut down the colony. In 1794, in an attempt 
to keep the colony under French control, the Revolutionary Assembly in Paris abolished slavery 
in all its dominions. One year later, the Spanish ceded their portion of the island to France. The 
French then spent the next ten years trying to keep the area under control, as a succession of 
former slaves plotted to overthrow their rule and murder the white inhabitants.30  
In 1801, the British allowed Napoleon to try to recapture the island, but his force 
withdrew after two years. The attempt to maintain French rule of Saint Domingue had been a 
dismal failure. As summarized by one historian: “Since 1791, some 70,000 European soldiers 
and seamen had died in the attempt to maintain slavery. Of the few thousand whites who 
optimistically stayed behind, most died in a series of massacres in the following months.” Many 
of these 70,000 Europeans died of tropical diseases, but this fact did not lessen the psychological 
terror the revolt had upon slave owners in Virginia and elsewhere in the new world. In all, 
thousands of white lives had been lost, and millions of dollars in investments liquidated. With 
the white people gone, the blacks turned on the mulattoes, and murdered thousands of them as 
well. Saint Domingue no longer existed; now that part of the island would be known by the name 
its aboriginal inhabitants used: Haiti.31  
For years to come, Virginia slaveowners viewed the creation of Haiti as their worst 
nightmare. As only the second colonial possession in the Americas to declare its independence, 
Haiti had a claim to be working from the precedent established by the United States. Indeed, 
                                                          
30 David Geggus, “The Haitian Revolution,” in Franklin W. Knight and Colin A. Palmer, eds., The 
Modern Caribbean (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 21-50.  
 
31 Ibid., 47; Carolyn E. Fick, The Making of Haiti: The Saint Domingue Revolution from Below 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1990). 
 
 24
some of the leaders of the revolt were free blacks who had acquired their first military experience 
as soldiers under French command in Georgia during the American Revolution.32 Virginian 
slaveholders generally did not see things this way; they interpreted the activities in Saint 
Domingue as a simple slave revolt. Yet even in this capacity, the events that made Haiti had set 
their own precedent.  
One historian has identified the creation of Haiti as the first “non-restorationist” of the 
slave revolts in the New World. By this characterization, Eugene Genovese meant that all 
previous revolts had as their aim the attempt to return to a way of life the slaves had known in 
Africa, one in which the conception of society and individual freedom resembled that of 
traditional societies throughout history. According to this interpretation, the French Revolution 
set the precedent for the Haitian Revolution; it gave the slaves of the New World an example of a 
struggle for the new individualistic freedom that had, in much of Europe and America, replaced 
the older community-based form of freedom.33 Southern thinkers of the 1850’s would have 
disagreed with this interpretation, arguing instead, as did one antebellum law professor, that “the 
mock empire of Hayti, the subject of ridicule and regret, is but a transfer of an African despotism 
from Ethiopia to the West Indies.”34 
 The uprising that made Haiti, perhaps more than any other event of its time, forced the 
southern slaveholder to take sides on the issue of slavery, but it also, ironically, gave strength to 
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proslavery arguments in the tradition of modern natural rights. Thousands of white masters lost 
their lives at the hands of their slaves. Thus it became possible for Virginian slaveowners to 
equate emancipation with violent death, and thereby to declare emancipation and self-
preservation as mutually exclusive possibilities. Not surprisingly, Haiti became a constant trope 
in discussions of slavery from the end of the eighteenth century onwards.35  
IV. 
St. George Tucker’s Dissertation on Slavery, illustrates the moment in time when the pressures 
of the ongoing events in Saint Domingue interacted with Lockean natural rights arguments to 
give the proslavery argument a new character. In 1795, Tucker began preparing for the essay by 
corresponding with Dr. Jeremy Belknap of the Massachusetts Historical Society. Tucker hoped 
that Belknap could tell him how that state managed the peaceful abolition of slavery.  
In his opening letter, Tucker compared slavery to leprosy: Virginians had inherited it, and 
there was not much that they could do about it. He attached a series of eleven questions 
concerning slavery in Massachusetts, which can be summarized in the following way: When was 
slavery introduced? Were slaves imported directly from Africa? Who brought them, Europeans 
or Americans? When the state had slavery what was the condition of the slaves?  How was 
slavery abolished? When was this abolition complete? Are the freed slaves flourishing?  Do they 
at present have full political rights? Do they behave morally? Are there many intermarriages 
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between whites and blacks, and if so, “are such alliances more frequent between black men and 
white women, or the contrary?” Is there general harmony and intercourse between the races? 36 
Dr. Belknap distributed these questions among a number of prominent correspondents, 
and used their responses to draft a reply to Tucker’s query. The correspondents all seemed to 
latch on to one or another question, rarely answering them all. Among the various 
correspondents, however, a general consensus existed that Massachusetts never became a 
primary destination of the Atlantic slave trade, and that the slaves who did enter the colony 
probably came from Barbados or from Rhode Island. Some noted that the form of slavery 
practiced in Massachusetts had generally been rather mild. Most correspondents agreed that a 
general harmony pervaded relations between the races both before and after emancipation, but 
one correspondent singled out an exception: “We seldom have contentions, except in houses of 
ill-fame, where some very depraved white females get among the blacks. This has issued in the 
pulling down such houses at times, and caused several actions at Justices’ Courts these two years 
past.”  Another correspondent noted that intermarriages seldom occurred, but when they did they 
were usually between white women and black men. Most agreed that the end of slavery came not 
with a formal decree, but with the interpretation —or in the view of one correspondent, the 
“misconstruction”— of the 1780 constitution with its declaration that: “‘All men are born free 
and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights, among which may be 
reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties.’”37  
 One of the briefest and most remarkable responses came from John Adams. The future 
president began by saying that he had not given much thought to the issue of slavery, other than 
                                                          
36 SGT to Dr. Jeremy Belknap, 24 Jan. 1795, in “Letters and Documents Relating to Slavery in 
Massachusetts,” Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society III (1877): 375-431. 
 
37 Ibid., 383, 390. 
 27
being involved in a few cases before the Revolution in which black people had sued for their 
freedom. He noted that in those days the slaves used arguments “arising from the rights of 
mankind,” just as they did at present. Adams never found such arguments persuasive, for he 
believed “the real cause” driving abolition came from “the multiplication of labouring white 
people, who would no longer suffer the rich to employ these sable rivals so much to their injury.” 
Adams found the same basic forces operating to keep “negro slavery out of France, England and 
other parts of Europe.” Abolition, according to Adams, arose not from natural rights arguments, 
but from white populist rage: “The common people would not suffer the labour, by which alone 
they could obtain subsistence, to be done by slaves. If the gentlemen had been permitted by law 
to hold slaves, the common white people would have put the negroes to death, and their masters 
too, perhaps.” According to Adams, the freed blacks possessed moral and social norms 
comparable to those demonstrated by “the lowest order” of poor whites. Adams seems to have 
harbored some bitterness toward the white working class for ruining the slaves of Massachusetts: 
“Their scoffs and insults, their continual insinuations, filled the negroes with discontent, made 
them lazy, idle, proud, vicious and at length wholly useless to their masters, to such a degree that 
the abolition of slavery became a measure of economy.”38 
 In preparing a report for Tucker, Dr. Belknap synthesized the various responses he 
received from his correspondents. Tucker’s letter thanking Belknap for this report contains a 
summary of many of the points that he would soon make in his essay. Arguing that the British 
had forced the Atlantic slave trade on Virginia, and that Massachusetts had been fortunate to 
escape such a curse, Tucker referred to the Belknap’s state as “your country.” Tucker marveled 
at Massachusetts’ luck in having a mixture of natural, political and moral causes that made 
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abolition possible. Specifically addressing the sorts of lower-class prejudices mentioned by 
Adams, Tucker noted that those views had a very different effect in Virginia: “With us, on the 
contrary, climate, a baneful policy, and a different operation of the same prejudice which 
prevented its growth in Massachusetts, have combined to cherish an evil which is now so 
thoroughly incorporated in our constitution as to render ineffectual, I fear, every attempt to 
eradicate it, and to make it doubtful whether even palliatives may not operate to increase our 
distemper.”39  
Tucker saw Virginia as having two choices, both of which could lead to disaster. She 
could “persist in the now perhaps unavoidable course entailed upon us by our ancestors, or, 
copying after the liberal sentiments of the national convention of France, endeavor to do justice 
to the rights of human nature, and to banish deep-rooted, nay, almost innate prejudices.” Tucker 
feared that the fate of Saint Domingue awaited Virginia no matter which of the two courses she 
choose. He did not think that his countrymen would accept emancipation unless it could be 
coupled with colonization, and he saw colonization as too expensive. The best Virginians could 
hope to do, would be to ameliorate the condition of the slaves, and indeed, he noted that much 
progress had been made in liberalizing the slave code.40 
 Five months later, Tucker wrote to Belknap again, only this time he had a plan of 
abolition that he thought his fellow Virginians might be willing to accept. By proposing a course 
of action that worked at a glacial pace, Tucker hoped that he could convince the world “that the 
existence of slavery in this country is no longer to be deemed a reproach to the present 
generation.” The plan proposed in his letter is fundamentally the same as that Tucker inserted in 
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his Dissertation on Slavery, which he published a few months later. Although the Dissertation 
contained this abolition plan at the very end, fundamentally the essay defended slavery within a 
Lockean framework, driven by a fear for the safety of Virginia’s slaveowners sparked by the 
ongoing events in Saint Domingue.  
Beginning his essay with a premise frequently revisited by historians re-examining the 
conduct of the founding fathers, Tucker sought “to demonstrate the incompatibility of a state of 
slavery with the principles of our government, and of that revolution upon which it was 
founded….” He argued that the Englishmen who settled Virginia, “brought not with them any 
prototype of that slavery which has been established among us.” Distinguishing between political 
slavery and civil slavery, Tucker argued that in the former category the entire state may be under 
the rule of another, but the individual remains free, while the latter exists wherever “there is an 
inequality of rights, or privileges, between the subjects or citizens of the same state….”41  
According to Tucker, the liberalization of the slave codes demonstrated that progress in 
attitudes towards black people could be made. He pointed out that it was no longer legal to kill a 
slave while punishing him, or even when attempting to capture a runaway. Tucker seemed rather 
sardonic in his treatment of sexual relations between the races. Arguing that the aforementioned 
legal changes manifest the “dawn of humanity” in Virginia, Tucker still saw “dismemberment” 
as a fit punishment for any black man who attempted to rape a white woman. He noted that while 
intermarriage between whites and blacks was forbidden in Virginia, the white person officiating 
the marriage, and the white partner in the union were both subject to arrest and imprisonment, 
while no punishments were mandated for the African. Tucker noted that this example was the 
only one “in which our laws will be found more favorable to a negro than a white person.” He 
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then detailed the numerous ways in which the laws discriminated against black people, ending 
with a list of actions that were not criminal for a white person but which were for a slave. Tucker 
concluded that the “laws of nature have been set aside in favour of institutions, the pure result of 
prejudice, usurpation and tyranny.”42 
After this rhetorical plea to the laws of nature, Tucker surveyed the black population of  
Virginia. He found 300,000 slaves encompassing about two-fifths of the state’s population. He 
believed that Virginians had their doubts about the importation of so many Africans: they tried, 
while still under British rule, to get the king to tax the importation of slaves. Later, in 1772, the 
House of Burgesses begged the crown to let them block the further importation of slaves and 
were similarly unsuccessful. In Tucker’s mind, stopping the importation of slaves was “an object 
sufficient of itself to justify a revolution.” Confidently asserting that the Virginia legislature 
made sincere efforts to stop the slave trade, Tucker believed that anyone who knew the facts of 
the story would resist calling Virginians hypocrites.43  
Like a true Jeffersonian, Tucker enumerated three primary divisions of civil rights: “the 
right of personal security; the right of personal liberty; and the right of private property.” He 
believed that slavery abolished the latter two of these rights, and that slavery was therefore 
“perfectly irreconcilable … to the principles of a democracy, which form the basis and 
foundation of our government.” He therefore found it impossible to justify the enslavement of 
black people “unless we first degrade them below the rank of human beings, not only politically, 
but also physically and morally.” Unwilling to take this step, Tucker argued that the time had 
come to “admit the evidence of moral truth….” Virginians needed to “learn to regard them as our 
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fellow men, and equals, except in those particulars where accident, or perhaps nature, may have 
given us some advantage; a recompense for which they perhaps enjoy in other respects.” This 
assertion of modern natural rights seems a singularly inauspicious ground from which to defend 
slavery, but by employing the two loopholes established by Hobbes and Locke, as well as a 
number of his own innovations, Tucker managed to do just that.  
He began with an appeal to the right of self-preservation. The “recent history of the 
French West Indies,” indicated that mass abolition would be disastrous. Employing the 
information he acquired in his correspondence with members of the Massachusetts Historical 
Society, Tucker noted that mass abolition had only been successful in those states with a low 
ratio of slaves to freemen. According to Tucker, the ratio of slaves to freeman in the states south 
of Delaware was simply too high; in some districts “it is probable that there are four slaves for 
one free white man.” Under such conditions the consequence of mass emancipation, according to 
the Virginian, would be famine or worse.44  
Tucker then moved onto ground opened up by Locke’s theory of property. Noting that a 
“great part of the property of individuals consists in slaves,” Tucker strained to come up with an 
emancipation plan that would not impinge upon the property rights of Virginia slave owners. He 
employed the Lockean conception of property rights coupled with the general emphasis upon 
consent employed by all modern natural rights thinkers. The state sanctioned the ownership of 
this form of property, and Tucker wondered whether the laws could be changed without 
considering the consent of the slave owners. Believing that few masters would wish to give up 
their slaves without being paid a “just compensation,” Tucker wondered if the state could find 
money to pay them. He doubted that any political class in Virginia would agree to be taxed in 
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order to reimburse slaveowners. Moreover, he believed that creditors who loaned money “upon 
the faith of this visible property” would consider themselves defrauded. The laws of society 
should conform to the laws of nature, but in this case a compromise would be necessary: “If 
justice demands the emancipation of the slave, she also, under these circumstances, seems to 
plead for the owner and for his creditor.” Tucker believed that he had an abolition plan that “may 
be effected without the emancipation of a single slave; without depriving any man of the 
property which he possess, and without defrauding a creditor who has trusted him on the faith of 
that property.” Attempting to follow in the tradition of gradual emancipation plans established in 
New York and Pennsylvania, Tucker proposed a slow-working plan, one which would take over 
a hundred years for the last slave in Virginia to be freed.45 
This plan would deny freed blacks their basic civil liberties. To justify such an action, 
Tucker again referred to Saint Domingue. He argued that the “recent scenes transacted” there 
“are enough to make one shudder with the apprehension of realizing similar calamities in this 
country.” Any attempt to “smother those prejudices which have been cherished for a period of 
almost two centuries” would lead to a similar upheaval in Virginia, according to Tucker. Again 
taking recourse to modern natural rights philosophy, he argued that men entering “into a state of 
society,” have a right to “admit or exclude” anyone on based upon whatever criteria they wish. 
Thus he found it consonant with natural rights to deny freed slaves the basic rights of citizens. 
Besides, the manumission made in Virginia thus far indicated that, “the emancipated blacks are 
not ambitious of civil rights.” Finding it impossible to propose a plan of emancipation that did 
not “either encounter, or accommodate itself to prejudice,” Tucker proposed a middle course 
between two extremes. Namely, a course that  would negotiate “between the tyrannical and 
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iniquitous policy which holds so many human creatures in a state of grievous bondage,” and one 
that would “turn loose a numerous, starving, and enraged banditti, upon the innocent descendants 
of their former oppressors.”46 
Tucker noted that the British Crown never would have permitted abolition, and that after 
the revolution, abolition would have been unthinkable until “our newly established governments 
had been found capable of supporting the fabric itself, under any shock, which so arduous an 
attempt might have produced.” Now that Virginia had escaped from under the British yoke and 
established a stable government of her own, however, the time had arrived to consider abolition. 
Tucker believed in the “necessity of eradicating the evil, before it becomes impossible to do it, 
without tearing up the roots of civil society with it.”  Tucker noted that Virginia had, in 1782, 
adopted a law removing the old restrictions against emancipation. He believed that in the fifteen 
years since the passage of that act, nearly ten thousand slaves had been given their freedom. He 
noted that Virginians, like the ancient Romans before them, had refused to give freed slaves the 
rights of citizenship. Tucker thought that even without the rights of a freeman, the slave would 
be better off than before: with freedom, the former slave had freedom of movement, and he could 
therefore decide whether to “submit to that civil inferiority, inseparably attached to his condition 
in this country, or seek some more favorable climate, where all distinctions between men are 
either totally abolished, or less regarded than this.”47  
With these considerations in mind, Tucker put forth a plan calling for the freedom of all 
slave women who had reached the age of twenty-eight years. These women would transmit their 
freedom to all their children born after that twenty-eighth year. Those born prior to that that time 
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would themselves be bound to service for twenty-eight years. The plan provided for “freedom 
dues” to be awarded to all slaves reaching the age of maturity. These dues would consist of 
twenty dollars, two suits of clothes, and two blankets. The plan also deprived freed blacks of all 
basic civil liberties: the right to keep weapons, to serve on juries, to testify against or marry 
white people, or even to write a will. Tucker hoped that by restricting the civil liberties of freed 
slaves he might encourage them to leave the state. “There is an immense unsettled territory on 
this continent more congenial to their natural constitutions than ours, where they may perhaps be 
received upon more favorable terms than we can permit them to remain with us.”48  
Tucker correctly predicted that the real challenge to his plan would come not from the 
slaves themselves, but from the white slaveowners of Virginia. These men believed in their 
natural right to property, but “shut their ears against this moral truth, that all men are by nature 
free and equal….” The Virginian also adhered to the idea of property rights, but he doubted that 
the slave owner had such a right to an unborn child; besides, he argued, the planter would get at 
least fourteen years of good labor out of every slave born on his plantation. Tucker thought that 
those skeptical of abolition plans would be surprised with his plan. They would be surprised to 
learn that under it “the number of slaves will not be diminished for forty years after it takes 
place; that it will even increase for thirty years; that at the distance of sixty years, there will be 
one-third of the number at its first commencement; that it will require above a century to 
complete it; and that the number of blacks under twenty-eight, and consequently bound to 
service, in the families they are born in, will always be at least as great, as the present number of 
slaves.”49  
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Tucker submitted a copy of his essay to each of the two houses of the Virginia 
legislature. He described the reception it received: “In the House of Delegates, a motion was 
made to send the letter and its enclosure back to the author, which produced, I believe, a warm 
debate, which ended with their being suffered to lie on the table.” The Senate, having no power 
to propose legislation, saw the essay as less of a threat, and responded with a polite letter noting 
that they had received it. Tucker saw “mistaken self-interest and prejudice” as his primary 
enemies, and he tried “to elude, rather than invite, their attacks.”50 The effort had failed; his 
essay remained virtually unknown. “Nobody, I believe has read it; nobody could explain its 
contents.” Even if they had read it, Tucker doubted that anyone in the Assembly would have 
been willing to take a stand on its behalf. That body was “split into factions, debating upon 
federal politics, and neither side probably wished to weaken its own influence by a division of 
sentiment among its partisans on any point whatever.”51  
Tucker also sent a copy of the Dissertation to Thomas Jefferson. The future president 
agreed with Tucker both as to the means of emancipation as well as to the urgency of the 
question. According to Jefferson, history would decide the question of emancipation for itself, 
regardless of the answer given by the slaveowners. “Perhaps the first chapter of this history, 
which has begun in St. Domingo, and the next succeeding one which will recount how all the 
whites were driven from the other islands, may prepare our minds for a peaceable 
accommodation between justice, policy and necessity, and furnish an answer to the difficult 
question: whither shall the coloured emigrants go?” According to Jefferson, the consequences of 
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failing to plan for emancipation would be disastrous: “if something is not done, and soon done, 
we shall be the murderers of our own children.” The future president saw all of America and 
Europe as ripe for insurrection, but he noted that only the southern states had to concern 
themselves with slave uprisings, which “a single spark” could produce at any time. If such an 
uprising were to come, Jefferson held out little hope that the other states would be of any 
assistance in putting it down. “There is but one state in the Union which will aid us sincerely if 
an insurrection begins; and that one may perhaps have it’s own fire to quench at the same 
time.”52  
V. 
By the turn of the century Virginia was, as Jefferson had predicted in his letter, ripe for 
revolution. The census of 1800 recorded that black people had become the majority of Virginia’s 
population. Most of these people were slaves, but they had begun to conceive of a larger African 
identity for themselves in addition to the local and tribal identifications held by slaves. Inspired 
by the revolution in Saint Domingue, Virginia’s slaves began to see “frenchness” as a synonym 
for revolutionary possibility. As white refugees from Haiti streamed into the state, slave 
insurrection scares became more common. White Virginians found it very easy to blame slave 
discontent upon agitation perpetrated by the slaves brought in by the refugees. Very different 
from their native Virginian counterparts, the slave immigrants from Haiti were nearly all 
African-born, nominally Catholic in religious observance, and speaking a French-African patois. 
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Yet it would turn out that these slaves did not represent the real threat. That threat came from 
Gabriel, a Virginia-born slave.53 
Gabriel’s first brush with the law occurred near Richmond in 1799, when he, his brother, 
and another slave tried to steal a pig from a white farmer new to their neighborhood. When the 
farmer stopped them, a fight ensued and Gabriel bit the farmer’s ear off. In addition to the 
physical prowess implicit in such an action, the slave had strong organizational abilities as well. 
In recruiting blacks to his revolutionary cause, Gabriel employed techniques he learned from 
watching white evangelists and politicians. He would plant his followers in the audience, and 
then ask those who would join him in his fight against slavery to stand up. He hoped, 
presumably, that others besides those he had planted would rise. Like many slaves of his time, 
Gabriel only turned to Christianity in the years after mass revivals had shaken the state. The 
primitive and emotionalistic nature of these revivals appealed to the sentiments of unlettered 
slaves and lower-class whites. Like many evangelicals, these slaves identified themselves with 
the chosen people of God and strove to remake their world through revolution.54  
Gabriel and his co-conspirators revered the Bible and indeed any example they could find 
of the written word. This reverence, however, was not so much pragmatic as mystical. Gabriel 
and his co-conspirators had lists containing the names of all those who would fight to overthrow 
the whites. These lists were a liability, for obvious reasons, yet the conspirators would show 
them to nearly everyone they met. The slaves fantasized about killing all the white people, or at 
least all the white people who were not Quakers, Frenchmen or women. Luckily for the whites, 
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like almost all attempted slave revolts in the United States, Gabriel’s rebellion failed because his 
own subalterns turned him in to the authorities.55 
Despite the plot’s failures, the danger remained, and it was in this atmosphere that St. 
George Tucker’s cousin, the similarly named George Tucker, began in his writings to confront 
the problem of slavery. Thomas Jefferson would later appoint George to serve as the first 
professor of philosophy and belles lettres at the University of Virginia. Before attaining that 
position George worked as a lawyer and as a man of letters, and his first literary success came 
from an essay he modeled upon St. George’s Dissertation. The two cousins had similar 
biographies as well. Born on Bermuda in 1775, George Tucker resolved at a young age to study 
the law. Believing that he needed to study in the United States or Britain if he wished to be a 
successful lawyer, he left the island in July of 1795 and headed for Williamsburg where he could 
confer with his cousin.56  
Upon arriving in Williamsburg, George was struck by the “air of decay and dullness” in 
the former capital of Virginia. This atmosphere produced great “disappointment and depression” 
in the young man, a feeling compounded by his inability to track down his cousin. Judge Tucker 
was out on circuit, thus presenting George with a problem: he needed advice, and he needed to 
borrow money. Setting out after St. George on horseback he rode for several days before finding 
him at one of the family’s plantations in central Virginia. “After reading the letters I brought he 
gave a most affectionate welcome to Virginia, and, having heard my story, was decidedly of the 
opinion that, with my views, it would be better for me to remain in Virginia than to go to 
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England.” Young George had strong republican sympathies, such that might have gotten him 
into trouble in the old country, but posed no problem at all in Williamsburg.57  
The city did, however, present dangers of its own. Despite its drab exterior, Williamsburg 
possessed, especially for someone with personal connections and a background of wealth, a 
lively social scene. George recalled that he “found the society of the place so seductive” that he 
ended up giving no attention to his legal studies. “The only time bestowed on them being while I 
was in bed before breakfast.” In 1797, he married a sickly Virginia woman. He noted in his 
biography that he had not intended to get married so soon after arriving in America, but that he 
did so in order that his new wife might be able to travel with him back to Bermuda where the fair 
climate could help her to recover. The attempt failed, but the considerable inheritance she left 
him leads one to wonder what really lay behind this early marriage: “one fourth part of a sugar 
estate in Antigua …, 13,000 acres of land in North Carolina on the Dan River, some small tracts 
in Virginia and a share in the dismal swamp company.” George later found it impossible to claim 
the Antiguan lands, but he would profit from the rest of this estate.58 
While in Williamsburg, George made his first struggling attempts to write for the public. 
All of these early efforts were, by his own account, failures. What he needed was a fit subject, 
and he finally found one when the spirit of Haiti came to Virginia in the guise of Gabriel’s 
Rebellion. An analysis of George Tucker’s essay indicates that he used  his cousin’s Dissertation 
on Slavery as his model. Indeed, the two corresponded on the subject. Equally importantly, an 
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analysis of George’s writing indicates that he was one of the first Virginians of his day to take 
the first small steps away from the modern natural rights tradition.59 
 According to George Tucker, slavery surrounded white Virginians just as water 
surrounds a fish: no one notices what everyone sees. If a white Virginian would actually stop to 
think about it, he would realize that threats confront him on every side, yet this realization “has 
as little influence on his conduct, and excites as little emotion in his mind, as the belief of 
rewards and punishments in the next world, influences human conduct in this.” In isolating the 
particular danger confronting Virginia, George focused on “the advancement of knowledge 
among the negroes of this country.” Every year more and more of them learn to read and write, 
and this “increase of knowledge is the principal agent in evolving the spirit we have to fear.” The 
modern natural rights discourse of late-eighteenth century Virginia had not entirely lost touch 
with the older way of understanding political matters. Classic natural right recognized wisdom as 
the highest attribute of a human; to become wise would be to reach one’s telos. In addition, 
according to the pre-Hobbesian standard, wisdom served as the title to rule. If the slaves were to 
become wise, another justification for keeping them in bondage would be lost. George, however, 
did not develop his argument in such terms. Instead, he unhesitatingly universalized his culture’s 
rhetoric about freedom, arguing that every human has “the love of freedom” as “an inborn 
sentiment” and that in the slaves, this new “breath of knowledge kindles it into flame.”60 
 Beginning with the premise that black people started far behind white people in their 
intelligence, George argued that the slaves actually acquired knowledge faster than did white 
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people. He believed that the example of white civilization, specifically their constant and 
ongoing dialogue on the question of “natural rights,” worked as a impetus to stimulate the minds 
of the slaves. To demonstrate their progress, George compared those slaves who rallied to Lord 
Dunmore’s banner with those who rallied to Gabriel’s: the former fought for freedom “merely as 
a good,” while the latter “also claim it as a right.” Finding no way to check the material causes 
“which tend to enlighten the blacks,” George railed against those who argued that slave revolts 
could be quelled if only the slaves were subjected to harsher discipline. He did not think that 
Virginia’s safety could be ensured with “a few cautionary laws, joined to a seasonable rigour….” 
Such laws, he argued, would go against the opinion of the age, and would therefore have little 
chance of succeeding.61  
According to George, black ignorance must continue to recede before black knowledge. 
Those who thought the slaves incapable of large scale organizing had been proven wrong by 
Gabriel’s Rebellion. “Ignorant and illiterate as they yet are, they have maintained a 
correspondence which, whether we consider its extent or duration is truly astonishing.” Worse 
yet, the state had become infected with religious fanaticism, and both blacks and whites were 
falling under the sway of this new mode of worship. George feared that before long, black and 
white evangelicals would sense a connecting bond, and work to overthrow the social order. “Do 
you not, already, sir, discover something like a sympathy between them? It certainly would not 
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be a novelty, in the history of the world, if religion were made to sanctify plots and 
conspiracies.”62  
Dismissing those who argued that black out-migration from the state would make 
Virginia secure, Tucker argued that white out-migration occurred at an equally high rate. 
Furthermore, he found that black population grew at a faster rate than white population. George 
isolated the causes behind this demographic fact. “Many a black woman is a grandmother when 
her fair mistress pines in fruitless celibacy.” And why not? The slave had no need to think about 
tomorrow’s security, and could thus yield “to the impulse of love as soon as she feels it, while, 
with us, a thousand principles and prejudices either delay the commerce of the sexes, or prevent 
it altogether.” George counseled those who did not believe him to look to “the approaching 
census” where they will see “that the ratio of blacks to whites is continually increasing.” He 
believed that in a time of war, this growing horde would be the natural friend of Virginia’s 
enemies. Even those slaves that might seem to remain loyal could secretly work as spies. He 
insisted that Virginia must find a way to remove this weapon from the hands of her enemies.63 
George saw only two possible remedies, either “emancipation, or transportation.” To 
implement the former remedy, he considered the possibility of “qualifying the gift of freedom, 
by denying the negroes some of the most important privileges of a citizen.” Has not the 
peasantry of Europe, though “admitted to the rights of individual liberty and property” been 
willing to endure “the deprivation of civil rights?” George suggested that a black middle class 
might arise out of such a situation, and that this middle class could keep those beneath them in 
place. But he feared that such a project could have problems. “This project, it must be confessed, 
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has an air of plausibility, which seduces us at first sight.” Yet he thought such a plan untenable: 
“the negroes, if once emancipated, would never rest satisfied with anything short of perfect 
equality.” Without such equality he believed they would be querulous and easily manipulated by 
Virginia’s internal and external enemies: the potential “auxiliaries of domestic faction; or the fit 
engine of any artful and enterprising leader….” George believed that this danger could only be 
eliminated through colonization, and he had a plan.64 
With 300,000 “Blacks and Mulattoes” in Virginia, George predicted an “annual increase” 
of about 15,000. At a rate of twenty pounds a head to transport them away, total colonization 
would cost the state, in total, about a million pounds. He did not believe that the state could bear 
such an expense. Besides, even if the West Indies were “willing to admit so dangerous a body” it 
was not at all clear that the master class of Virginia would allow their slaves “to be torn from 
those tender attachments which now soften the miseries of servitude to suffer still greater in a 
foreign land.” Perhaps the slaves could “be colonized in some part of the American continent.” 
Finding the “western side of the Mississippi” a good place for freed blacks, George thought that 
that land should be purchased from the Spanish government. Or perhaps “a purchase of some 
part of the Indian country, comprehended with the limits of Georgia” could serve the purpose. 
Such a plan could be paid for by a “poll tax … laid on every negro and mulatto,” so that “the 
diminution of slaves would be proportioned to the number, in every part of the state.” Proposing 
that a cash bounty be given to every master who sent a black woman of child-bearing age out of 
the state, George reasoned that “when a girl under fourteen or fifteen is sent out of the country, 
six or eight unborn negroes are probably sent with her.” Confessing that such a traffic would be 
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“dishonorable,” George nevertheless justified the action upon the fundamental basis of modern 
natural rights:  “the most imperious of all laws, that of self-preservation, authorize it.”65   
Finding this early “experiment in authorship” to be “rewarded with the public 
approbation” George Tucker was now able to regard himself as “in the class of men of letters.” 
In that capacity he spent his mornings reading, or writing the occasional piece for the 
newspapers, and his evenings playing cards. The state of Virginia, however, did not carry out the 
plans he had set forth. Their immediate response was to set an armed guard of one hundred men 
before the state capital building and to pass a law forbidding the nocturnal assembly of black 
people. In addition, the state publicly executed several of Gabriel’s co-conspirators.66  
In the wake of Gabriel’s rebellion, St. George Tucker weighed in again on topic of  
slavery. This time he argued that the new Louisiana territory would be a good place to relocate 
Virginia’s emancipated slaves. Finding that too much of his and his children’s future rested upon 
the work of his own nineteen slaves, St. George did not free them. In fact, his most recent 
biographer notes that he continued to do business with a slave-trader in Petersburg years after 
writing his emancipation proposal. Despite the evidence that St. George continued to own slaves, 
he never seems to have felt any need to renounce his essay. He included it as an appendix to his 
1803 edition of William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, his greatest 
scholarly effort.67  
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Indeed as late as 1813, when John Adams had inquired after some biographical 
information concerning “the poet of Williamsburg,” St. George sent the former president not 
more of his poetry, but a copy of the Dissertation on Slavery. This decision probably proved a 
wise one. Adams had been impressed with a brief piece of sentimental verse St. George wrote in 
1807, entitled simply “Resignation.” Adams asked rhetorically, “Is there in Homer, in Virgil, in 
Milton, in Shakespeare, or in Pope, an equal number of lines which deserve to be engraven on 
the memory of youth and age in more indelible characters?” One has reason to speculate that 
Adams would have been far less impressed with Tucker’s more significant work, “The 
Probationary Odes of Jonathan Pindar.” These poems, which Tucker published anonymously in a 
Philadelphia newspaper in 1796, mercilessly satirized Adams, Alexander Hamilton and other 
Federalists whom he believed were corrupting the administration of George Washington. Indeed, 
in the first of the odes Tucker denounced Adams as “A Would-be Great Man.” Tucker 
apologized for submitting his Dissertation to Adams, but expressed doubt that either of its 
previous publications (in 1796 and 1803) had “ever cross’d Hudson’s river….” Tucker hoped 
that Mr. Adams would find the essay satisfactory. Adams did approve, remarking that he knew 
“of nothing better said, upon the most difficult subject and the most intricate problem the U.S. 
have to solve.”68 
Despite the failure of the two proposals considered thus far, some Virginians continued to 
hope that colonization would solve the problem of slavery. In the first years of the nineteenth 
century, Virginia legislators began to attack the 1782 law that had allowed emancipated slaves to 
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remain in the state. By 1806, the strategy had proven successful and emancipation became 
conditional upon removal. Unfortunately, since all the states surrounding Virginia had, or soon 
would have, laws denying permanent residence to free black people from other states, the 
measure had little practical effect. For the next ten years, the issue fell by the wayside because of 
the renewed conflict with Britain. By the time Virginians were again able to consider 
colonization, Louisiana had many white settlers, and Virginians no longer saw it as a suitable 
place to send emancipated slaves. They began to look to Africa as a suitable home for the 
freedmen. The American Colonization society held its first meeting in 1817, with a Virginian as 
its president. The founders of the American Colonization Society believed emancipation 
impossible without colonization.69 
VI. 
At about this same time, John Taylor of Caroline formulated a trenchant defense of slavery 
centered on the modern natural rights tradition. A Virginian of Tucker’s generation, Taylor had 
fought in the Revolution. He had a distinguished career in politics, serving several terms in the 
General Assembly, and filling out terms in the United States Senate from 1792-1794 and from 
1822-1824, but his greatest fame resulted from his writings. Through his essays and books, 
Taylor became one of  principal theorists of the so-called “Old Republican” movement, which 
aimed to preserve the Jeffersonian conception of political philosophy in its pure form. Despite 
the admiration that Taylor and Jefferson had for each other, Taylor nevertheless believed it 
necessary to use the experience of Haiti to refute Jefferson’s arguments against slavery. In 1813, 
                                                          
69 Alison Goodyear Freehling, Drift Toward Dissolution: The Virginia Slavery Debate of 1831-1832 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 85-120. 
 
 47
Taylor published his refutation of Jefferson along with his own counter-thesis in a book entitled 
Arator.70 
 Writing well after the revolution in Saint Domingue, Taylor felt confident that he could 
dismiss Jefferson’s reflections as the products of a more innocent time. To make this point, he set 
forth some amazingly grandiloquent prose: “Circumstances affect the mind, as weather does 
beer, and frequently produces a sort of moral fermentation, which throws up bubbles of prismatic 
splendor, whilst they are played upon by the rays of some temporary effervescence, but destined 
to burst when the fermentation ceases.” According to Taylor, Jefferson wrote his Notes on the 
State of Virginia “in the heat of a war for liberty” at a time when “the human mind was made still 
hotter by the French revolution….” Taylor therefore stated that it would be unjust to “censure 
Mr. Jefferson.” According to this interpretation, the experience of history had made Taylor wiser  
than the Jefferson of 1787. The spirit of abolitionism had “attempted to compound a free nation 
of black and white people in St. Domingo. The experiment pronounced that one people must 
perish.”71 
Although unwilling to chastise Jefferson, Taylor had no qualms about refuting him. 
Jefferson had asserted that slavery had a deleterious effect on the master, but history proved him 
wrong: “Slavery was carried farther among the Greeks and Romans than among ourselves, and 
yet those two nations produced more great and good patriots and citizens, than, probably, all the 
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rest of the world.” Furthermore, the example of Jefferson himself, and the many other prominent 
Virginians who had made their mark on the national stage, refuted the argument that only moral 
prodigies could escape the burdens of mastership unscathed. Believing that the children of slave 
masters found themselves in a situation hospitable to the inculcation of virtue, Taylor took 
exactly the opposite tact of the former president. He disputed Jefferson’s contention that slaves 
“inspire furious passions” among their masters, indeed he believed that such passions were “as 
rare and disgraceful towards slaves as towards horses….”72 
This horse metaphor casts light upon the natural rights tradition in nineteenth century 
Virginia. Modern natural rights theory is not based upon the Bible, though students of political 
philosophy frequently make the mistake of conflating these two distinct traditions of political 
thought.73 The Bible granted mankind the dominion over all the other animals on earth, but 
within the theory of modern natural rights it was not at all clear whether, or to what extent, 
animals should be subjected to humans. The tensions between the two philosophies can be seen 
in Thomas Jefferson’s famed “last letter.” In this letter Jefferson remarked “that the mass of 
mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, 
ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace of God.”74 Of course, horses are not born with 
saddles on their backs either. Men have to put them there, just as men have to make and wear 
spurs if they wish to ride effectively. Jefferson knew this fact, and if pressed he may simply have 
                                                          
72 Ibid., 121-122. 
 
73 A succinct warning against such a method of interpretation can be found in the following essays by 
Ernest L. Fortin: “Natural Law and Social Justice,” “On the Presumed Medieval Origin of Individual 
Rights,” and “The New Rights Theory and the Natural Law,” in Fortin, ed., Classical Christianity and the 
Political Order: Reflections on the Theologico-Political Problem (3 vols., Lanham: Rowan and 
Littlefield, 1996), II: 223-86. 
 
74 TJ to Roger C. Weightman, 24 June 1826, in Thomas Jefferson: Writings, 1516-1517. 
 
 49
referred back to the Biblical injunction giving man dominion over the animals, but it does not 
seem likely that Jefferson would have been very comfortable basing any of his arguments upon 
biblical authority alone. 
Ancient and medieval thinkers stressed the potentialities of humans in considering what 
was right by nature for them. Modern natural rights thinkers begin from a different premise; 
namely, that all humans possess freedom by nature. In seeking to move beyond the classical and 
Christian understanding of rights, modern natural rights thinkers must come to terms with the 
rights of animals as well. The leading modern natural rights theorists have long sensed this 
necessity. For instance, in an odd ending to his chapter on slavery, Hobbes made a brief 
discourse on the rights of men over animals. The philosopher of Malmesbury argued that the 
dominion of man over animals came from “the right of nature” and not from “divine positive 
right.” He held that humans and animals existed in a state of nature towards one another, thus 
“one may at discretion reduce to one’s service any animals that can be tamed or made useful, and 
wage continual war against the rest as harmful, and hunt them down and kill them.” According to 
Hobbes, this right is natural, for even before God told humans they could do it, humans had to do 
it in order to survive.75 
Ancient political science presented few challenges for slavery, but slavery occupies a 
more problematical place in modern philosophical systems. Similarly, Hobbes must have felt 
some anxiety about humankind’s right to dominion over animals, or else he would not have seen 
fit to tag it on at the end of a chapter on slavery. Such a tension continues throughout the 
tradition of modern natural rights thought. Historians and philosophers seeking to explain how 
ideas of rights change over time might use the example of vegetarianism to make their point. 
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Imagine that at some time in the future, all of mankind were to become vegetarians, and look 
back with disgust at their ancestors who ate the flesh of animals. Imagine bronze statues of cows, 
pigs and chickens standing outside the abandoned remains of slaughterhouses, to commemorate 
their suffering. Just as we visit abandoned concentration camps and mourn man’s inhumanity to 
man, perhaps our descendants might visit these abandoned slaughterhouses and mourn man’s 
inhumanity to animals. And while we today might think extreme animals rights activists and 
vegetarians rather strange, many of our ancestors looked at abolitionists in the same way.76 There 
would be a certain logic at work here, and the roots of it could still be traced back to the modern 
natural rights philosophy of Hobbes. 
Arguments for natural rights face this reductio ad absurdum argument concerning animal 
rights. In arguing that it is as disgraceful to mistreat a slave as it is to mistreat a horse, Taylor 
merely made the first lunge at what proslavery theorists would come to see as a weakness in the 
armor of antislavery advocates. He accompanied this first step with a further hint of the possible 
abandonment of modern natural rights theory: a brief nod to the place of knowledge in the 
question of who is to rule: “Knowledge manages ignorance with great ease, whenever ignorance 
is not used as an instrument by knowledge against itself.” Taylor suspected that those who 
wished to free the slaves had designs to appropriate their services for themselves.  
Both Jefferson and Taylor agreed that a master had it in his power to lord it over those 
that he owned, but they drew different conclusions. Taylor believed that a master governed 
through knowledge, and that his high station made it such that “the slaves are more frequently 
the objects of benevolence than of rage.” When children were present the masters, following the 
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social code of their class, were more “inclined to soothe, and hardly ever suffered to tyrannize” 
their slaves. In such a society, children came to associate “vicious and mean qualities” not with 
their parents, but with their slaves. This association had a heuristic value, in that base 
characteristics “become more contemptible” by this association, as “pride steps in to aid the 
struggles of virtue.”77 
Writing after the outrages in Saint Domingue, and setting forth a foreshadow of the 
restoration of classic natural right, Taylor clearly represented something new in the defense of 
slavery in Virginia. At least one scholar has argued that Taylor was the first representative of the 
positive good school of proslavery writers.78 Such an analysis overlooks Taylor’s recognition of 
slavery, rhetorically at least, as an evil. Indeed he could be quite trenchant about it: “The fact is, 
that negro slavery is an evil which the United States must look in the face. To whine over it, is 
cowardly; to aggravate it, criminal; and to forbear to alleviate it, because it cannot be wholly 
cured, foolish.”79 Taking the word “evil” to heart, the best way to understand Taylor’s proslavery 
argument is in the terms put forward by the scholar M. E. Bradford, who argued that Taylor 
refused “to treat an argument from definition as if it were an argument from circumstance.” 
Slavery had established deep roots in Virginia and could not be eliminated without impinging 
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upon the master’s right to self-preservation. Therefore, any abstracting of natural rights 
definitions from actual circumstances would be not only dangerous but foolish.80  
The proslavery arguments made by Thomas Jefferson in the Notes on the State of 
Virginia and by John Taylor in Arator represent the two extremes of proslavery thought available 
within the modern natural rights tradition of St. George Tucker’s Virginia. Tucker himself 
steered a middle course between these two poles, as did his cousin George Tucker. Yet all four 
men agreed that the self-preservation of the slaveowner forbade any sort of immediate abolition. 
It is likely that they all would have concurred with Jefferson’s contention regarding abolition: 
“[j]ustice is in one scale, and self-preservation in the other.”81 Although St. George Tucker was 
the only one of the four to employ a Lockean appeal to property rights, it seems likely that 
Jefferson or Taylor would have turned to the same example if they had written essays of a 
similar length. Virginia’s professors would eventually abandon the defense of slavery in terms of 
modern natural rights in favor of scriptural defenses of the institution and even a return to the 
classical understanding of political philosophy. Yet a corollary of the modern natural rights 
understanding of contractual relations would persist throughout the nineteenth century in the 
professoriate’s theory of constitutionalism. 
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Chapter Two: The Constitutional Orthodoxy of St. George Tucker 
I. 
St. George Tucker made practical as well as scholarly contributions to American 
constitutionalism. Indeed, he played a small but early role in bringing about the drafting of the 
United States Constitution. By the summer of 1786, many Americans had come to fear that the 
union might dissolve. More specifically, many Virginians were worried that New York and New 
Jersey might form a separate confederation with New England. Sectional spirits had been on the 
rise ever since May of 1786, when John Jay had made an effort to pass a treaty with Spain that 
would have closed the Mississippi to American navigation for twenty-five years. The Northern 
commercial states had supported the treaty but every state from Maryland down to Georgia had 
opposed it. This talk of disunion played a major role in precipitating action from the General 
Assembly of Virginia.1  
Tucker believed that the new union had the prerequisites for greatness, but only if the 
states made it more hospitable to commerce. He set forth this viewpoint in an article he 
published in 1787.2 He had wished to see the Articles of Confederation revised almost as soon as 
they had been drafted. Already in 1786, Tucker had become convinced that Congress needed the 
power to protect the commerce of the colonies. In January of that year the General Assembly of 
Virginia called for a commercial conference of all the states and appointed Tucker as a delegate. 
History would come to know this meeting as the Annapolis Convention, an important precursor 
to the more famous convention in Philadelphia one year later. The proceedings of the gathering  
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indicate that the delegates from New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and North 
Carolina never arrived, and that the delegates from the other states present were unwilling to 
proceed to a formal discussion without a quorum. The members present at Annapolis expressed 
by “unanimous conviction” the opinion that another convention should be called, and that other 
topics besides commerce should be discussed. Tucker did not attend the resulting convention in 
Philadelphia, but he followed the events there with great interest. Disappointed that the delegates 
had been sworn to secrecy, Tucker nevertheless tried to keep informed of what happened there.3  
Most of the Virginia judiciary came out in favor of the constitution drafted at 
Philadelphia, but Tucker seems to have changed his mind several times. At first he agreed with 
Edmund Randolph, an active member of the Virginia delegation who had been one of only three 
men at the convention who refused to sign the final draft. By October of 1787, Tucker had 
decided that the dangers of the new constitution outweighed its benefits, although he felt 
reassured on the grounds that the General Assembly of Virginia had unanimously agreed to put 
the question of ratification before a special convention. Many Virginians, like Tucker, were 
uncertain about the new proposed constitution. Unlike the other states where support or 
opposition followed clear class or interstate geographical lines, in Virginia both proponents and 
opponents of the new constitution shared similar economic interests. Similarly, the geographical 
distribution of support and opposition were too tangled to lend themselves to any clear pattern.4  
The literature of support for and opposition to the constitution, both in Virginia and the 
other states, comprises some of the most important literature in the history of American political 
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thought. The collection of essays collected under the title The Federalist is the clear masterpiece 
of the genre. Scholars and laymen alike, when seeking to interpret the Constitution of the United 
States, generally reach for a copy of this volume. James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John 
Jay (often referred to collectively by their nom de plume “Publius”) collaborated to write the 
eighty-five essays in this volume. Taken collectively, these essays offer a brilliant and thorough 
explication of the Constitution, but they do, unfortunately, have some faults. For one thing, 
because the authors wanted to convince their readers to ratify the Constitution, they downplayed 
the defects and oversights in the instrument. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the 
authors wrote their essays before the addition of the Bill of Rights to the Constitution; indeed 
they actively opposed the addition of a Bill of Rights.5  
Like the essays in The Federalist, St. George Tucker’s essays also offer a detailed 
examination of the United States Constitution, but they do not suffer from the same liabilities. 
Tucker had several advantages over his predecessors. He had spent time both in favor of and in 
opposition to the Constitution, and he thus had a better chance to evaluate the arguments of both 
sides. He wrote after the Bill of Rights had been adopted. And perhaps most importantly, he had 
the example of Publius before him. In writing his constitutional essays Tucker kept Publius’s 
“very elaborate and masterly discussion of the constitution” constantly in mind. He found these 
essays of fundamental importance in his quest to understand American constitutionalism, but he 
disagreed with the authors on certain points. Tucker argued that Publius failed to face “the 
defects of the constitution” with the same candor with which they developed its “eminent 
advantages….” Had Hamilton, Madison, and Jay explored the defects of the Constitution as well 
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as its advantages, Tucker doubted whether it would have been necessary to write anything more. 
As he put it, the Federalist Papers “would probably have saved me the labor of this attempt, if 
the defects of the constitution had been treated with equal candor, as the authors have manifested 
abilities in the development of its eminent advantages.” Despite Publius’s oversight in this 
regard, Tucker ended by recommending the work to anyone wishing “to make themselves 
perfectly acquainted with a subject so truly interesting to every American citizen, as the federal 
government of the United States.”6  
Tucker’s constitutional essays have exercised a considerable influence since their first 
publication in 1803. American nationalists have always felt it necessary to attack them, while 
those preferring the partly national, partly federal system proposed by the framers have looked to 
them for support. Yet despite this influence, St. George Tucker’s essays are not as well known 
today as they ought to be. The relative obscurity that engulfs them has much to do with their 
publication history. Although they represent Tucker’s most significant intellectual 
accomplishment, they have remained, until very recently, tucked away as a series of appendices 
to Tucker’s heavily annotated five volume edition of William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the 
Laws of England. To the extent that Tucker transcends the immediate debate between Federalists 
and Antifederalists, he does so because his primary interlocutor was Blackstone, not the 
proponents and opponents of the Constitution. With Tucker’s essays more easily available it may 
now be possible for scholars and laymen interested in the Constitution to understand better 
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Tucker’s sophisticated and orthodox interpretation of that document and of the tradition from 
which it arose.7 
II. 
Tucker grounded his constitutional thought upon Whig principles. In the Whig estimation, 
freedom must be based upon suspicion of government, not trust in it. As Thomas Jefferson 
phrased the matter, “free government is founded in jealousy and not in confidence; it is jealousy 
and not confidence which prescribes limited constitutions, to bind down those whom we are 
obliged to trust with power….” Jefferson saw the distinction between Whigs and Tories as 
something present in all times and places: “Men have differed in opinion, and been divided into 
parties by these opinions, from the first origin of societies; and in governments where they have 
been permitted freely to think and to speak. The same political parties which now agitate the 
U.S. have existed thro’ all time.” He believed that, as a general principle, the Whigs side with the 
many while Tories side with the few, but as a Whig partisan Jefferson always kept in mind that 
governments are the natural enemies of liberty.8 
Jefferson’s belief in the omnipresence of Whig/Tory distinctions in political life has 
inspired some more recent political thinkers to move to reclaim the Whig legacy. By the early 
years of the twentieth century, American Progressives had come to see the state as an ally in their 
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effort to keep business and corporate interests at bay. As a consequence, American libertarians 
appropriated the Whig rhetoric of Thomas Jefferson. For instance, thinkers such as Albert Jay 
Nock and F. A. Hayek tried to keep the Whig ideal before their readerships. Both men noted that 
their ideal of Whiggery had little to do with the seventeenth century English party that went by 
that name and nothing to do with the nineteenth century American variant. Turning progressive 
theory on its head, Nock argued that Whigs work from a principle of voluntarianism, akin to 
what one sees in the organizational principle of a corporation. According to Nock, no one has to 
work for Standard Oil “unless he wishes to do so; he is not conscripted. His acceptance of the 
Company’s rules is a matter of free contract; he is not coerced; he may leave if he does not like 
them.” Tories on the other hand, work from a military model, and they design all of their 
measures to increase the power of the state and to decrease the power of the individual. Nock 
believed that government social programs, to the extent that they are dependent upon coercively 
collected taxes, build from a Tory model. In a similar fashion, Hayek famously refused to call 
himself a conservative; he saw himself instead as a Whig. According to Hayek, the Whig party 
represented the “party of liberty” and Tories the party of coercion.9 
 Twentieth century Whigs such as Nock and Hayek deserve their claim to the label, and it 
seems unlikely that anyone will rise to dispute their provenance. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
these twentieth century Whigs abandoned much of the creed that men like Tucker and Jefferson 
held sacred. Eighteenth and early nineteenth century Whigs held very specific ideas concerning 
history, law, and constitutionalism. For instance, they believed that English liberties had their 
origins in the primitive liberty of the early Germanic tribes. Whig thinkers traced their liberties to 
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the “original constitution” established by their early German ancestors; they believed that the 
principles of Toryism arose later, after the Normans invaded and introduced feudal principles to 
England.10 
Early Whigs learned the nature of primitive Germanic society by reading the ancient 
Roman historian Tacitus and his modern disciples, chiefly the French political philosopher Baron 
De Montesquieu. In his greatest work, The Spirit of the Laws, which he published in 1748, 
Montesquieu manifested an appreciation for the Germanic contribution to European civilization 
that one might not expect to find in a Frenchman. He repeatedly referred to “[o]ur fathers the 
Germans….” Although Montesquieu took pride in the Germanic ancestry of his people, he saw 
the English as having made off with the best part of the ancient German legacy: their 
governmental forms. “If one wants to read the admirable work by Tacitus, On the Mores of the 
Germans, one will see that the English have taken their idea of political government from the 
Germans. This fine system was found in the forests.” American Whigs such as Tucker and 
Jefferson saw the Revolution of 1688 as a move in the right direction, but they did not think that 
it had sufficiently restored the original Germanic forms described by Montesquieu.11  
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Tucker believed such matters to be of more than mere antiquarian interest. He asserted 
that the constitutional order could only be maintained properly by those who understood the 
nature of that order, and that such understanding could be had only by those with a proper 
understanding of the origins of that order. Tucker used a metaphor of an acorn and an oak to 
explain how primitive Germanic society developed into the society of early nineteenth century 
Virginia: “Government in this state may be compared to a seedling oak, that has just burst the 
acorn and appears above the surface of the earth with its first leaves; it advances with 
civilization, rears its head in proportion as the other increases; and puts forth innumerable 
branches till it covers the earth with an extensive shade, and is finally regarded as the king of the 
forest: all behold it with reverence, few have any conception of its magnitude, or of the 
dimension, or number of its parts; few are acquainted with the extent of its produce, or can 
compare the benefits derived from its shade, with the loss of soil which it appropriates to its own 
support.” According to Tucker, only historians and political philosophers could chart the extent 
of such a society, and these scholars would find their works to be “painful, laborious, and 
incessant….”12 
Tucker insisted that scholars learn to look below the surface appearance of things, for the 
magnificent edifice of the American constitutional order may no longer be what it once was, or 
what it appears to be: “the roots may be decayed, the trunk hollow, and the monarch of the forest 
ready to fall with its own rottenness and weight, at the moment that its enormous bulk, extensive 
branches, and luxuriant foliage would seem to promise a millennial duration.” According to 
Tucker, the rot at the center of the American system came from the reforms perpetrated upon it 
by well-meaning but misinformed politicians. “Those who administer it acquire a mechanical  
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acquaintance with its powers, and often, by a slight alteration of the frame, produce an entire 
revolution in the principles of its action; to detect the cheat requires a thorough acquaintance 
with the principles of its original construction, and the purposes to which it was intended to be 
applied.” The scholar must work against “this mechanical monopoly of knowledge,” and teach 
the politician the true principles with which to guide the constitutional order. Only proper 
scholarship can teach the leaders how to keep the system working, and teach the people how to 
make sure that their representatives behave themselves. “Hence, since the introduction of letters, 
those nations which have been most eminent in science, have been most distinguished by 
freedom. Man only requires to understand his rights to estimate them properly: the ignorance of 
the people is the footstool of despotism.”13 
 As a corollary to their very definate ideas about the origins of free government, 
eighteenth-century Whigs held a variety of governmental practices to be odious. They placed the 
existence of a permanent active army —in Whig language a “standing army”— as one of the 
chief threats to liberty. The 1689 English Bill of Rights, an early and important manifestation of 
Whig political thought, offered an example of this fear at work. Like the later American 
Declaration of Independence, the English Bill of Rights contains a formidable list of grievances 
against a monarch, in this case King James II. One of these grievances involved the King’s 
“raising and keeping a standing army within this kingdom in time of peace, without consent of 
Parliament….” This same Bill of Rights made this monarchical trespass illegal: “the raising or 
keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with the consent of 
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Parliament, is against [the] law.”14 Virginia Whigs inherited their fear of standing armies directly 
from their British ancestors. George Mason drafted the Virginia Bill of Rights adopted by the 
General Assembly on 12 June 1776, and in the thirteenth article he asserted that a “well 
regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and 
safe defence of a free State” and that “standing armies in time of peace should be avoided as 
dangerous to liberty….” Of the sixteen articles in the Virginia Bill of Rights, the thirteenth was 
one of the few that produced  “unquestioned consensus” among the members of the General 
assembly.15  
Tucker manifested this same whiggish fear of a standing army. Indeed, his fear lead him 
to oppose the Constitution of 1787 until it had been properly amended. As he wrote to his wife: 
“If the new Constitution takes place I believe I must turn cat in pan once more and be a Tory, for 
I fear it will be down with the Whigs.”16 Tucker regarded the second amendment as the most 
important of the ten, referring to it as “the true palladium of liberty.” He thought that the right of 
the people to arm themselves came not from the state but from God. Such a right existed as a 
corollary of the “right of self defense” which he called “the first law of nature….” Most 
governments throughout history had worked “to confine this right within the narrowest limits 
possible.” Not surprisingly then, most governments had been inhospitable to liberty: “Wherever 
standing armies are kept up, and the right of the people to keep and bear arms is, under any color 
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or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the brink of 
destruction.” Tucker considered the various reasons the British Parliament used for restricting 
the rights of gun ownership and found them all specious. Protecting game, or keeping guns out of 
the hands of non-Protestants were not, to his mind, sufficient reasons for abridging the 
fundamental right of self-defense.17  
Tucker had less enthusiasm for the third amendment. This amendment states that: “No 
soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner; nor in 
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.” Tucker provided only terse commentary 
on this amendment. He believed standing armies to be dangerous, but he feared that this 
amendment did nothing to restrict their existence. Therefore, he believed that this amendment 
“adds nothing to the national security.” According to Tucker, Congress shared the power to arm 
the militia with the states themselves: “Congress has, moreover, power to provide for organizing, 
arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in 
the service of the United States, reserving to the states, respectively, the appointment of the 
officers, and the authority of training the militia, according to the discipline prescribed by 
congress….”  He argued that the second amendment made this area of the Constitution clearer, 
noting that “the power of arming the militia, not being prohibited to the states, respectively, by 
the constitution, is, consequently, reserved to them, concurrently with the federal government.” 
Tucker thought that such a measure of central control would make the militia very useful 
“whenever the occasion may again require the cooperation of militia of the states respectively.” 
Due to the lack of organization, and the differing times of enlistment, the militia of the several 
states had proved a “fruitless expense” during the Revolutionary War. According to the 
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professor, the militia must be well-organized, well-trained, and well-armed; for if they are not “it 
will pave the way for standing armies; the most formidable of all enemies to genuine liberty in a 
state.”18 
Considering the power of declaring war, Tucker thought it beneficial that the Constitution 
restricted such powers to Congress. “The power of declaring war, with all its train of 
consequences, direct and indirect, forms the next branch of the powers confided to congress; and 
happy it is for the people of America that it is so vested.”  According to the professor, wars arise 
because the few people who possess power criminally bring them about. Most of war’s victims 
die innocently: “War would be banished from the face of the earth, were nations instead of 
princes to decide upon their necessity.” Tucker noted that the president had the power to veto a 
declaration of war, but not the power to declare war. However, he noted with regret that the 
president may have the power to provoke a war. He therefore recommended an amendment that 
the Virginia ratifying convention had proposed: “that no declaration of war should be made, nor 
any standing army or regular troops be raised or kept up, in time of peace, without the consent of 
two-thirds of the members present in both houses. And that no soldier should be enlisted for a 
longer term than four years, except in time of war, and then for no longer term than the 
continuance of the war.” Upset that the restriction to a two year term for funding the military had 
not been followed, Tucker thought that a one year term would be preferable, but took solace in 
the knowledge that representatives could be thrown out after only two years. Tucker admitted 
admits that navies were, by their very nature, permanent investments.19 
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St. George Tucker and Thomas Jefferson were not only Whigs, they were New Whigs. 
This modifier “new” signifies that these men faithfully adhered to the modern natural rights 
philosophy. According to Tucker, the American Revolution had proven wrong all those who 
doubted the existence of the state of nature and the social contract. Ever since the establishment 
of independence, the various states had produced written contracts, more commonly referred to 
as constitutions. Tucker saw the conventions that had produced these constitutions as something 
new in the history of civilization. Never before had “the original written compact of society” 
been “formally expressed as the first institution of a state.” The American Revolution made the 
modern natural rights philosophy real, thereby forming “a new epoch in the history of civil 
institutions, by reducing to practice, what, before, had been supposed to exist only in the 
visionary speculations of theoretical writers.…” For the first time in history, all could see “an 
original compact formed by the free and deliberate voices of individuals disposed to be united in 
the same social bonds….”20  
 Tucker saw the Constitution of the United States as a compact. He presented this thesis 
with a six part argument: first, the Constitution is a compact, not a charter or a grant, for the 
contracting parties are equals and none of them grant anything to each other, rather “each 
stipulates to part with, and to receive the same thing, precisely without any distinction or 
difference in favor of any of the parties.” Secondly, he described the compact as “federal” in 
nature. This description arose from the fact that the Constitution created “in fact, as well as in 
theory, an association of states, or, a confederacy.” According to Tucker, the various state 
governments “not only retain every power, jurisdiction, and right not delegated to the United 
States,” they actually compose the “constituent and necessary parts” of the new government. 
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Strictly speaking, Tucker did not believe that the tenth amendment to the Constitution was 
necessary, for the powers the states delegated to the new government were carefully enumerated, 
and according to the “ordinary rules of construction” those powers which are not enumerated are 
retained.21  
Thirdly, Tucker viewed the new Constitution as  “a social compact….” In making this 
argument he had recourse to the language of natural rights philosophy: “The end of civil society 
is the procuring for the citizens whatever their necessities require, the conveniences and 
accommodations of life, and, in general, whatever constitutes happiness: with the peaceful 
possession of property, a method of obtaining justice with security; and in short, a mutual 
defense against all violence from without.” Tucker believed that individuals voluntarily joined a 
society in order to enjoy these benefits.22  
Fourthly, Tucker saw the Constitution as “an original compact,” in that it “completely 
dissolved and annihilated” the old relations which existed before it. The manner in which 
representatives from each state met to amend the Articles of Confederation had “all the features 
of an original compact, not only between the body politic of each state, but also between the 
people of those states in their highest sovereign capacity.” Tucker tied his fourth point in with his 
third point by arguing that the original contract of society consisted of an act of association by 
which each individual “entered into engagements with all, to procure the common welfare….” 
Such an association existed to produce “for the citizens whatever their necessities require, the 
conveniences and accommodations of life, and, in general, whatever constitutes happiness: with 
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the peaceful possession of property, a method of obtaining justice with security; and in short a 
mutual defense against all violence from without.”23   
Fifthly, Tucker pointed out that this compact was “a written contract,” one of the first of 
its kind in history. While some had doubted that such social contracts had ever existed, Tucker 
believed that the Constitution had proven the skeptics wrong. The individual states had entered 
into this compact “freely, voluntarily, and solemnly,” with the people of each state ratifying it 
without any internal or external compulsion. By emphasizing the solemnity with which the 
people of the various states adopted the Federal Constitution, Tucker put the spotlight upon the 
highly deliberative nature of the associations that produced and ratified that document. The 
people came up with and accepted the Constitution only after much discussion “not only by the 
general convention who proposed, and framed it; but afterwards in the legislatures of the several 
states, and finally, in the conventions of all the states, by whom it was adopted and ratified.” 
Therefore the Federal Constitution “is a compact by which the several states and the people 
thereof, respectively, have bound themselves to each other, and to the federal government.” 
Thus, “the acceptance of the constitution was not only an act of the body politic of each state, but 
of the people thereof respectively, in their sovereign character and capacity….” Therefore, “not 
only the body politic of the several states, but every citizen thereof, may be considered parties to 
the compact, and to have bound themselves reciprocally to each other … and, also to have bound 
themselves to the federal government, whose authority has been thereby created, and 
established.”24  
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For his sixth and final point, Tucker argued that the Federal Constitution bound the 
Federal Government “to the several states, and to every citizen of the United States.” 
Understanding the necessity of keeping the federal government on a tight leash, Tucker argued 
that the duties of that government had “become the exact measure of its powers; and whenever it 
exerts a power for any other purpose, than the performance of a duty prescribed by the 
Constitution, it transgresses its proper limits, and violates the public trust.” This sixth and final 
point lead to a reiteration of Tucker’s overarching thesis: the Constitution established a 
government which he described as a “confederated republic, composed of several independent 
and sovereign democratic states, united for their common defense and security against foreign 
nations … each state retaining an entire liberty of exercising … all those parts of sovereignty 
which are not mentioned in the constitution….” As the “supreme law of the land” the 
Constitution was “binding upon the federal government; the several states; and finally upon the 
citizens of the United States….” Thus the federal government existed as “the organ through 
which the united republics communicate with foreign nations, and with each other. Their 
submission to its operation is voluntary: its councils, its sovereignty is an emanation from theirs, 
not a flame by which they have been consumed, nor a vortex in which they are swallowed up. 
Each is still a perfect state, still sovereign, still independent, and still capable, should the 
occasion require, to resume the exercise of its functions, as such, in the most unlimited extent.”25  
Tucker believed that the individual states of the United States had their foundations “in 
their respective colonial charters,” and with independence from Britain these units “ceased to be 
colonies, and became independent and sovereign republics, under a democratic form of 
government.” In the face of their common enemy, these states formed a “confederacy” in which 
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they renounced some of their “sovereign rights.” With the adoption of the Constitution of 1787 
“they formed a closer, and more intimate union than before; yet still retaining the character of 
distinct sovereign, independent states.” The various state constitutions had gone through many 
different permutations in the years since independence, but the states themselves continued to 
exercise the basic sovereignty of the people.  
Those who bemoan the career of the later Thomas Jefferson, and speculate, usually with a 
sad shaking of the head, that the great statesmen would have supported the secession of Virginia 
in 1861, have missed the point. Its is only fitting that the author of the most famous secessionist 
document in world history would be an advocate of the right of secession in the abstract. 
Jefferson’s views received a lengthy and scholarly development in the writing of St. George 
Tucker. Distracted by a continuing string of national conquests and reconstructions, it is all too 
easy to miss the significance of the failure of the Confederate experiment. A Union based on 
consent became a Union based on conquest. It is not difficult to imagine how Tucker would have 
responded to the secession of the southern states; he already had the language prepared: “If the 
bond of Union be the voluntary consent of the people, the government may be pronounced to be 
free; where constraint and fear constitute that bond, the government is no longer the government 
of the people, and consequently they are enslaved.”26  
An American Empire followed in the wake of the newly restored Union; today that 
empire controls a standing army that garrisons much of the world. Tucker would most likely 
have been terrified of such a prospect. He labeled the warning signs that would accompany the 
end of the American republic: “whenever our evil genius shall prompt us to aspire to the 
character of a military republic, and invite us to the field of glory: when rapacity, under the less 
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odious name of ambition, shall lead us on to conquest; when a bold, though raw militia shall be 
exchanged for a well trained, well disciplined and well appointed army; ready to take the field at 
the nod of an ambitious president, and to believe that the finger of heaven points to that course 
which his directs; then we may regard the day of our happiness as past, or hastening rapidly to its 
decline.”27   
III. 
But Tucker was an idealist. Regarding his constitutional writings, one legal scholar has noted 
that “[n]o other commentator of such pure Jeffersonian pedigree and persuasion ever wrote.”28 
This statement carries a great deal of truth, for both men espoused a political philosophy based 
upon Whig political ideals and modern natural rights theories. Nevertheless, a full consideration 
of the constitutional thought of St. George Tucker must not pass over the differences between the 
two Virginians. The disagreement between the two men centered on the Virginia Constitution of 
1776.  
In his Notes on the State of Virginia, Jefferson argued that under the 1776 Constitution, 
all governmental powers including those of the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, 
“result to the legislative body.” According to Jefferson, by concentrating all these powers in the 
hands of the legislature, the framers of the Virginia Constitution established a despotic 
government. “It will be no alleviation that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, 
and not by a single one. 173 despots would surely be as oppressive as one. Let those who doubt 
it turn their eyes on the republic of Venice.” Despite this despotic form, Jefferson believed that 
the Virginia legislature had done a good job of remaining “perfectly upright.” He feared, 
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however, that they would not long remain uncorrupted. “Mankind soon learn to make interested 
uses of every right and power which they possess, or may assume.” Jefferson predicted that in 
the not so distant future America would be as corrupt as the old country from which she had 
sought to distance herself. He feared that politicians would work to spread this corruption 
“through the body of the people”; that they would “purchase the voices of the people, and make 
them pay the price.” According to Jefferson, Virginia should reform her institutions before the 
corruption arises: “It is better to keep the wolf out of the fold, than to trust to drawing his teeth 
and talons after he shall have entered.”29  
 Jefferson thought that the 1776 Constitution lacked validity because it could be altered by 
the Virginia legislature. At the time the legislature drafted the instrument, they had not yet fully 
conceived the meaning of independence. Because the men who drafted the 1776 Constitution 
were not yet thinking of  “independence and a permanent republic,” they only desired to create a 
“temporary organization of government….” According to Jefferson, the 1776 Constitution 
“pretends to no higher authority than the other ordinances of the same session; it does not say, 
that it shall be perpetual; that it shall be unalterable by other legislatures; that it shall be 
transcendent above the powers of those, who they knew would have equal power with 
themselves.”30   
Arguing that the Virginia legislature had had the power to oppose Britain, but not the 
power to found a permanent form of government, Jefferson had little patience with the popular 
belief that the permanence of the 1776 Constitution could be inferred from the fact that it was not 
called an “ordinance.” On the contrary, Jefferson believed that “constitution” and “ordinance” 
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were convertible terms: “To get rid of the magic supposed to be in the word constitution, let us 
translate it into its definition as given by those who think it above the power of the law; and let 
us suppose the convention instead of saying, ‘We, the ordinary legislature, establish a 
constitution,’ had said, ‘We the ordinary legislature establish an act above the power of the 
ordinary legislature.’ Does not this expose the absurdity of the attempt?” The proponents of the 
1776 Constitution stated that the people had acceded to this Constitution, thereby giving it 
authority. Jefferson thought this procedure had established a dangerous principle, and to make 
his point he employed a reductio argument: “On every unauthoritative exercise of power by the 
legislature, must the people rise in rebellion, or their silence be construed into a surrender of that 
power to them? If so, how many rebellions should we have had already? One certainly for each 
session of assembly.”31  
Tucker disagreed with Jefferson’s arguments. As a foundation for his counter-argument, 
he returned to the first principles of natural rights theory. Under these principles, as applied by 
Tucker, the Virginia Constitution existed as an inevitable corollary of Virginia’s declaration of 
independence. The latter abolished a form of government while the former instituted a new one. 
“It would therefore have been absurdity in the extreme, in the convention, to suppose it to be the 
sense of their constituents, that they might cast off their dependence upon Great Britain, and 
annihilate the government exercised under its authority, without establishing another in its stead; 
thus leaving the people wholly without government, at the moment when the utmost exertions of 
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a regular and well organized government were required for the preservation, not of their liberties 
only, but their lives also, from the hand of the executioner.”32 
To make his case clearer, Tucker retold the story of Virginia’s move to declare 
independence: On 15 May 1776, a convention composed of two delegates from each county met 
in Williamsburg and declared Virginia independent of Britain. Tucker called this “a day ever to 
be remembered in Virginia….” According to his interpretation, Royal Governor Lord Dunmore’s 
proclamation played an important role in motivating Virginians to separate from England. He 
quoted the following from the Virginia declaration: “The King’s representative in this colony, 
hath not only withheld the powers of government from operating for our safety, but having 
retired on board an armed ship, carrying on a piratical and savage war against us, tempting our 
slaves by every artifice to resort to him and training and employing them against their masters.” 
On the very day of issuing this declaration, the convention appointed the committee that would 
draft the Virginia Bill of Rights and the 1776 Constitution. This committee had twenty-eight 
members. The convention approved the committee’s bill of rights draft on 12 June 1776 and the 
committee’s draft of a Constitution on 29 June 1776. On 5 July 1776 the leaders in the new 
government took their oaths of office “and then the convention adjourned; leaving the 
government of the Commonwealth of Virginia, as a independent state, completely organized, as 
such.”33  
According to Tucker, it took six weeks of careful deliberation to bring the Virginia 
Constitution into being. The lawgivers of Virginia examined the ancient constitutions of Sparta 
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and Athens but found them structured for a martial and warlike population and unsuitable for the 
“peaceable character of an agricultural people” such as those who occupied Virginia. In their 
search for a precedent the lawgivers took “the democratic part of the British constitution,” and 
“carefully lopt off from it every germ of monarchy, and feudal aristocracy.” These framers knew 
that governmental splendor and human happiness were largely incompatible, and that great ages 
of human history were rarely characterized by a “state of peace.” Historians tend to focus on eras 
of tumult and bloodshed, but “ambition, tyranny, treachery and revenge,” should not, according 
to Tucker, be confused with glory. He believed that the procedure that made the Virginia 
Constitution carried more legitimacy than that employed by the British in 1688 or by the French 
in 1789: “The convention of Virginia had not the shadow of a legal or constitutional form about 
it. It derived its existence and authority from a higher source; a power which can supersede all 
law, dispense with all forms, and whenever it pleases annul one constitution and set up another: 
namely the people in their sovereign, unlimited and unlimitable authority and capacity.”34  
 Despite their disagreements regarding the nature of the Virginia Constitution, Tucker 
generally followed Jefferson in seeing and lamenting the legislative dominance of that 
instrument. He qualified this agreement, however, both by noting that Virginians had established 
their Constitution “at a time when the spirit of equality was at its utmost height, and under 
circumstances which contributed greatly to augment the natural jealousy of executive power….” 
Section five of the Bill of Rights that preceded the Virginia Constitution indicated that the 
judicial power should be kept separate from the executive and legislative branches. The colonial 
constitution had been defective in this regard, and the example of royal prerogative over the 
other branches in the mother country had provided further demonstration of the need for a clear 
                                                          
34 Ibid., 91. 
 
 75
separation of powers. According to Tucker, the framers of the Virginia Constitution wanted a 
government conducive to the happiness of the people, and they wanted that government to have 
clearly defined executive, legislative and judicial branches.35 
 Jefferson had argued that the Virginia Constitution gave the legislature complete 
supremacy over both the executive and judicial branches, but Tucker disagreed, noting “that 
more than one instance might be adduced where the judiciary department have doubted, or 
denied the obligation of an act of the legislature because contrary to the constitution.”36 Although 
he did not make the point, at least one of these acts of judicial review would have been his own. 
The formative precedent, however, came not from Tucker but from George Wythe. In 1782, in 
his opinion in the case of Commonwealth v. Caton, Wythe argued that even if  “the whole 
legislature …should attempt to overleap the bounds, prescribed to them by the people, I, in 
administering the public justice of the country, will meet the united powers, at my seat in this 
tribunal; and pointing to the constitution, will say to them, here is the limit of your authority; and 
hither shall you go, but no further.” Tucker followed this precedent in 1793, when he delivered 
his opinion in the case of Kamper v. Hawkins. In this case Tucker, using Federalist 78 for his 
authority, argued that judicial review was the logical outcome of having a constitution superior 
to mere legislation.37  
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Tucker believed that only the people could change the Constitution; the legislature could 
not. He asked all Virginians to respect their Constitution until that time that they should see fit to 
call up a convention fit to alter it. In the meantime, he believed that they could be confident that 
the framers of that Constitution had intended it to be permanent. If they had not intended 
permanency, argued Tucker, they would not have included clauses such as the twenty-first which 
“released and forever confirmed” the boundaries set out by the Charters between Virginia and 
her neighbors. Yet despite these disagreements about the Virginia Constitution, Tucker and 
Jefferson were in fundamental agreement about the dangers posed by that document.  
For instance, Jefferson had feared that Virginia might become a dictatorship. He noted 
that in December of 1776 and again in June of 1781, the General Assembly of Virginia had 
considered a motion to hand control of Virginia over to a dictator. Jefferson noted with chagrin 
that the measure came within a few votes of being passed, and he argued that a dictatorship 
would violate “our ancient law…” as well as the “fundamental principle” of Virginia’s 
government, namely that “the state shall be governed as a commonwealth.” Jefferson conceded 
that his fellow Virginians had meant well in appealing to the Roman precedent of dictatorship, 
but that the Old Dominion differed so much from ancient Rome, that the ancient precedent 
should have no force in Virginia. In Rome “the government was of a heavy-handed unfeeling 
aristocracy, over a people ferocious, and rendered desperate by poverty and wretchedness….” 
Virginians, by contrast, were “a people, mild in their dispositions, patient under their trial, united 
for the public liberty, and affectionate to their leader.” Yet even with Roman precedents cast 
aside, Jefferson feared that the legislative dominance established by the Virginia Constitution, 
coupled with that legislature’s ability to set itself a quorum of one, could provide for dictatorship 
on a wholly domestic model. He therefore called for a convention to establish a constitution with 
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a real separation of powers, one which would “bind up the several branches of government by 
certain law, which when they transgress their acts shall become nullities….”38  
 Tucker also worried about the immediate and future dangers that could arise as a result of 
legislative dominance. Like Jefferson, he believed that the best time for reform would be before 
the crisis struck. Unlike Jefferson, however, Tucker had the advantage of writing after the 
ratification of the Federal Constitution. By guaranteeing a republican form of government, the 
Federal Constitution protected Virginia from the sort of despotism feared by Jefferson. Always 
keeping the possibility of secession in mind, Tucker provided a different type of motivation for 
constitutional reform in Virginia: “If by any fatal event the federal union should happen to be 
dissolved, or broken, there is not a state in the confederacy, that would sooner feel the total 
inadequacy of its constitution, to support its liberty and independence, as a state, then Virginia.” 
Despite these grave warnings, as late as 1803, Tucker still found the 1776 Constitution largely 
serviceable, finding it “to be fully commensurate, in time of peace, to the security and protection 
of the citizen from domestic violence or oppression either in his person, or his property.”39  
IV. 
Although they differed on the topic of the Virginia Constitution, Jefferson and Tucker had 
similar ideas concerning legal education. Jefferson intended his University of Virginia to be a 
bastion of Whig political thought. In a letter to James Madison he set forth his criterion for the 
appointment of a law professor at the new university and argued that while Virginia’s lawyers 
had been good Whigs before the Revolution, they had degenerated into Tories in the years since. 
According to Jefferson, few had noticed this slide, for the lawyers “suppose themselves, indeed, 
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to be Whigs, because they no longer know what whigism or republicanism means.” Jefferson 
thought that the legal professorship at the new University of Virginia could help change this state 
of affairs: “It is in our seminary that the vestal flame is to be kept alive; it is thence to spread 
anew over our own and the sister states.” Jefferson believed that this change in political thought 
would come about as a result of a change in reading material.40  
According to Jefferson, young Virginia lawyers before the Revolution had learned proper 
principles by reading one of the classics of English legal literature, Sir Edward Coke’s 
Commentary upon Littleton, generally know to lawyers simply as “Coke on Littleton,” and first 
published in 1628. After the Revolution, lawyers began their training with a more recent classic, 
William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England. Blackstone based his four volumes 
of commentaries on lectures he gave at Oxford University beginning in 1753. These lectures 
were the first lectures in English law ever offered at any university. Blackstone published his 
first volume in 1765, with the additional volumes following in 1766, 1768, and 1769.41 
Blackstone’s volumes are more comprehensive than those of his predecessor, but this very 
comprehensiveness made Jefferson uncomfortable. Young lawyers who read all four volumes 
were apt to become arrogant and think that they had mastered the law. Even “unlettered common 
people,” can see through this charade, thought Jefferson, for they “apply the appellation of 
Blackstone lawyers to these ephemeral insects of the law.” Jefferson wanted young Virginians to 
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start with Coke, to go through two or three years worth of legal training, and then with this 
knowledge as a base, approach Blackstone.42 
Tucker, like Jefferson, believed the teachings of Blackstone inimical to the interests of a 
free and independent Virginia. Indeed, much of Jefferson’s tirade against Blackstone seems to 
echo, almost word for word, Tucker’s introduction to his Blackstone edition. Tucker admitted 
that Blackstone’s scholarship allowed the law of England to emerge “from a rude chaos,” and to 
take on “the semblance of a regular system.” This progress, however, brought with it unintended 
drawbacks, as:  
The student who had read the Commentaries three or four times over, was lead to 
believe that he was a thorough proficient in the law, without further labor, or 
assistance; the crude and immethodical labors of Sir Edward Coke were laid aside, and 
that rich mine of learning, his Commentary upon Littleton, was thought to be no longer 
worthy of the labor requisite for extracting its precious ore. This sudden revolution in 
the course of study may be considered as having produced effects almost as pernicious 
as the want of a regular and systematic guide, since it cannot be doubted that it has 
contributed to usher into the profession a great number, whose superficial knowledge 
of the law has been almost as soon forgotten, as acquired.43  
 
Like Jefferson, Tucker knew that he could not teach law without having recourse to the four 
volumes by the Englishman. His edition of Blackstone came about as an effort to make the 
Englishman’s work safe for his law students at the College of William and Mary. 
Upon replacing George Wythe as professor of law at that college, Tucker wanted to write his 
own work, but he knew that time constraints would force him to make Blackstone’s 
Commentaries  the backbone of his legal curriculum.  
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Because he also had to work as a judge, Tucker did not have time to write his own 
comprehensive guide to the laws of the Anglophone world. He divided the school year into two 
relatively short semesters: the first ran from the first of December to the twenty-fifth of March 
and the second ran from the first of July to August 25. During this time he kept his students very 
busy: they were to read from dawn until 11:00 a.m.; listen to him lecture until 2:00 p.m., and 
then continue reading until dark. Tucker had his students read a variety of works, but he always 
kept Blackstone at the center. Never having more than seventeen students at a time, he taught his 
classes at home, a practice that would later prove controversial with the governing body of the 
college. Tucker insisted on the practice, however, on the grounds that he needed to have his legal 
books close at hand. He made extensive marginal notes in his copy of Blackstone and used these 
notes to lecture to the class. These notes eventually became the basis for his annotated edition.44 
Tucker believed that his annotations aided his students in their comprehension of Blackstone and 
made it possible for them to apply the relevant parts of the volumes while disregarding the rest: 
“To a student pursuing a systematical course of study it must be highly important to be delivered 
from a labyrinth of uncertainty, by casting his eye to the bottom of the page, and there finding 
whether the statute he is considering still forms a part of, or has been expunged from, that code, 
which he wishes to understand.”45 
Tucker’s chief debate with Blackstone hinged on the issues at the root of America’s War 
of Independence. Blackstone’s thought should not be, prima facie, thought of as hostile to the 
cause of American independence. Edmund Burke, the great English statesman and Old Whig, 
held a different view of Blackstone than did Tucker and Jefferson. In 1775, he noted: “I hear that 
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they have sold nearly as many of Blackstone’s Commentaries in America as in England.” Burke 
was sympathetic to the complaints of the Americans, and he warned his fellow members of 
Parliament that they should rightly fear the legal knowledge of the colonists, for reading in the 
law “renders men acute, inquisitive, dexterous, prompt in attack, ready in defense, full of 
resources.” According to Burke, men with such legal knowledge are dangerous, for “when great 
honors and great emoluments” do not win them “to the service of the state,” they can easily 
become “a formidable adversary to government.” The Americans, with their wide reading of 
Blackstone, learned to “augur misgovernment at a distance; and snuff the approach of tyranny in 
every tainted breeze.”46  
It is strange that a Tory like Blackstone could have such a strong influence upon Whigs 
on both sides of the Atlantic. The particular issue upon which Tucker focused did not concern 
the American independence movement in general, but rather upon the specific issue of 
sovereignty. Tucker thought that sovereignty rested with the people, and that the people only 
allowed a government to be sovereign so long as that government continued to serve their 
interests. Blackstone disagreed; even if the people had once possessed sovereignty, they had, 
over the course of time, bestowed it upon Parliament. Believing that the sovereignty of 
Parliament had become irrevocable, Blackstone did not, however, believe that the common law 
applied to the United States. Instead, the Englishman argued that only those acts of Parliament 
that specifically mentioned the colonies were binding. He thought that all governments possessed 
a seat of sovereignty that could not be divided. In the case of England this sovereignty rested 
with the Parliament. Thus the sovereignty of Parliament, according to Blackstone, could not be 
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undone without destroying all positive law and throwing everyone back into a primitive state of 
nature.47 
Although he praised the idea of a separation of powers, Blackstone thought that 
Parliament must serve as a check on the power of the king, but not vice versa. With the success 
of the Revolution, Americans thought they knew better: the people could divide their sovereignty 
among different branches, not necessarily just the legislature, and these branches would hold that 
sovereignty only conditionally. The English had made an important first step when they had 
checked the power of the executive with the legislative branch, but how could the people keep 
the power of this legislature in check? The American Revolution showed the way, and it did so 
by revolting against Blackstone’s notion of sovereignty. The conception of divided sovereignty 
did not arise out of the Revolution by accident. As one historian has noted, “whatever additional 
legal, theoretical, or substantive issues divided American from their mother country, what broke 
apart the empire was an inability to agree on the locus and nature of sovereignty.”48 In the 
Anglophone political world of the time, the leading authorities regarded divided sovereignty as 
an impossibility. The British, following Blackstone, believed that there had to be a seat of final 
and undivided authority somewhere in the Empire.49 
In establishing a voluntary union of free and independent states, the Declaration of 
Independence did not fully resolve the problem of divided sovereignty. Instead it set the stage for 
continued debate on the issue. Most Americans would come to believe that ultimate sovereignty 
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resided in the people of the United States. This seemingly simple solution, however, presents 
problems of its own. According to the traditional understanding, the essence of sovereignty 
resides in the making of law, and the people do not, of themselves, make the law. Under the 
Articles of Confederation, the states clearly exercised the sort of sovereignty described by 
Blackstone. If all sovereignty had continued to rest with the states, matters would have remained 
relatively simple, but the Constitution of 1787 marked a complicated innovation in political 
thought. As one historian puts it: “The Constitution would be a compact not among sovereign 
states, as was the 1781 Articles of Confederation, nor a Lockean compact between ruler and 
ruled, nor even a compact of the whole people among themselves. It would be a compact among 
peoples of different political societies, in their capacities as peoples of the several states.”50  
An analysis of the Tucker interpretation of the Constitution demonstrates that he did 
more than simply attach a useful expository essay on the United States Constitution to the back 
of an edition of Blackstone; instead, he insulated the impressionable minds of his law students 
from an excessive reverence for the British model of government that one might otherwise 
acquire from reading the Englishman. Tucker did this out of the belief that “wherever the 
constitution of the United States departs from the principles of the British constitution, the 
change will, in an eminent degree, contribute to the liberty and the happiness of the people, 
however it may diminish the splendor of those who administer it.” Tucker looked with a “jealous 
eye” at all the parts of the Constitution that “savor of monarchy, or aristocracy, or tend to a 
consolidated, instead of a federal, union of the states.” He argued that a true friend of the 
Constitution would always look for problems and propose amendments, before the injury caused 
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by oversight became too great to be repaired. Tucker heeded his own lesson by comparing all 
three branches of the Federal Government to their English counterparts.51 
He began with a discussion of the principles of representation used by the British and 
American Constitutions in establishing their legislatures. The House of Commons “which forms 
the democratical part of the British constitution” thereby constitutes “its superior excellence....” 
He quoted Blackstone on the necessity of representative democracy, but then demonstrated that 
the British system did not represent people equally. In America, on the other hand, “the 
representation is in exact proportion to the inhabitants.” According to Tucker, the problem with 
the English system was that “a borough composed of half a dozen freeholders, sends perhaps as 
many representatives to parliament, as a county which contains many thousands….” The 
Framers designed the American system of representation in such a manner as to avoid this abuse, 
and Tucker defended the three-fifths compromise in the light of this understanding.52  
Tucker saw the equal representation of each state in the senate as a fundamentally 
important characteristic of American federalism. The Senate represented the states “in their 
sovereign capacity, as moral bodies, who as such, are all equal; the smallest republic, as a 
sovereign state, being equal to the most powerful monarchy upon earth.” Tucker feared that 
without this equality existing somewhere in the American federal system “the Union could not, 
under any possible view, have been considered as an equal alliance between equal states.” The 
equality of state representation in the Senate prevented the smaller states from having to submit 
to “the most debasing dependence.” Tucker therefore regarded the equal mode of state 
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representation in the Senate as “one of the happiest traits” in the Constitution, and one able  “to 
cement the union equally with any other provision that it contains.”53 
Tucker did not think well of the British counterpart to the American Senate. After noting 
the qualifications necessary for a seat in the House of Lords, Tucker argued that in America “all 
are citizens possessing equal rights in their civil capacities and relations; there are no distinct 
orders among us, except while in the actual exercise of their several political functions.” 
Dissecting Blackstone’s claim that the class distinctions in the British Constitution helped to 
create a “laudable ardor” to preserve the country, Tucker argued that such distinctions were 
unnecessary, for a “pure democracy” produced “VIRTUE.” To define this word, Tucker turned 
to Montesquieu. The Frenchman found virtue to be nothing less than the love of the republic that 
engenders in turn love for democracy and love for equality. Taking this thesis to heart, Tucker 
argued that democracies generally produce more great men than do aristocracies. The ambition 
excited by virtue “must of necessity be directed to the public good,” while the ambition excited 
by aristocratic honors “may exist in the breast of a Caesar or a Cataline.” Had nature made 
“vigor of mind and activity of virtue” hereditary, then one could make an argument for a 
hereditary aristocracy. Nature, however, often produces sons who are inferior to their fathers. 
Therefore Tucker believed that aristocracies always posed a threat to liberty.54  
Tucker compared the relatively few privileges given to senators versus those the English 
bestowed on members of the peerage. “Happy for America that the constitution and the genius of 
her people, equally secure her against the introduction of such a pernicious and destructive class 
of men.” He found the newly made members of the House of Lords serviceable, for their place in 
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that House rested upon their individual attainments; however, he thought the hereditary members 
of that House contemptible. Noting that hereditary membership in the House of Lords passed to 
the first-born son, Tucker turned to the Bible for his argument against primogeniture: “The first 
born son of the first man, was a murderer.” Abraham’s first born “was an outcast from 
society…,” and “the first born of Jesse … was rejected in favor of David the youngest: and the 
first born of that same David, was by the same providence set aside in favor of Solomon his 
youngest son.” In those heady pre-seventeenth amendment days, Tucker could argue that 
Senators were “selected for their probity, attachment to their country, and talents, by the 
legislatures of the respective states.” He correctly predicted that though the “whole number of 
senators are at present limited to thirty-two …. It is not probable that they will ever exceed 
fifty….” The House of Lords had more than two hundred, and Tucker thought that even if they 
all had the mental attributes of Isaac Newton, they would still “be a mob.” Furthermore, 
according to Tucker, United States senators existed to represent the interest of their home state, 
while the peers of England had nothing to represent save their own class interest.55 
Moving to consider the executive branches of the American and English Constitutions, 
Tucker noted that a presidential veto could be easily overcome with a two-thirds majority in both 
houses, while the King’s veto was superfluous in that he could make whoever he wanted into 
Lord, thereby producing “a sufficient guarantee against the necessity of exercising this unpopular 
prerogative in the crown.” The King also had the power to dissolve the House of Commons, 
thereby procuring a body more hospitable to his aims. Although the American president 
possessed less power in this regard, Tucker believed that his office provided more unity and 
more responsibility to the executive branch. Under the English system, executive unity “exists 
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only theoretically, in an individual; the practical exercise of it, being devolved upon ministers, 
councils, and boards.” Tucker believed that these different bodies diffused responsibility through 
a “secret conclave,” thereby assuring that the British executive could be neither unanimous nor 
responsible. In the United States, by contrast, “the unity of the executive authority is practically 
established, in almost every instance.” From this premise, Tucker concluded that responsibility 
followed the president at all times, and that a president would be held just as responsible for what 
he did as for what he did not do. Having to seek election every four years, Tucker found the 
president both more accountable and more capable of unity than his British counterpart.56 
Although Blackstone praised the British executive for its perpetuity, Tucker did not 
agree. He noted that a king “may die, may be an infant in swaddling clothes, a superannuated 
dotard, or a raving maniac.” In any of these instances the king’s continual rule would be a 
disadvantage, not an advantage. Tucker noted that the Constitution of the United States forbade a 
child from assuming the presidency, and he happily noted that impeachment proceedings would 
quickly dispatch a senile or an insane chief executive. With the United States Constitution  
“[n]othing is wanting to the perpetuity of the office, but a provision for its continuance in case no 
president shall be elected at the period prescribed by the constitution.” Tucker believed that such 
a situation would not arise unless the people were “weary of the present constitution and 
government” and looking to terminate it. Always keeping an open mind regarding the possibility 
of secession, Tucker noted that “it is, perhaps, among the recommendations of the constitution, 
that it thus furnishes the means of a peaceable dissolution of the government, if ever the crisis 
should arrive that may render such a measure eligible, or necessary.” In addition, the 
Constitution of the United States forbade a foreign-born citizen from being elected president. 
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Tucker extolled the benefits of the constitutional restraint upon the election of foreigners to the 
office of the chief executive. He approved of this restriction, noting that a foreigner made 
himself king of Holland to the ruin of that country, and that “the fraternity of crowned heads” in 
Europe had more than once thrown the continent into crisis in an effort to preserve their 
interests.57  
Moving on to the judicial branch, Tucker argued that the United States Constitution 
provided the courts with both legal independence and constitutional independence. In England, 
by contrast, the executive and the legislative in combination could overturn the judiciary, but the 
United States Constitution rendered the judiciary immune to such attacks. This independence 
arose from the lifetime tenure of judges; from the fact that a federal judge’s salary could not be 
lowered; from the letter and spirit of the Constitution’s separation of the branches of 
government; and from the supremacy of the federal judiciary over all lower courts. According to 
Tucker, the judiciary traditionally formed a part of the executive authority. Under such a form of 
government judges advise the king, and when they reached a judgment it took the power of the 
king to carry it out. “But in the United States of America, the judicial power is a distinct, 
separate, independent, and co-ordinate branch of the government....” Justices swore an oath to 
the Constitution, not an oath to follow the decrees of the legislature.58  
V. 
In comparing the differences between the English and American constitutions, Tucker thought 
himself to be doing much more than engaging in an academic parlor game. He believed that only 
a proper and orthodox understanding of the United States Constitution could preserve the 
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liberties that Virginians held dear. Among these liberties, the freedom of speech had always held 
a pride of place, and Tucker believed that events in the late eighteenth century had put this 
freedom under attack. In 1798, a Federalist-dominated Congress passed the Alien and Sedition 
Acts in preparation for an expected war with France. In addition to allowing for the easier 
deportation of immigrants deemed hostile to the United States, these acts established strict 
restrictions on criticism of the government. Domestic opponents of the John Adams 
administration, such as Tucker, rightfully believed that the Sedition Act in particular impinged 
upon their freedom of speech.59  
Tucker did not hesitate to spell out what he meant by freedom of speech: “Liberty of 
speech and of discussion in all speculative matters, consists in the absolute and uncontrollable 
right of speaking, writing, and publishing, our opinions concerning any subject, whether 
religious, philosophical, or political; and of inquiring into and, examining the nature of truth, 
whether moral or metaphysical; the expediency or inexpediency of all public measures, with 
their tendency and probable effect; the conduct of public men, and generally every other subject; 
without restraint, except as to the injury of any other individual, in his person, property, or good 
name.”60 He believed that the United State Constitution existed, in part, to defend this broad 
conception of freedom.  
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Tucker thought that such liberty had been universally restricted until his time. Providing 
an example from English history to make his point, the professor argued that England only 
acquired some freedom of the press in 1694, and even this freedom only prevented prior restraint 
of publication. After something had been published one could still be punished for writing it. In 
addition, the British Constitution assumed the supremacy of Parliament, and the English laws 
protecting the freedom of speech therefore only shielded the people from the royal power, not the 
parliamentary power: “They are mere legislative precautions against executive usurpations.” 
According to Tucker, the United States Constitution protected the freedom of speech not only 
from executive encroachments, but from legislative encroachment as well. The rights protecting 
freedom of speech “are secured, not by laws paramount to prerogative; but by constitutions 
paramount to laws.”61  
In viewing the political conflicts surrounding the Sedition Act, Tucker noted that as soon 
as it had passed, the government began carrying out prosecutions, and that these prosecutions 
“were conducted … with a rigor, which seemed to betray a determination to convert into a 
scourge that, which it had been pretended was meant only to serve as a shield.” Not surprisingly 
then, when the scurrilous journalist James Thompson Callender wrote Tucker from jail, noting 
that he had been put there by the Sedition Act, Tucker made an effort to help him. Tucker wrote 
to the future Chief Justice of the United States, John Marshall, and asked his fellow Virginian to 
intercede on Callender’s behalf with the president. In this letter, Tucker expressed the hope that 
he and Marshall were still friends despite their “political differences of opinion....” Tucker noted 
that he was writing “on behalf of a man whom I never saw, not ever had the slightest intercourse 
or communications with until” receiving his letter the night before. While admitting that the 
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president might lose popularity by freeing Callender, Tucker argued that such a course of action 
would nevertheless be the right thing to do. “And though I am in truth incapable of saying 
anything which may be considered as offering incense to the President of the United States, I 
have no hesitation in declaring to my friend John Marshall, that I should feel myself obliged to 
him for his human interposition on behalf of a man, whom I cannot but consider as suffering an 
unconstitutional punishment.”62  
John Marshall replied promptly to Tucker’s plea, noting his contempt for that “intolerant 
and persecuting spirit which allows of no worth out of its own pale, and breaks off all social 
intercourse as a penalty of an honest avowal of honest opinions.” He informed Tucker that the 
president had no control over the prosecution of these matters. “The laws are made, and those 
who violate them are prosecuted by the proper officer without the knowledge or direction of the 
President.” Marshall believed that Callender could only be excused if he were “below” the 
“resentment” of the law. Perhaps he was, but Marshall did not believe this case to merit his 
interposition with the president. He wished that Callender’s screed against Alexander Hamilton 
“had never been seen by any person.” In any case, even if he were willing to interpose himself 
with the president,  “I do not think Mr. Adams would take any step in the case while the election 
is uncertain.” As to the Sedition Act being unconstitutional, Marshall politely left his opinion to  
one side, merely noting that the “unconstitutionality of the law cannot be urged to the President  
because he does not think it so.” Marshall noted that other “wise and virtuous men” held the 
Sedition Act unconstitutional. “Of consequence, whatever doubts some of us may entertain, he 
who entertains none, would not be, and ought not be influenced by that argument.”63 
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Tucker had no doubt as to the unconstitutionality of the Sedition Act. He argued that the 
first amendment provided “a positive denial to congress, of any power whatever, on the subject.” 
He noted that defenders of the Sedition Act generally referred to Article One, Section Eight of 
the Constitution, the famous “necessary and proper clause.” Tucker followed the orthodox 
doctrine that this clause did not provide any new powers to Congress but merely made “a 
declaration, for the removal of all uncertainty, that the means of carrying into execution, those 
[powers] otherwise granted, are included in the grant.” According to this reasoning, since there is 
no express power for which the Sedition Act could be construed as a means of enforcement, the 
Sedition Act was therefore unconstitutional. Tucker did not believe that the power to suppress 
insurrections could properly be used as a precedent for the Sedition Act. For “it surely cannot, 
with the least plausibility, be said, that a regulation of the press, and the punishment of libels, are 
exercises of a power to suppress insurrections.”64  
According to Tucker, constitutional orthodoxy derived from “the construction which 
prevailed during the discussions and ratifications of the constitution….” Tucker believed that the 
consequences of abandoning constitutional orthodoxy on the question of the necessary and 
proper clause would be severe. He held the orthodox construction to be “absolutely necessary” in 
order to maintain “consistency with the peculiar character of the government, as possessed of 
particular and defined powers only; not of the general and indefinite powers vested in ordinary 
governments.” With the abandonment of constitutional orthodoxy “it must be wholly immaterial, 
whether unlimited powers be exercised under the name of unlimited powers, or be exercised 
under the name of unlimited means of carrying into execution limited powers.” 65 
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 Tucker firmly believed that freedom of speech implied the freedom of the press. He 
offered a blueprint for how the press should employ this freedom: “A freedom unlimited as the 
human mind; viewing all things, penetrating the recesses of the human heart, unfolding the 
motives of human actions, and estimating all things by one invaluable standard, truth; applauding 
those who deserve well; censuring the undeserving; and condemning the unworthy, according to 
the measure of their demerits.”  He then demonstrated why a sedition law would be 
unconstitutional, taking on the argument that the first amendment, like its British predecessors, 
only offered freedom from prior restraint. Some had argued that the federal government inherited 
the full jurisdiction of the British common law, but Tucker disagreed: “The United States as a 
federal government have no common law.” The individual states had adopted parts of the 
common law tradition, but “the common law of one state … is not the common law of 
another.”66 Tucker believed that giving the federal government a common law jurisdiction would 
destroy the limited government established by the United State Constitution, and instead 
establish a government on principles identical to those of the British Constitution.   
In making this case Tucker offered a fuller development of arguments first put forth in 
the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions. James Madison had penned the Virginian Resolutions 
while Thomas Jefferson wrote the Kentucky Resolutions. Although drafted as a response to the 
Alien and Sedition Acts, these resolutions concerned the deeper question of the relationship 
between the federal government and that of the states, and the source of authority when disputes 
arose between them. Jefferson’s document was the bolder of the two, arguing as it did that the 
states, as the original parties in the constitutional compact, had the power to nullify federal 
legislation which went against the United States Constitution. Madison merely thought that the 
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states could interpose themselves between the federal government and the unjustly persecuted 
citizens of a state. Tucker agreed with these resolutions, and he thought it a shame that the other 
states had largely rejected them: “The general assembly of Massachusetts, alone, condescended 
to reason with her sister states; the others scarcely paid them the common respect that is held to 
be due from individuals to each other.”67 
James Madison headed the committee that reviewed these hostile responses from the 
other states, and he responded with a review of them. His review of the resolutions, according to 
Tucker, contained “a train of arguments, and of powerful, convincing, and unsophistic reasoning, 
to which, probably, the equal cannot be produced in any public document, in any country.” In his 
defense of constitutional orthodoxy, Tucker had recourse to Madison’s report, which he regarded 
as “very long,” and  “incapable of being abridged, without manifest injury.” Madison not only 
believed that the first amendment forbade a Sedition Act, he argued that even without the first 
amendment, the federal government lacked the power to pass such an act. Proponents of the 
Sedition Act disagreed and put forth an argument that Madison greeted with “astonishment and 
apprehension;” namely, that the common law, “a law of vast extent and complexity, and 
embracing almost every possible subject of legislation, both civil and criminal” composed “a part 
of the law of these states, in their united and national capacity.” Madison conceded that the  
common law existed in the colonies before the revolution, but that “it was the separate law of  
each colony within its respective limits, and was unknown to them as a law pervading and 
operating through the whole, as one society.” The common law existed this way by necessity. 
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Because no common legislature or court existed, each colony had to propagate or amend the 
common law on its own.68 
Madison then moved to consider the effect of the Revolution upon the common law in 
the colonies. According to his interpretation, the colonies had believed themselves bound to the 
king, but not to parliament. The American Revolutionaries believed that the “legislative power 
was … as complete in each American Parliament, as in the British Parliament.” In Madison’s 
view, it was the “denial of these principles by Great Britain, and the assertion of them by 
America, [that] produced the revolution.” The British colonies had tacitly acquiesced in 
Parliament’s attempts to regulate commerce so long as “this regulating power was confined to 
the two objects of conveniency and equity….” Once the commerce-regulating power had been 
“perverted to the selfish views of the party assuming it, then the injured parties began to feel and 
to reflect; and the moment the claim to a direct and indefinite power was engrafted on the 
precedent of the regulating power, the whole charm was dissolved, and every eye opened to the 
usurpation.” Therefore, the future president found the doctrine “that the common law is binding 
on these states as one society … repugnant to the fundamental principle of the revolution.”69  
Perhaps the Constitution of 1787 introduced a common law jurisdiction between the 
states. Madison admitted that “particular parts of the common law may have a sanction from the 
Constitution, so far as they are necessarily comprehended in the technical phrases which express 
the powers delegated to the government; and so far, also, as such other parts may be adopted by 
Congress, as necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers expressly delegated.” 
                                                          
68 Ibid., 390-392; James Madison, “Report of the Committee to whom were referred the Communications 
of Various States, Relative to the Resolutions of the Last General Assembly of this State, Concerning the 
Alien and Sedition Laws,” in Marvin Meyers, ed. The Mind of the Founder: Sources of the Political 
Thought of James Madison (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1973), 244-245. 
 
69 Ibid., 246-247. 
 96
Madison did not believe, however, that the federal government’s common law jurisdiction 
exceeded these parameters. Those who disagreed, interpreted the second section of Article Three 
as granting it. This section reads as follows: “The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law 
and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under their authority.” Madison regarded this clause as a reiteration of the 
Supreme Court’s power to decide cases against states that violated the Constitution and to decide 
cases between citizens of different states or between citizens and a foreigner. Furthermore, 
Madison interpreted the expression “‘cases in law and equity’” as explicitly forbidding criminal 
cases. The Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and as to fact, but criminal 
cases must be heard before juries; therefore, according to his reasoning, the Supreme Court could 
not hear criminal cases. In sum “it is evident that this part of the Constitution … would not 
include any cases whatever of a criminal nature, and consequently would not authorize the 
inference from it, that the judicial authority extends to offenses against the common law, as 
offenses arising under the Constitution.”70  
Madison pointed out the two portions of the Constitution that enumerated the laws. He 
noted that the common law was not mentioned in either. He then listed a number of hypothetical 
questions for the proponents of common law jurisdiction, most hinging upon the difficulties that 
must face anyone seeking to determine when to cut off the influence of British statutes. He made 
a reductio argument, noting that if the Constitution established the common law in the United 
States, then the legislature would have no power to alter it, and that the sedition law would 
therefore be nullified. On the other hand, if the Constitution did establish the common law and 
gave Congress the power to amend it, then the Congress would have unlimited power. Similarly, 
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the president, who has the power to enforce the laws, would see his powers greatly increased. 
And the Supreme Court would acquire, according to Madison, “a discretion little short of a 
legislative power.” The fate of such a grant would be to make the laws unknowable by the 
majority of the citizens. It “would overwhelm the residual sovereignty of the states, and, by one 
constructive operation, new-model the whole political fabric of the country.” Madison regarded 
it as an insult to the prudence of the framers of the Constitution to think that they would be so 
stupid as to give the new government common law jurisdiction.71 
Tucker followed Madison’s arguments against a common law jurisdiction for the federal 
government, but he did so in his own way. In analyzing the subject, Tucker broke it into four 
questions: Did the laws of England travel across the Atlantic with the colonists? To what extent 
did the colonists adopt them independently? To what extent did the revolution annul these laws? 
And have these laws “been engrafted upon, and made a part of ” the Constitution of the United 
States? With regard to the first question, Tucker began with the opinion put forth by Blackstone, 
who argued that the colonies were taken from the natives by right of conquest, and  that the 
common law therefore had no force in them. It would have been easy for Tucker to simply 
follow Blackstone here, but he did not. Instead, he argued that the only place where Blackstone’s 
argument held force would be in the colony of New York. In all the other colonies, whether the 
land had been purchased, conquered or ceded to the people who settled the colony, the 
Americans living there “were neither the people who were conquered, nor those who were ceded 
by treaty, to a different sovereignty….” Tucker argued that sovereignty, when acquired through 
conquest, “is acquired when a nation, having just reason to make war upon another people, 
reduces them by the superiority of their arms to the necessity of thenceforth submitting to the 
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government of the conquerors.” Free Englishmen, who brought with them the common law, 
settled all of the other colonies.72  
 According to Tucker, the colonists had the same rights and privileges as those who 
remained at home, and by consequence they “did bring with them that portion of the laws of the 
mother country, which was necessary to the conservation and protection of those rights.” 
Existing far from England, and facing numerous dangers from the Indians, which they had to 
meet almost solely on their own initiative, the colonists continued to have recourse to the laws of 
the mother country, “until leisure and experience should enable them to make laws better 
adapted to their own peculiar situation.” When it came time to adapt the common law, Tucker 
believed that the various states did so in mutually irreconcilable ways. For instance, the professor  
believed that the legal cultures of the South and New England could never be reconciled. He 
offered sketches of the laws of each colony to demonstrate just how different they were in their 
origins and development, and to show the impossibility of establishing a unified common law for 
the United States. 73 
According to Tucker, the laws of England began to have force in Virginia either with the 
constitution of the colony in 1607, or with the charter granted to Sir Walter Raleigh in 1584. 
Either way, early colonists adhered to the law by choice. He demonstrated how these laws 
extended to mandatory churchgoing for all colonials, and how they restricted anyone not 
ordained by a bishop in England from becoming a minister. Failure to attend church would resort 
in a monetary fine, but these fines differed between normal non-attendees and Quakers. “But this 
general adoption of the laws of England was probably confined to the colony of Virginia, which, 
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even to the period when the revolution commenced, was distinguished for its loyalty, beyond any 
other of the plantations.” In Virginia the colonists distinguished between those laws passed 
before they left the mother country, and those they passed after their arrival in the New World. 
When Virginia agreed with a law passed by Parliament, the colonial legislature would explicitly 
adopted it, with alterations if necessary.74  
Tucker contrasted Virginia’s loyalty with the “spirit of independency” that characterized 
those who chose to settle in the “savage deserts” of New England. Tucker demonstrated that the 
New England colonies had their own rules and regulations, noting that “whilst Cromwell was at 
the head of affairs, he showed them all the indulgence they desired; from 1640 to 1660, they 
approached very near to an independent commonwealth.” As such, New England established a 
system of laws, which “instead of making the laws of England the ground work of the their 
code,” used “the Law of Moses” as a guide. Tucker argued that New Englanders moved away 
from the common law tradition by expanding the list of crimes that could be punished with the 
death penalty. Even real estate restrictions seem to have followed biblical law, which forbade 
“the alienation of lands from one tribe to another.” New England “established an ecclesiastical 
polity of their own, totally differing from the mother country….” Tucker noted that the entire 
organization of the colony changed in 1691, in part because the old one was so prejudicial 
towards “Episcopalians… Baptists, Quakers, and other sectarists….” Under the new system, 
“[l]iberty of conscience was allowed to all except papists.”75   
Tucker knew that the seventh amendment explicitly contains the term “common law” and 
that the other amendments provide for privileges with a common law pedigree, such as the right 
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of habeas corpus and the right to a jury trial. Yet he compared this borrowing to the British 
court’s occasional employment of the conventions of Roman, canon, and civil law when there 
were no native precedents available. As to the latter borrowings from common law forms, 
Tucker believed that they involved only a manner of proceeding. Any actual grant of common 
law jurisdiction to the federal government would be, according to Tucker, a disaster. It would  
“at one stroke… annihilate the states altogether … repeal and annul their several constitutions, 
bills of rights, legislative codes, and political institutions in all cases whatsoever.” 76  
For instance, the Virginia Constitution separated the legislative, executive, and judiciary 
departments, whereas the common law united them all in one person. The Virginia Constitution 
also eliminated forfeiture as a penalty in criminal cases, whereas forfeiture “is one of the pillars 
of criminal jurisprudence, by the common law.” Tucker provided other instances where other 
state constitutions provided rights and privileges beyond those dictated by the common law. 
Furthermore, according to Tucker, giving the federal government full common law jurisdiction 
would endanger the continued existence of slavery. All of the state constitutions at the time, 
except perhaps that of Massachusetts, permitted slavery. “The common law, as understood for 
many centuries past in England, absolutely rejects slavery. Should a question arise upon that 
subject in Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina or Georgia, it might be of serious 
consequence, if the common law were pronounced to be paramount to the laws of the states.”77 
Not surprisingly, there were those in the Union who desired to give the federal government 
exactly these powers, and equally unsurprisingly these people saw Tucker and Madison as their 
natural enemies. They will be introduced in later chapters.  
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To those who argue that the federal government received common law jurisdiction by 
implication, Tucker argued that the tenth amendment should have cleared up any confusion in 
this regard. He believed that even without the tenth amendment, it would be absurd to think that 
the Constitution provided the federal government common law powers that the states had 
explicitly excluded her own courts from having. It would not be correct, even as a general 
principle, to assume “that sovereign and independent states can be abridged of their rights, as 
sovereign states, by implication, only.” By definition, a “free nation” is one that cannot “be 
bound by any law but its own will….” In making this case, Tucker returned to the natural rights 
rhetoric of self-preservation: “And as every nation is bound to preserve itself, or, in other words, 
its independence; so no interpretation whereby its destruction, or that of the state, which is the 
same thing, may be hazarded, can be admitted in any case where it has not, in the most express 
terms, given its consent to such an interpretation.”78 
In writing his numerous essays on constitutional themes, Tucker returned again and again 
to the same natural rights principles that he had used in his essay on slavery. Unlike that essay, 
however, Tucker’s constitutional essays continued to exercise influence even after the mid-
nineteenth century revolt against modern natural rights theory. That revolt turned many 
Virginians away from the sort of anti-slavery stance that Tucker had expressed. Indeed, even 
today when adherence to the basic tenets of the natural rights faith remains only nominal, the 
constitutional thought of Tucker bears considerable similarity, if indeed it does not influence on 
its own, orthodox interpretations of the Constitution. A comprehensive understanding of the 
Constitution of the United States must take into account the way that document was understood 
by the generation that wrote and ratified it. As one of the earliest and most comprehensive post-
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ratification commentaries, Tucker’s essays provide an invaluable snapshot of constitutional 
orthodoxy at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and are thus all but indispensable. 
 103
Chapter Three: Slavery and the Successors of St. George Tucker 
I. 
The successors of St. George Tucker discussed in this chapter include not only his relatives who 
became professors —there were three: his cousin George and his two sons Henry and 
Beverley— but all Virginian professors who found it necessary to speak and write publicly on 
the issue of slavery during the first fifty years of the nineteenth century. These men conceived of 
slavery both in relation to a sectional dispute within the country at large, but perhaps more 
importantly in terms of a sectional divide in their home state. They lived at a time when 
Virginia’s colleges were turbulent places full of difficult to manage and often even violent 
students, and in a place that was becoming an ethnically more diverse State. This atmosphere 
uncertainty and change influenced the way in which professors viewed the issue of slavery and 
contributed to the gradual abandonment of modern natural rights theory.  
The first of the successors of St. George was his oldest son, Henry St. George Tucker, 
who was born in 1780. Henry took the baccalaureate degree at William and Mary in 1798, and 
then stayed for another three years, receiving his law degree in 1801. His father, impressed with 
some of the judges out in the western part of Virginia, sent his son to practice law in Winchester, 
a town at the bottom of the Shenandoah Valley, near the border with Maryland. St. George 
agreed to support Henry for three years, after which, he would be on his own.1  
In Winchester, Henry found a small town of about 2,700 people. He praised the industry 
of its citizens, noting their predilection for building their houses of stone, a sign he took to mean 
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that they intended to remain rooted to their locale. Henry specifically contrasted the “punctuality 
and attention to business” that he found among his fellow Winchesterians to the “sloth and 
indolence” of the people in his hometown of Williamsburg. He believed slavery to be 
responsible for many of the differences between the two regions of the state: “The difference, I 
suppose, proceeds from the large proportion of whites to blacks which in this country is 22,000 
to 2,500.” Unfortunately, he also found the regional culture of Winchester to stand in the way of 
his prosperity as a young lawyer. Many of the citizens of Winchester were of German or Scotch-
Irish descent, and Henry found them to be “close and stingy” with their money. He wondered 
whether “it is better to gain the industrious and notable character” of these immigrants or “to 
retain that liberality, hospitality, and generosity which has been generally regarded as the 
peculiar trait of the Virginian.”2 
 St. George Tucker had encouraged his children to own slaves. In 1802, Henry rode out to 
Winchester with a young slave bodyservant named Johnny. The two did not get along well; 
Johnny was too “familiar” and his attitude became unbearable when Henry caught Johnny 
wearing his clothes. The young master sought to sell his slave and move into a boarding house, 
but St. George did not approve. He sent Henry another slave, this one named Bob. Henry wrote 
his father a rather surprised note when he discovered young Bob’s homesickness, noting that the 
young slave had woken him “from a very sound sleep” with “a most piteous lamentation.” Henry 
called to Bob repeatedly, finally awaking him. After asking him what was the matter, Bob 
replied that he was dreaming of his mother. Henry professed himself to have been shocked by 
this reply. He had “regarded this child as insensible when compared to those of our complexion.” 
He had been wrong: “How finely woven, how delicately sensible must be those bonds of natural 
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affection which equally adorn the civilized and savage. The American and African –nay the man 
and the brute!” After this incident, Henry seemed to find Bob much more malleable than Johnny 
and usually spoke of him in similarly sentimental yet paternalistic terms.3 
 By 1806, Henry had enough legal work to keep him busy, and he began to consider the 
advantages that he could accrue from seeking elective office. He believed that time spent in 
Washington could help him achieve “practical knowledge,” which would compliment what he 
had learned from the reading of books. He thought that he had already acquired enough practical 
knowledge of politics to enable him to overcome any youthful idealism he might have previously 
possessed. He no longer viewed the government with “that admiration and veneration common 
to very young persons,” and he had become aware “that the contending and conflicting interests, 
views and ambitions of members of those bodies will mar every project for extending one’s 
influence, and will teach them to view with jealousy, those exertions to excel which certainly 
merit a better fate then they usually meet with.” Henry stated that if he were to acquire a seat in 
the state assembly he would “most probably be a silent member,” and that he would use his time 
there to acquire practical knowledge; knowledge that he would find useful after he achieved his 
real goal: becoming a judge. St. George, however, counseled his son against political 
involvement, and Henry made only a halfhearted attempt to do the sort of campaigning necessary 
to win political office.4 
 Henry nevertheless ended up serving in the United States House of Representatives from 
1815 to 1819. Before retiring from the job, he expressed his feelings to his father in a metaphor: 
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“the game is not worth the candle.” Henry thought that “the affairs of the United States are at 
present in such a state of calm (happily for the people) that there is very little to interest the 
representatives: and even when any matter occurs which is calculated to excite interest with us, it 
passes off without a correspondent feeling among our constituents.”5 Soon after retiring from his 
seat in the House of Representatives, however, Henry took up a seat in the state senate, where he 
served from 1819 to 1823. After just having stated that politics was not worth the trouble, Henry 
rationalized his decision in a series of letters to his father: “It is true I am a candidate for the 
Senate, chiefly with a view of reviving my old acquaintances in Virginia and of coming to see 
you.” He did not enjoy being absent from Winchester, but he noted that the “absence from home 
will not be so serious as in my congressional service: though God knows it will be sufficient.” In 
another letter he stated that he wished to flee Winchester since everyone there had the whooping 
cough, further noting that he had become too “aloof from the society of the low country” and that 
he needed to become reacquainted with his friends from college.6 
 Henry’s biographer has argued that the real reason underlying Henry’s retreat from 
Congress concerned his being too “thin-skinned” for a life in national politics and that he 
especially disliked public clashes with his half-brother and fellow congressman John Randolph. 
The two had had minor clashes on the floor over issues as diverse as slavery in the District of 
Columbia and constitutional pay raises, but it seems more likely that Henry left Congress for the 
reasons he described above. He did not fear conflict, and he never hesitated to take an unpopular 
position, even among his constituents. For instance, he opposed the sentiments of many of his 
constituents whom he found too prone to “bow down and worship General Jackson.” Henry did 
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not approve of Jackson’s conduct in the Seminole War, and when Jackson passed through 
Winchester, Henry noted: “a dinner was given him which I positively refused to attend.” Henry 
had left Congress, in part, because he thought that that body had no important questions to face. 
Had he remained in that office, he would have found that the force of events had proven him 
wrong.7 
Henry left Washington before the Missouri Crisis began to trouble the Union. His second 
cousin, however, had just made the journey to Washington to serve in the House of 
Representatives. George Tucker had struggled as a lawyer in the southern part of Virginia and in 
Richmond, and had failed to win a seat in the General Assembly in 1813 and again in 1814, 
before finally having had the good fortune to win election to the United States Congress at 
exactly the time Henry left that body. Soon after arrival in Washington, he became a partisan on 
behalf of statehood for Missouri, writing to St. George that slavery must be allowed to move 
west, for if the institution were contained in the present slave-holding states, “this exclusion must 
necessarily have the effect of increasing the ratio of black to white population in the slaveholding 
states….” George believed that such a demographic change would produce the “most dangerous 
and alarming” effects in less than one hundred years. He noted that he was “desirous of 
exhibiting my views to the Committee as soon as I can get the floor, which is a matter of some 
uncertainty.” Contrary to his initial expectations, George did not have to wait long.8 
Not surprisingly, the man who had won his first praise as a man of letters for writing on 
the dangers that faced the Old Dominion as a result of Gabriel’s rebellion, rose to the occasion 
and penned a speech providing an incisive analysis of the Missouri question. He noted the 
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criticism made by some in the North that Virginia should have little interest on this subject. On 
the contrary, George argued that the issue “threatens not only the peace and welfare of Virginia, 
in common with all the slaveholding states, but their very political existence.” He went on to 
consider the dubious constitutionality of the constitutional regulation of slavery in Missouri, 
employing arguments that will be analyzed in the following chapter. Regarding slavery, George 
noted for rhetorical effect, that were he an inhabitant of Missouri, he would himself oppose the 
introduction of slavery into his state, but that such decisions should be made by the citizens of 
that territory, not by congressional leaders in Washington.9 
George argued from the principles of population growth set forth by Thomas Malthus in 
his Essay on Population, “which I cannot but consider as a work of great ability.” He then set 
forth some mathematical legerdemain with asides about the importance of looking more than one 
hundred years into the future before reaching his conclusion: if whites were allowed to leave the 
slaveholding state but blacks were not, in one hundred years the slaveholding states would have 
three black persons for every white person. “The wildest political visionary does not think it 
practicable to amalgamate such discordant materials; we must be in that situation then, in which 
we can neither safely set them free nor hold them in subjection.” George believed that the 
inevitable forces of “political economy” would eventually force emancipation upon the 
slaveholding states. He reasoned that the United States possessed only a finite amount of 
“wastelands” and that as more of these areas came under cultivation, a point would be reached 
when labor would decline in value “until at length the cost of bringing up a slave will be more 
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than he is worth.” At that point, slaveowners would find themselves desirous of freeing their 
slaves.10 
Since he did not think that freed blacks could be amalgamated into white civilization, 
George considered instead the colonization of slaves into another part of the country. He noted 
the existence of a  “society established for the purpose of colonizing the people of color” but he 
had “long since abandoned the hope of deriving any remedy for the evil of domestic slavery from 
this quarter.” According to George’s calculations, the United States had one million slaves 
producing an annual increase of fifty-one thousand. If one were to pay $300 for each of them it 
would take more than fifteen million dollars to buy them from their owners and probably another 
five million to transport them to Africa. “And this annual expenditure of twenty millions is not to 
reduce the number, but merely to keep it stationary.” George did not think that amalgamation or 
colonization could ever be successful. He believed that the only solution would be to allow 
slaves to migrate west, so that “when the period arrives, as it certainly must, when the self-
interest of individuals will burst the bonds of the slave, emancipation will then consist with the 
tranquillity and safety of the state….” George believed that future tensions in the United States 
would be more likely to follow an East/West rather than a North/South divide. He thus warned 
his northern colleagues that it would be in their best interest to help the South, “their natural 
allies.” In closing his speech, George stated that “the question is not whether we shall have a 
greater or smaller number of slaves, but whether we shall have the same number on the east and 
west side of the Mississippi.” He admitted to the danger of slave insurrections, but compared the 
danger to that of “foreign commerce” producing wars. George believed that asking Missouri to 
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give up slavery would be like asking Maine to give up “foreign commerce.” In other words, it 
would be absurd.11 
Previously to this speech, George had always struggled as a public speaker, and he had 
thus found it difficult to prosper as a lawyer. In this instance, however, he prepared the speech 
with care, even going so far as to memorize it. George would later recall that though there were 
only about fifty members present, that nearly all of them listened with rapt attention; all save 
one, John Randolph, who made a show of getting up and walking out of the hall. George began 
to notice a pattern: whenever he used his skill with words to defend slavery, he received great 
compliments. Only Randolph dissented, and George noted that his fellow Virginian said bad 
things about the speech to anyone who would listen. This campaign failed “and as he was then ill 
affected towards me, and had endeavored to injure me in the district (which was adjoining to his 
own) he denounced it because it had won the praises of others —and during the greater part of 
the time which I served in Congress, I scarcely ever said anything …which did not provoke his 
opposition.” George would go on to serve three terms in the House of Representatives before 
taking up a position as professor at the University of Virginia.12 
George had argued eloquently in an effort to secure Missouri’s admission as a slave state, 
but many Virginians would be very unhappy with the conditions that surrounded the famed 
Missouri Compromise. The admission of Missouri as a slave state was desired by all, the 
admission of Maine as a free state troubled few, but the restriction of slavery in the territories 
above the line of 36 degrees, 30 minutes upset many, not the least of them Henry Tucker, who 
wrote to his father about his disgust with James Monroe, the president who signed the 
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compromise bill: “I have long since set him down as a man who had set his eye upon the 
presidency, determined to have it at any price and to keep it whatever the sacrifice.” Henry 
thought that Monroe failed to oppose the compromise out of a fear that doing so would create 
opposition in his run for a second term. As a result, “the great, the essential, the permanent 
interests of the South are sacrificed forever.” Henry did not think that any southern man could be 
put in Monroe’s place in time: “we have embarked our all in this leaky hulk and it is now too late 
to look for a sounder vessel.” Looking back on the course of action that had brought Virginia to 
this impasse, Henry stated that Virginia “had been shorn of her strength by the North Western 
cession,” and he feared that in seeking to regain her proper place Virginia and the South would 
precipitate “a dissolution of the union before a half a century.”13 
II. 
George Tucker’s newfound political success did not keep him from continuing to exercise his 
passion for letters. The summer of 1823, home from service in Washington, he decided to try his 
hand at a novel. The “extraordinary success of Walter Scott” had excited his ambition. Thinking 
that every country needed its own Walter Scott, George argued that each distinctive region of the 
world “afforded abundant materials for this class of writings in the delineation of national 
manner, habit, and character.” While still managing to dedicate himself full-time to the law, 
George dashed off, in two months,  what would become the first of what critics now call the 
“Virginia novel.”14 Traveling to New York, George attempted to interest magazines and 
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publishers in the book he called The Valley of the Shenandoah. One publisher offered him $500 
for it, if George would remain in New York to supervise the printing. If not, a proofreader would 
cost George Tucker $50 off the original payment. Unsatisfied with this deal, George made 
another with Charles Wiley, the man responsible for the American editions of Scott’s novels. 
The men agreed to print the book “at our joint expense and joint profit.” Although it would be 
translated into German during George Tucker’s own lifetime, George’s first novel was a failure 
in the English speaking world. In George’s estimation the book failed because “it had the 
disadvantage of ending unhappily, and its catastrophe was offensive to Virginia pride.”15 
The matter of the ending aside, an examination of the book reveals that by 1824 George 
had either moved further in favor of slavery or that he made a conscientious effort to appeal to 
white Virginia’s prejudices on the subject. There is no conceivable reason why the treatment of 
slavery and class relations in the book would offend the upper-class Virginians with the time and 
inclination to read such a book; indeed it seems likely that the description of slavery in the book 
set the tone for most novels of plantation life that followed it.16 Edward Grayson, the chief 
protagonist of the novel, was completing a degree at William and Mary. He brought home James 
Gildon, a fellow student from New York. The twenty-three year old Gildon began to fall for 
Edward’s little sister, the eighteen-year-old Louisa Grayson. The sister seemed to like the 
Yankee as well, and entertained him with her piano playing, after which they discussed poetry 
and novels. Mrs. Grayson did not seem to mind the young New Yorker courting her daughter, for 
he was wealthy, and the Graysons had just fallen on hard times, with the death of Colonel 
Grayson, a planter and hero of the Revolution. After his death, Mrs. Grayson had cut back on 
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expenses: “reduced the number of her domestics from eighteen to eight; her carriage horses from 
four to two, and a house with ten large rooms to six moderate ones.” The new house was the old 
summerhouse, located out in the Shenandoah Valley.17 
Through the mouth of Edward Grayson, George provided the reader with a cultural 
geography of the Shenandoah Valley. His account sounds quite similar to that given by Henry 
Tucker twenty years earlier in letters to his father. Grayson began with the Germans. Convinced 
that the characteristics of this group would not dissipate through acculturation, Grayson believed  
that they would, like it or not, “have some effect in forming the compound that is hereafter to 
mark our national character.” He resented their “plodding frugality” and their litigiousness. 
Noting that they complimented their farming and husbandry with crafts practiced by 
“blacksmiths, wheelwrights, hatters, and the like,” Grayson thought their products acceptable but 
often quite “deficient in taste.” He described their eating habits, including “sourkrout, an 
excellent antiscorbutic, and well adapted to counteract the effects of eating salt meat.” He found 
the Germans insufficiently interested in literature, education, and public affairs. Their usefulness 
consisted in performing the “coarse but useful labor” required by society.18 
In George’s portrait, the Scotch-Irish composed a fit counterpart to the Germans. Where 
the Germans were “cold and phlegmatic” the Scotch-Irish were “ardent and impassioned,” but 
with an unfortunate tendency to be “idle, indolent, and improvident.” With their hardiness, “they 
have been the most successful warriors against the aboriginal proprietors of the country, and the 
advance guard of civilization,” thereby helping the older stock of Cavalier Virginia. In religion 
they were usually Presbyterian with the “usual pride and intolerance that that sect has been  
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thought to inspire.” Unlike the Germans, the Scotch-Irish were politically active. Oddly enough,  
when they live together in large groups they are usually “good democrats” but when found in 
small numbers “they are apt to be federalists.” Edward Grayson believed that this anomaly could 
be explained by the persistence of Anglophobia in the larger communities.19 
Edward then turned his attention to the slaves of the Valley. His friend from New York 
felt that the slaves’ presence brought out a part of his character that he had never felt when living 
in the North: “Don’t you feel Edward, when riding over these vast domains of yours, something 
like a feudal baron?” Gildon noted his annoyance with the impertinence of those free farmers up 
north who rented land from his father, and he proposed something of a proslavery argument to 
the Virginian: “There is something very fascinating … in this unlimited control, let us fiery 
republicans say what we will. Indeed what is the love of liberty, but the love of doing what we 
please? And, consequently, he who is proud of his own freedom, is equally gratified at 
controlling the freedom of others.” The Virginian denounced this argument as a “sophistry.” 
According to Edward, the best “system of civil liberty” would be the one that best supplies the 
desires and needs of all; therefore anyone with “a proper sense of his own rights” should have a 
proper respect for the rights of others as well. By contrast, Edward argued that the worst 
government would be one “where only a single person is free, if indeed the fears and dangers 
that environ him suffer him to be so.”20  
Despite his praise of liberty, Edward nevertheless defended slavery as well: “We, of the 
present generation, find domestic slavery established among us, and the evil, for I freely admit it 
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to be an evil, both moral and political, admits of no remedy that is not worse than the disease.” 
Continuing with disease metaphor, he noted that no cure existed for slavery, and that the best 
anyone could hope to do is mitigate its symptoms. According to Edward, emancipation would 
only lead to another Haiti, and distance coupled with the sheer number of slaves would make 
colonization impossible. The only possible precedent would be the expulsion of the Moors from 
Spain, of which there were far fewer Africans with a much smaller distance to traverse. 
Employing another familiar trope, Edward Grayson noted that the slaves of Virginia  were 
“perhaps better supplied with the necessities of life than the laboring classes of any country out 
of America.” He believed that much of the humanitarian sentiment directed towards the slave 
derived from the false premise that the slaves chafed at their bondage the same way free whites 
would if put in a similar situation. Those who believed such falsehoods forgot that the blacks 
“were born slaves, and that there is as much difference between their feelings respecting their 
condition, and those of the white man, as is the privation of sight to one who is born blind, and 
one who has become so.”21  
Edward disputed the New Yorker’s charge that masters used slaves to fulfill their power 
fantasies. If anything, some masters attempted to fulfill their dreams of avarice, but not of power. 
In this drive for lucre, argued Edward, the slaves usually failed to provide the promise their 
master imagined, for after deducting the costs necessary for their slaves’ preservation, most 
planters only met their expenses. Even if the man born to mastership was “very impatient of 
disobedience or contradiction” he rarely got any more joy out of abusing his slaves than he 
would in abusing his own children. While having this conversation, the two men moved across 
the field. They came across a middle-aged white overseer and his crew of slaves. The slaves 
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were well plied with whiskey and labored at cutting down a field of oats. Many of them came up 
and shook hands with “Master Edward.” The one slave who skulked away was angry at being 
banished to the field after impregnating a fourteen-year-old house slave. George Tucker drew the 
moral: “As the negroes about the mansion-house are better fed, better clothed, and more 
intelligent, they look upon themselves as the superiors of the crop hands; and no degraded 
courtier feels deeper mortification than a slave who is thus taken from the house and put in the 
crop, or sent to the [slave] quarters.” Despite the mortification, this slave came out of his slump 
when Edward approached him and shook his hand.22 
Impressed with the efficiency displayed by these slaves, the New Yorker stated that they 
probably did more work in less time than their free counterparts to the North. Edward disagreed 
again, stating that the two forms of labor each contained their own positive and negative 
reinforcements and that they balanced each other out in the end. Edward counted among these 
incentives pride in their work and competition with the slaves of nearby plantations. According 
to the Virginian, the economics of slavery did not harm the slaves so much as they harmed the 
whites themselves, because slavery allowed the whites to label all domestic labor as degrading. 
A call came from the house for dinner, and the two friends got dressed with the aid of a body 
servant. Gildon had expected a fancier house and less luxuriant meals, as was the model in his 
native New York. At first he tried to make reality comport with experience by believing that the 
lavish meals had been especially prepared for him. 
After dinner the young men went out to examine the plantation cornfield and to check in 
on Granny Mott, an eighty-four year old slave. Her mulatto granddaughter swept her floor each 
day. Granny spoke of the good old days, when “Bristol beer and London porter, were as common 
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then as whiskey is know….” She told a tale of how one of the neighboring families, the 
Fawkners, came to marry up the social ladder. Their prudence had made it possible for them to 
buy the lands of the first families, but “they an’t quality after all.” Instead, the rise of the 
Fawkners illustrated that “[t]here is only a few of the old families left, and they can barely keep 
their heads above water.” As the young men walked away from her residence, Edwards told 
Gildon that Granny Mott maintained her affection for the English pageantry she had witnessed as 
a child, “and consequently, her predilections for rank and official dignity, had given her a 
distaste for the equality that now prevails, and to those persons who had newly made their 
fortunes —upstarts as she called them….” George Tucker employs this astonishing character to 
illustrate the extent to which many slaves adopted the class values of their society.23  
The year after the publication of the Valley of the Shenandoah, Thomas Jefferson offered 
George Tucker a professorship in “moral philosophy and belles lettres” at the newly-opened 
University of Virginia. At the time, Tucker was finishing his second term in Congress. Having 
previously hoped to win an ambassadorship to some foreign country, George deliberated before 
replying to Jefferson. The job in Charlottesville would offer him “a more congenial society” than 
what he would have upon returning to Lynchburg, it paid well, and it would enable him “to 
cultivate letters” an occupation for which he felt strongly inclined. Meeting privately with 
Thomas Jefferson, the former president painted the life George would lead in such favorable 
terms, that George accepted without further hesitation. At the age of fifty, he moved into a 
pavilion at the University of Virginia with his son, three daughters, his sister, and her daughter. 
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George felt unqualified for the task, but Jefferson told him not to worry. Ignoring the former 
president’s advice, George made a full-time effort to devote himself to study, so as to make up 
for his “insufficient acquaintance with the subject on which I was required to lecture….” He 
would study and write until late in the night, “so as sometimes to apprehend from the grotesque 
images that floated before my fancy when I retired to rest, that my brain might be seriously 
affected.”24  
As chapter one demonstrated, George Tucker had used Gabriel’s rebellion as his entrée 
into the Virginia world of letters. Nineteen years later he used the controversy over Missouri to 
make a mark in the House, and then a proslavery novel to pave the way for an academic career. 
During his twenty years at the University of Virginia, he wrote two more novels, both of which 
discussed slavery only briefly, but in a fascinating way. In 1827, he published a novel in which 
the protagonist, Joseph Atterly, discovered a metal which allowed him to propel himself away 
from the earth. Atterly used this newfound power to take a voyage to the moon, where he 
employed his critical powers to narrate a tale resembling the more famous story relayed by 
Lemuel Gulliver. Among the diverse “Lunarian” peoples, Atterly discovers the Glonglims who 
possessed no intellect and existed as slaves. George Tucker’s A Voyage to the Moon did better 
than its predecessor, the Valley of the Shenandoah, selling nearly a thousand copies. George left 
his next effort at fiction, written in 1841, unpublished. Entitled A Century Hence: Or, a Romance 
of 1941, George set the novel in “Centropolis, Missouri” the new capital of the United States. In 
this novel George proved remarkably prescient in predicting a technological rivalry between the 
United States and Russia, but he was far less farsighted in his prediction that the South would  
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have fourteen million slaves.25   
III. 
One year after George accepted the offer to teach at the University of Virginia Henry Tucker 
received a similar offer to serve as the first law professor there. He rejected the call to join 
Virginia’s new university on several grounds, chief among them being that he had just 
established his own law school in Winchester, Virginia. Henry had begun his school with a 
modest ambition. As he wrote to his father: “I have some thought of a law class to fill up vacant 
time. What think you of it?” Henry ended up lecturing most of the year and conducting moot 
courts in June and July, a very busy schedule for someone also involved in a full-time law 
practice. Yet in a letter to his father, Henry argued that the real reason he turned down the 
position at Charlottesville concerned the impact that such a move would have upon his family. 
He especially did not relish trying to raise five young girls in the vicinity of a university, and so 
he remained in Winchester. Despite his inability to accept the post, Henry expressed great 
interest in securing the best professor possible to fill the position. He believed that the new 
university needed a first rate lawyer to teach the law, and he did not think that such a 
professional could be acquired cheaply. “You cannot command the man you want for a paltry 
sum: perhaps indeed for no sum, without some other honor than that of a professorship.” Henry 
suggested that the local district court should move its seat to Charlottesville, so that the new law 
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professor would also be able to serve as a judge. Thomas Jefferson did not approve of this idea, 
however, and the Board of Visitors failed to act on it.26 
The new university had eight professors, none of whom had ever worked in that capacity 
before, and most of whom were foreigners. These men held the erroneous view that if they just 
made sure the students did their academic work, then everything else would fall into place. 
George Tucker, although a native of Bermuda, was the most southern-minded of the early 
faculty. He knew better. Drinking and gambling were, in his estimation, “the rock on which so 
many youth in Virginia, and in all the slave-holding states, had been wrecked.” If the new 
university were to succeed, the faculty would have to keep these vices in check. Student 
rowdiness and violence represented a more immediate problem. The young men of Virginia 
sometimes ran about the campus in disguises, “inviting and defying the notice of the faculty.” 
When George and a fellow faculty member attempted to apprehend one of these young men, the 
students threatened them with violence. George, having some experience with the Southern code 
of honor, folded his arms and said that the students, who greatly outnumbered him, were 
welcome to attack him if they were “mean enough” to do so. The students dispersed. The next 
day the professors tracked down the students responsible for the rioting and dismissed them from 
the college, thereby creating an even greater spirit of insubordination among the mass of the 
students. The professors, threatening to resign if the legislature did not offer them more 
protection, were able to enlist Thomas Jefferson to aid in student discipline, forcing out the 
names of the ringleaders. George Tucker bemoaned the effects of this riot on the early history of 
the University: “This riot, in the infancy of the University, had an unhappy influence on its 
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success, and we heard from all quarters of persons who had previously intended to send their 
sons to it, but had now been induced to change their purpose.”27  
Henry Tucker knew very well that he needed to ensure proactively that his law students 
behaved well. His law school attracted students from both Virginia and the deep South, and he 
took great pride that he could keep them on their best behavior: “We have not yet had a solitary 
instance of irregular conduct in members of my class, either last year or this year.” Henry kept 
his students busy, forcing them to take an examination each day. But perhaps more importantly, 
he sent them to live at different boarding houses throughout the town of Winchester, so that they 
would not have “the same opportunity for dissipation or the temptations furnished elsewhere.” 
Within the first year of operation he had twenty-five students studying under these conditions.28 
In 1831, after turning down another impressive offer, the post of attorney general in the 
Jackson administration, Henry published his first book, Commentaries on the Law of Virginia. 
When considering slavery in this work, Henry followed a path set before him by other liberals 
confronted with the slavery problem. According to this theory, if the southern states tried to 
emancipate their slaves, the inevitable result would be a race war, resulting in the extermination 
of one side or the other.29 In making this claim Henry had appealed to the example of Haiti, but 
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made no mention of Gabriel’s rebellion from thirty years before. As chance would have it, 
however, Virginia was about to suffer from a much more deadly appeal to the Haitian precedent.  
That summer, the spirit of Haiti made its return to the Old Dominion. Nat Turner, like his 
predecessor Gabriel, had found inspiration in Christianity. Some time in the 1820’s, he argued, 
the Holy Ghost visited him, entered his soul, and absolved him of all sinfulness. Originally 
planning to rise up and murder the whites on 4 July 1831, he waited too long and his plan fell 
through. Just one month later, however, a strange eclipse of the sun presented Turner with 
another opportunity. Unlettered Virginians, both black and white, feared that this eclipse 
beckoned the end of the world, and in their own way they were correct to do so. On that night 
Turner and his henchmen would murder fifty-five white people, mostly women and children. By 
the time word of the murderous rampage reached the governor, the slaves were making their 
final stand. Soon thereafter the white militia caught Nat Turner, and executed him on November 
11th. At his trial and in his confessions, he testified that he had originated the conspiracy among 
four of his lieutenants, and that the plan had spread of its own accord.30 
Governor John Floyd, thought that Turner had lied; he believed that every black preacher 
east of the Blue Ridge Mountains knew of the rebellion in advance. Born in Louisville in 1783, 
when it was still a part of Virginia, Floyd was the first governor of Virginia to have been born 
west of the Alleghenies. He brought to his office a prejudice common in western Virginia, a 
prejudice against slavery, and he hoped in the wake of Nat Turner’s revolt to be able to eliminate 
slavery from Virginia once and for all. In the wake of the Turner revolt, the white population of 
Virginia generally blamed the incendiary publications sent south by northern abolitionists more 
than they blamed the slaves themselves. White Virginians had always feared outside agitators. 
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Going back as far as the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson had argued that George 
the Third “has excited domestic insurrections amongst us,” and this pattern of accusation 
continued, but with the agitation coming from a different source. Something had to be done. Just 
one year before, governor Floyd had begun to intercept all unsolicited abolitionist pamphlets that 
northern activists had sent into the state. The legislature, following the governor’s lead, had 
banned all assemblages of free blacks and made it a crime to teach blacks, free or slave, how to 
read.31 
Other Virginians thought the remedy could be found in less drastic measures: restricting 
slaves to their plantations after dark, increasing the amount of men in the militia, and perhaps 
even sending the freed blacks back to Africa. In the winter of 1831, Virginians held a legislative 
convention in Richmond to decide what measures to take in the wake of the Nat Turner uprising. 
The delegates sent to this convention were generally younger and less experienced than those 
who had come together two years earlier at the Virginian Constitutional Convention of 1829-
1830. One of these young representatives was Thomas Jefferson’s grandson, the eponymously 
named Thomas Jefferson Randolph. This prominent young Virginian proposed a gradual 
emancipation plan and argued that the General Assembly should submit it to the people in a 
referendum. Much of the opposition to his plan hinged upon two points: that it violated the 
Virginia Constitution, and that it would force Virginia gentlemen to become slave traders in 
order to get rid of all their slaves at profit, before the day of emancipation arrived.32 
One could find doubts about slavery among the planter elites of the eastern part of 
Virginia. These men, many of whom were well-read, were continuing in the tradition of St. 
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George Tucker and Thomas Jefferson by applying modern natural rights reasoning in their 
arguments for emancipation. But another force had arisen in the meantime. Out in the far-
western part of the state, the part that would eventually secede during the Civil War and form the 
state of West Virginia, non-slaveholding whites had begun to oppose their eastern brethren. 
Although they occasionally called upon the rhetoric of the Founding generation in making their 
abolitionist claims, the chief scholar of the convention cautions her readers not to be fooled: 
“traditional humanitarian-moral concerns gave way to pragmatic class interest.” The people of 
the west, convinced that they had not won enough concessions in the Constitutional Convention 
of 1829-1830, saw the slavery convention as a way to further their perceived interests. Previous 
antislavery reformers had viewed the institution as hostile to “political democracy,” now they 
were also making the case that it was hostile to “economic democracy.”33 Analyzing the votes by 
region, 100 percent of the far western delegates voted for emancipation, nearly ninety percent of 
the Shenandoah Valley, thirty-five percent of the tidewater region and just under eighteen 
percent of the Piedmont region. The measure thus failed to pass, but demonstrated the strong 
sectional divide in the state of Virginia. Across the South many had been surprised that the 
Virginia convention had focused so much upon gradual abolition and so little on means of 
tightening existing security. The 1831-1832 convention was an anomaly in Southern history, and 
aside from a debate concerning the use of slaves as soldiers during the Civil War, such an event 
would never occur again.34  
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IV. 
One way to understand the regional contest between eastern and western Virginia is to examine 
the professors who best represented the interests and beliefs of their respective sections. The man 
most representative of the East was professor and latter president of the College of William and 
Mary, Thomas Roderick Dew. His Review of the Debates in the Virginia Legislature was 
certainly the best-known document to emerge in response to the 1831-1832 convention.35 
Historians have traditionally viewed this document as a landmark in the development of the 
proslavery argument, one that indicated that Virginia had abandoned its nominally antislavery 
stance and joined, in sentiment at least, with the lower South. By the 1940s, however, one 
historian noted that the arguments set forth in the Review could not properly be classified as a 
“positive good” argument in favor of slavery. In the early 1980s another historian went further 
by arguing that the Review maintained a peculiarly Virginian stance: Dew did not argue that 
slavery should exist perpetually in the Old Dominion; instead he stated that Virginia would 
eventually become economically more like the Northern states.36 All of these scholars have made 
useful points concerning Dew’s best–known work, but a complete understanding of Dew’s 
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position on slavery requires a consideration of both his life and all his writings, and an 
overemphasis on the Review generally distracts historians from this task.37     
Born in 1802, Dew began his undergraduate education at the College of William and 
Mary in 1818. At that time the undergraduate curriculum took three years to complete. After 
completing his B. A. on schedule, Dew spent another four years pursuing his Masters degree. 
During these seven years as a student Dew’s faculty advisor was John Augustine Smith. Dew 
would later praise his advisor for his “learning” his “piety” and his “conscientiousness in the 
discharge of his duties….” Smith, one of the first American professors to teach a class in 
political science, taught his young student the importance of this new academic discipline.38 
Dew believed that William and Mary excelled in the teaching of science, especially 
“moral and political science” in which she provided a course of study “more extensive than any 
other institution known to us.” In 1824, after receiving his Masters degree, Dew traveled to 
Europe on what Americans then called the “grand tour.” When touring in Italy, Dew often stayed 
at monasteries, which in those days were still able to maintain their ancient tradition of providing 
hospitality to travelers. Dew found the idea of monastic life unsettling, and in his diary he 
reflected on Edward Gibbon’s contention that monastic life contributed to the fall of the Roman 
Empire. As a practicing Baptist, it is not surprising that Dew held such a low opinion of the 
Roman Catholic Church and her traditions. He blamed the “mongrel monster of church and state 
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combined” for assessing such high taxes as to stunt the growth of society. Having an occasion to 
meet the Pope, Dew was not impressed, finding the man to be near death. He also met a white 
innkeeper’s daughter who claimed to be the Empress of San Domingo, after marrying a black 
man from the island named Christophe. The emperor later killed himself, leaving the empress 
with two mixed-race children. Dew noticed that the empress was prejudiced against him as a 
Virginian and a slave owner. Dew defended slavery before the empress, using arguments similar 
to those he would later employ in his Review of the Debates.39 
Dew described the archetypal slave revolt in Haiti as “[t]he bloodiest and most shocking 
insurrection ever recorded in the annals of history….” He regarded the Haitian revolt as a 
precedent for the events of the summer of 1831, when “a few slaves, led on by Nat Turner, rose 
in the night, and murdered, in the most inhuman and shocking manner, between sixty and 
seventy of the unsuspecting whites of that country.” Knowing the dangers of unguarded talk, 
Dew argued that only the prudent should be invited to discuss the problem of slavery. 
Abolitionists could put on a rhetorical show, but only with arguments “of a wild and intemperate 
character,” for their positions are “subversive of the rights of property and the order and 
tranquillity of society” and thus portend “the most inevitable and ruinous consequences.” To 
conquer this menace Dew turned to Aristotle, “the greatest philosopher of antiquity, and a man 
of as capacious mind as the world ever produced….” Dew pointed out that Aristotle found 
slavery “reasonable, necessary, and natural” and that he thus thought the best republics would 
consist of “comparatively few freemen served by many slaves.”40  
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Yet Dew proved unwilling to embrace Aristotle’s conception wholeheartedly. He 
preferred the moderns to the ancients and he explained why. He believed that a fundamental 
difference existed between the ancients and the moderns concerning the question of the state, and 
he aimed to describe “the difference between the notion universally prevalent in the ancient 
world, concerning the powers and functions of government, and those prevalent among modern 
civilized nations.” Dew stated that all governments of the ancient world were absolutisms: “The 
state was everything, the individual only became important through the state.” This difference, 
according to the professor, stemmed from the different principles upon which the ancients and 
moderns deduced their thoughts about government: the ancients started with the state and 
deduced all individual relations from that point, whereas the moderns began “with individuals, 
and deduce the state from them.” Consequently, according to Dew, ancient governments never 
had constitutions that limited the power of the state.41  
In searching for examples to support his thesis, Dew, not surprisingly, turned to the 
Spartans. He noted that they had no respect for private property or for personal freedom and that 
they paid the “same attention to the breeding of men that a Pennsylvania grazier does to breeding 
cattle.” The moderns, by contrast, created the state to preserve their private property and protect 
their equality. For Dew, ancient liberty “consisted principally in the share a man had in the 
government, not freedom from its action.” Thus if all men had the same share, then they all had 
liberty. “The government might be the most complete despotism on earth, but if each man had 
his share in that despotism, then he had liberty.” In striving for “perfect liberty in perfect 
equality” the ancients frequently had recourse to the principle of choosing military and civilian 
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leaders by random chance, in order to “do away [with] as far as possible, the inequality 
occasioned by talent and virtue.”42 
According to Dew, the ancients had other problems as well. They had no conception of a 
small and independent judiciary. The masses thought the right of judging to be too important to 
part with, and since the mass of men were despots, the judiciary was despotic. The Greek mob 
felt that it had the right to do whatever it pleased. “They had not yet arrived at that cardinal 
principle, growing out of feudalism and Christianity, that neither one, the few, nor the many, 
have a right to do what they please; that unanimous millions have no right to do what is unjust; 
that absolute power is not for frail, mortal man.” In short, Dew seemed to be saying that the 
ancients had no conception of natural law. In fact, without explicitly using the language of 
natural law, he argued that Socrates had possessed the right to escape from prison, but the 
Athenian did not realize it, for under the regime of that city the individual could conceive of no 
ability to oppose the state. The state, however, could oppose the individual in any way it wished, 
notably ostracism. According to Dew, this punishment carried very little opprobrium; indeed the 
ancients often considered banishment to be something of an honor. Any individual who seemed 
too excellent and thus a danger to equality would be banished, so that the great mass could rest 
content in its mediocrity.43 
Despite his dislike of ancient society, Dew nevertheless thought the classics should 
remain at the center of the undergraduate curriculum. He expected all undergraduates to read 
Horace, Cicero, Terence, Juvenal, Livy, and Tacitus in the original Latin and Xenophon, 
Aeschylus, Herodotus, Euripides, Sophocles, Thucydides and Homer in the original Greek. He 
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did not think that any student at college would be a success if he could not read these works 
“with facility,” as well as explain their meaning and the history referred to within them. The 
professor also used Spartan tenacity and the ancient conception of wisdom as the title to rule as 
an example of a proper model for the young slaveholders of the South. For instance, he argued 
that the children of slaveholders inherited an extra degree of power, a power that brought with it 
an added responsibility. Dew argued that the person “who governs and directs the action of 
others, needs especially intelligence and virtue.” He thus called upon his students to use their  
education to prepare them to be good masters, so that they could carry out the duties of their 
position with “humanity and wisdom.” They could not help it that the “domestic institutions” of 
the South “have been called in question by the meddling spirit of the age.” All they could do is 
strive to be good masters and attempt thereby to hold up the justice of their cause. If an attack 
should nevertheless come, should outsiders invade and attempt “the overthrow of our 
institutions,” Dew believed his students would rally “under our principles undivided and 
undismayed,” manifesting a spirit as “firm and resolute as the Spartan band at Thermopylae….” 
He argued that “such a spirit, guided by that intelligence which should be possessed by 
slaveholders, will ever insure the triumph of our cause.”44  
In 1843, the University of Virginia offered Dew a job as professor of moral philosophy. 
Ten years before, South Carolina College had offered him a similar position, and he had refused. 
That job eventually went to Francis Lieber, who became one of the most distinguished professors 
in nineteenth-century America. In a draft of his letter turning down the position, Dew noted that 
his primary wish was “to make some impress on my country’s literature and above all … to do 
real service to the South and her institutions on which I conscientiously believe much of the weal 
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or woe of our great confederacy depends and upon which the success of our republican 
institutions may generally be said to hang.” But he was not willing to leave William and Mary to 
accomplish these goals. “I love her with the fond attachment of a boy for his mother. I had liked 
to have said of a lover for his mistress. The dearest recollections … of my life cluster around my 
alma mater.” Dew continued at this pitch of intensity, at one point comparing his relationship to 
the college to the hunchback’s relationship to Notre Dame in the novel by Victor Hugo. Within 
two years the long-term bachelor would finally marry, selling $2000.00 dollars worth of stock to 
finance his honeymoon. This sale left him with $49, 543.40 in securities, making him one of the 
wealthiest men in Williamsburg. Such earthly blessings were not to last, and the professor died 
soon after reaching Europe, probably of pneumonia.45 
V. 
As T.R. Dew was to eastern Virginia and the College of William and Mary so Henry Ruffner 
was to western Virginia and Washington (later Washington and Lee) College. Descended from 
those German immigrants that Henry and George Tucker thought to be so different and so 
strange, Ruffner went and proved them correct by writing one of the most famous antislavery 
documents to come out of a southern college before the Civil War. Born in 1790, Ruffner grew 
up in Charleston, Virginia (now West Virginia). His parents owned and operated a prosperous 
salt mine that supplied much of that preservative to the meatpacking plants of Cincinnati. 
Ruffner converted to Presbyterianism and decided to become a scholar after attending a newly 
founded classical academy in Lewisburg from 1809 to 1811. He began his undergraduate work at 
Washington College in 1812, graduating just a year and a half later.46 
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Ruffner eventually became a professor at Washington College, and then, in 1836, he 
became president of the college. Ruffner took the job with the unanimous approval of the Board 
of Trustees, something that he found indispensable, given the difficulties he expected in such a 
position. He noted that he needed to control a group of students from diverse backgrounds, 
interests, and ages, all congregated “to receive a liberal education.” He pointed out that parents 
often had trouble controlling their own children, and that professors faced an even greater 
challenge: not only did they have more young men to deal with, they also “possess neither the 
legal nor the moral weight of parental authority….” Professors had to “stimulate the indolence, 
restrain the waywardness, and correct the misconduct of their pupils;” and since their pupils were 
young men they were “in that critical period of life … when dangerous passions are most eager, 
and vice spreads her most insidious lures before the susceptible heart.”47   
 Finding himself in need of the support of the townspeople, Ruffner stated apprehensively 
that many community members failed to grasp the importance of the rules of the college. In 
affairs of college discipline, Ruffner believed prevention to be preferable to cure: “Many of the 
youth who are sent to college, have never been accustomed to the salutary restraints of 
discipline; nor to any regular employment of their time.” He believed these students to be the 
victims of their parent’s misplaced self-indulgence, arriving at campus spoiled beyond any hope 
of redemption. He stated, controversially, that if taken too far the political goods of liberty and 
equality carry with them a “concomitant evil,” namely a weakening in “the reverence due from 
youth to age, from children to their parents, and from pupils to their teachers.” He inveighed 
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against the “leveling spirit of corrupted democracy; which in its madness, would obliterate all 
distinctions of persons, destroy all subordination, and introduce universal anarchy.” Ruffner saw 
the task of managing a college as a branch of political science: “A college ought to be a well-
regulated commonwealth in miniature; in which the youth, who are to occupy the chief stations 
of the country, shall be trained to the government of laws; and imbued with the principles and 
habits, that will qualify them to diffuse a healthful influence through the whole mass of the 
community.”48  
 Ruffner isolated three tools for effecting college discipline: philosophy, religion and 
honor. He found philosophy without religion, however, dangerous. He thought the prevalent idea 
of honor even worse: “What currently passes for honor with many, is a thing whose quickening 
spirit is malignant pride, whose disciples are often found at the gaming table and the brothel, 
whose instruments are the pistol and the dagger, and whose glory is to spurn the fear of God.” 
Thankfully, Ruffner thought that Christianity had done, and would continue to do good work in 
taming the spirit of honor. But by praising Christianity, he did not mean to refer to “the peculiar 
dogmas of any sect or school of theology. “ He believed that the college should direct the 
students to read “the sacred records to which all Protestants resort for instruction;” but that they 
should avoid “the discussion of those theological questions, which unhappily divide our religious 
community.” Ruffner pointed out that Washington College “was not designed to be a theological 
school.” Instead, it existed “to give instruction in classical literature and science.”49  
 Unwilling to praise the study of the ancient languages to the extent manifested by Dew, 
Ruffner conceded that the study of foreign languages could help the student to master the 
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grammar and literature of their own language. Students could take a “partial course” at 
Washington College without knowing any of the classical languages, but they could not receive 
full honors without such a study. Ruffner put more emphasis upon mathematics as the truly 
comprehensive science, on the grounds that “the whole material universe is comprehended in 
number and space; and in this respect, the whole universe is the subject of mathematical 
science.” According to Ruffner, mathematics best demonstrated “the great capacity” of the 
human intellect. He bemoaned the fact that the mental, moral and physical sciences could not 
reach the sort of certainty he found in his beloved mathematics, yet he conceded that a difference 
existed between the results of such inquiries and mere “opinion.” He also took on those who 
believed that all education should serve only an immediate practical purpose: “such an estimate 
of the worth of knowledge is mean and groveling.” Like many defenders of a liberal education 
both then and now, Ruffner immediately backed away from defending a liberal education in the 
abstract, and instead noted that such an education served as a gateway to the professions of “law, 
medicine, or theology.”50   
 Two years after becoming President of Washington College, Ruffner received an  
honorary Ph.D. degree from Princeton University in recognition for his theological writings.51 In 
1841, he proposed a public education plan for Virginia. This plan did not please eastern 
Virginians, who believed that education should generally be reserved for those able to pay for it. 
In 1870, after the Civil War had destroyed the power of the eastern planters, Ruffner’s son 
William put a plan similar to his father’s in operation in his capacity as the state’s commissioner 
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of education. Yet Henry Ruffner’s most controversial publication came in 1847, when he argued 
for the end of slavery in what he called, prematurely, “West Virginia.”52  
Ruffner emphasized that he himself owned slaves, and he attempted to distance himself 
from the abolitionist movement in the North. Still, he bemoaned the insistence of easterners to 
put the subject of slavery beyond discussion, but he did not blame them for the decision. Instead 
he placed the blame on “the fanatical violence of those northern anti-slavery men, who have been 
usually called ABOLITIONISTS.”  He traced the rise of the “moral insanity” of abolitionism to 
Great Britain. His hatred of northern abolitionists seems to have been more than a mere 
rhetorical ploy, for he stated that these people greatly injured the cause of gradual emancipation, 
arguing that over the previous fifteen years “they have done more… to rivet the chains of the 
slave, and to fasten the curse of slavery upon the country, than all the pro-slavery men in the 
world have done, or could do, in half a century.”53   
Ruffner recognized that the eastern part of the state had nearly eight times as many slaves 
as the western part, and that “[t]he same remedy may not be expedient in such different states of 
a disease.” He only asked for eastern non-interference should the western part of the state decide 
to eliminate slavery. Ruffner admitted that it would be unprecedented for half of a state to 
abolish slavery while the other half maintained the institution. Yet he noted that slave and free 
states “have, during fifty-eight years, lived peaceably and prosperously under one federal 
government.” In addition, he believed that the state constitution could be amended in such a way 
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as to secure the rights of slaveholders in the east. Under the plan of emancipation Ruffner had in 
mind, which bore a striking resemblance to that put forward by St. George Tucker fifty years 
before, it would take nearly forty years for slavery to disappear from western Virginia.54  
In making his argument for abolishing slavery in the western part of the state, Ruffner 
promised to “use no theoretical or abstract arguments.” Instead he would base his case solely 
“upon facts and experience.” Generally speaking, Ruffner kept to this promise, though towards 
the end of his presentation he did venture briefly into a consideration of the natural rights of man. 
His emancipation plan stated that it would remain legal to sell slaves out of the state, but children 
under five years of age could not be sold apart from their parents. The plan proposed that the 
offspring of the slaves residing in the western part of the state be given freedom upon attaining 
their twenty-fifth birthday. He hoped that this plan would encourage many slaveowners to leave 
western Virginia and take their slaves with them, but he believed that it would be in their best 
interest to stay and let the law take its effect. “If they chose to stay and submit to the operation of 
the emancipation law, they have the certainty of gaining more by the rise in the value of their 
lands, than they will lose in the market value of their slaves, in consequence of the emancipation 
law.” He thought that “thousands” of northerners would immigrate to western Virginia upon the 
passing of such a law, and he envisioned a land grown rich as west Virginians sold slaves and 
invested their money in land. In the only appeal to natural rights contained in this essay, Ruffner 
argued that slaveowners had no right to the children of their slaves. “By nature all men are free 
and equal; and human laws can suspend this law of nature, only so long as the public welfare 
                                                          
54 Ibid., 10. 
 
 137
requires it; that is, so long as more evil than good would result from emancipation.” In other 
words, Ruffner believed that men had no right to property outside of the social contract.55  
Overall, Ruffner focused his attention upon United States decennial census information 
from the years 1790 through 1840. In these years he claimed to see economic stagnation and 
constant out migration as characteristics of areas with a high slave population, and economic 
growth and the attraction of immigrants to areas where freedom prevailed. Ruffner placed 
immigration at the center of his theory concerning prosperity, classing it as the chief index of a 
states’s “comparative prosperity.” Like a true economist, Ruffner began with an assumption; in 
this case a rather dubious one, namely, that Virginians, like the people of the other states, 
multiplied at the rate of 33 and one half percent in ten years, so that if none immigrated, their 
number “would be increased by one third in that period of time.” With this figure as his base, 
Ruffner concluded that East Virginians sent over three hundred thousand settlers west from 1830 
to 1840. Ruffner scorned those who called Virginia “The Mother of States,” finding himself 
“grieved and mortified” to think of his state in that way. “Her black children have sucked her so 
dry, that now, for a long time past, she has not enough milk for her offspring, either black or 
white.” Ruffner believed that the existence of slavery had driven all the free and industrious 
white laborers out of eastern Virginia, and that this exodus of talent lay beneath the state’s 
precipitous decline.56  
Unlike Thomas Jefferson and other notable Virginians, Ruffner did not fear the big city, 
nor did he think highly of rural farmers. Ruffner’s vision of a great society consisted of large 
cities playing host to large scale manufacturing plants. He wanted Virginia, or at least West 
                                                          
55 Ibid., 39. 
 
56 Ibid., 16-17. 
 
 138
Virginia, to be as much like the North as possible. To make this case Ruffner argued that West 
Virginia —being nearly the same size as Ohio, and possessing even better mineral wealth if not 
quite as good farming land— should have nearly the same population as that northern state. “But 
instead of two-thirds, we have not more than one-fourth of her population and wealth.” More to 
the point, he noticed that western Pennsylvania grew at a much faster rate than did western 
Virginia, although the former possessed less land area and fewer natural resources. He also 
compared the Virginia section of the Shenandoah Valley to its northern counterpart, describing 
the land in Virginia  as “slave-sick,” and already “spewing out its inhabitants.” Henry found that 
lands in western Virginia cost less than their northern counterparts, but that northern immigrants 
nevertheless passed them by: “rather than buy and cultivate these good cheap Virginia lands, 
Northern farmers go farther, pay more, and fare worse; —so they do, and so they will. They look 
upon all Virginia as an infected country; —and so it is.” Ruffner had a very clear goal in mind 
for western Virginia: “The boast of our West Virginia is the good city of Wheeling. Would that 
she were six times as large, that she might equal Pittsburgh, and that she grew five times as fast, 
that she might keep up with her.” He believed that everything that was good about Wheeling 
came from northern influences, as the town resided quite close to the border. Everything that 
impaired the town’s growth stemmed from its residing in a state “in which slavery is established 
by law.”57  
VI. 
Ruffner’s idealization of northern society differed fundamentally from the critique of that society 
put forth by Nathaniel Beverley Tucker. Indeed, in many aspects of their political thought the 
men were mirror images of each other. Born in 1784, just four years after his older brother 
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Henry, Beverley enrolled as an undergraduate at William and Mary in 1801. In those first years 
of the nineteenth century the school never had more than thirty students at a time. Many of them, 
especially the ones that boarded at the Tucker home, were quite dedicated. The College also had 
its Jacobin contingent, young men sympathetic to the radical wing of the French Revolution, who 
made a name for themselves by vandalizing the local churches. Young Beverley, already 
something of a reactionary, despised these students. Overall a rather indifferent scholar, Beverley 
did however greatly enjoy the opportunity the College offered him to read political philosophy 
—especially those thinkers belonging to the conservative branch of the Scottish enlightenment: 
men like William Duncan, Thomas Reid, and Dugald Stewart. He especially enjoyed William 
Paley’s Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy a textbook commonly used at universities 
in the nineteenth century.58 
Beverley had planned to give his baccalaureate address on the subject of republicanism 
and literature, but student rowdiness kept the ceremony from occurring. Beverley told his half-
brother, John Randolph, that student lawlessness was worse at the college than it had been when 
he had briefly attended there in 1792. Since Randolph had been expelled after wounding a fellow 
student in a duel over a trivial matter, it seems that affairs may indeed have been quite bad. In 
February of 1802, St. George withdrew his son from the college and gave him a number of legal 
books to read. Although Beverley’s leading biographer tends to overstate the matter, it is clear 
that in the four years between beginning his study of law and passing the bar exam in 1806, the 
young Virginian’s friendship with John Randolph distanced him from his father and from his 
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brother Henry.59 St. George wanted Beverley to establish a law practice in Fredericksburg, but 
Beverley preferred to be near Randolph at the small town of Charlotte Court House in the 
southern part of the state. Tensions between father and son mounted further when, in 1809, 
Beverley refused to heed St. George’s advice to avoid marriage before becoming fully 
established in his profession.60 
In 1815, Beverley set out for Missouri in the hopes of finding success in law and politics. 
Despite losing his children to disease, he quickly found prosperity as a lawyer, and he became a 
judge in 1817. He also worked behind the scenes to help Missouri become a state. Beverley 
thought that Missouri would be the perfect place to establish a slaveholder’s utopia. He wrote 
letters home to this effect and on occasion the Virginia newspapers would print them. Everything 
went well until a Richmond paper subscribed to by an editor in Missouri printed one of these 
letters. The letter then ended up in a Missouri paper, complete with sarcastic footnotes. Beverley 
had spoken of himself as an aristocrat molding public opinion. He considered throwing non-
slaveholders across the river into Illinois and made disparaging remarks concerning the influx of 
foreign immigrants to the territory. This letter probably kept Beverley from being nominated as a 
delegate to the Missouri Constitutional Convention.61 
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By the late 1820s, Beverley had suffered further misfortune out west. With the death of 
his wife in 1827, he became more involved with evangelical Christianity, and perhaps more 
importantly, began to plot a way to return to Virginia. In 1830, the forty-six year old Tucker 
married a seventeen-year-old girl and vowed to achieve the sort of worldly success that had 
eluded him up until that time. He conceived a plan to represent Missouri in the House of 
Representatives, where he could work alongside his beloved half-brother John Randolph. Since 
the state sent only one representative in those days, Beverley found himself electioneering over 
the entire wide expanse of Missouri. He did not win the election, but in 1832, with Washington 
heating up over the nullification crisis, an ailing John Randolph asked Beverley to return to 
Virginia to be by his side. Randolph died soon thereafter. In the summer of 1834, Beverley 
Tucker was visiting friends in Richmond when T. R. Dew arrived and gave him an invitation 
from the Board of Visitors to assume his father’s old law professorship at the College of William 
and Mary. The offer had arrived unexpectedly, but the fifty-year-old Beverley Tucker had finally 
found his métier. He would remain a professor at the College until his death in 1851.62 
Like his second cousin George Tucker, Beverley inaugurated his professorial career with 
several novels. The best known of these works, The Partisan Leader, made one of the earliest 
known arguments in favor of southern secession. The preeminent generalist in the field of 
southern intellectual history, Michael O’Brien, has rightly described the novel as the first work in 
a new genre he calls the “southern political novel.” O’Brien, however, errs by claiming that 
Beverley evades the issue of slavery in the novel. Although the book said more about secession 
than it did about slavery, the way in which Beverley treated the peculiar institution in it 
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demonstrates some of the dramatic changes that took place in the understanding of slavery 
between the era of St. George Tucker and the era of Thomas Roderick Dew.63 
The very dedication of the novel indicates a proslavery stance, and an intriguing one at 
that. Beverley dedicated the book to the “the honest, brave, hardy, and high- 
spirited peasantry of Virginia.” Arguing that this class, which historians generally call the 
yeomanry, was “peculiar to a society whose institutions are based upon domestic slavery,” 
Beverley believed that slavery kept the yeomanry free from “abject and menial occupations.” 
The novel begins with a young aristocrat traveling among these yeomen. His name is Arthur 
Trevor. In the novel the Trevor family bears some resemblance to the Tucker family, and like the 
real-life Tuckers it is often difficult to keep the various similarly-named individuals straight. 
Attempting to fit the real life Tuckers with their fictional analogues would only compound the 
difficulty. My analysis will instead isolate the pronouncements on slavery that seem to be the 
opinions held by Beverley Tucker. The characters that he portrays in a positive light can properly 
be construed as his message bearers.  
Arthur Trevor is one such character. Arthur claimed that he would learn to live without 
luxuries just as the slaves learned to adapt themselves to slavery. This young aristocrat 
bemoaned the northern wish to set the slaves free and to make the yeomen into slaves.64 The 
chief protagonist of the novel is Arthur’s brother, the young revolutionary leader Douglas 
Trevor. In a key scene in the book, Douglas confers with his Uncle, just as the revolution begins. 
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Reintroducing Douglas to the members of his household, the pair comes upon a slave named 
Tom. This slave had once taught young Douglas how to ride a horse. Uncle Trevor instructed 
Douglas to call the slave “daddy.” Uncle and nephew then devised a plan to escape from the 
Yankee soldiers in the area. In hatching their plan, nephew and Uncle take the direction of a 
shadowy South Carolinian referred to in the text only as “Mr. B__.” This stranger told Uncle 
Trevor to arm his slaves using them as a bodyguard and to avoid telling the neighbors about the 
plan: “We must show that that which our enemies, and even some of ourselves, consider as our 
weakness, is, in truth, our strength.” Douglas thought that this plan would fail, but he admitted 
that his time in the North may have biased him. Counseling Douglas to remember how much he 
and his brothers and sisters loved and revere their “black Mammy,” the stranger argued that the 
slaves “‘are one integral part of the great black family, which, in all its branches, is united by 
similar ligaments to the great white family.’”65  
Challenging Thomas Jefferson’s arguments examined in chapter one, Beverley Tucker, 
speaking through the shadowy stranger, argued that white youth rarely lord it over their black 
brothers: “unless you were differently trained from what is common among our boys, you were  
taught not to claim any privilege, in a fight, over those who you treated as equals in play.” 
Defended by the military might of the slaves, the stranger believed that the Trevor family would 
be able to escape: “‘There are twenty true hearts which will shed their last drop, before one hair 
of your uncles’s head shall fall.’” The case of arming the slaves would become an actual debate 
during a real independence struggle less than thirty years later. While the confederacy, as a 
whole,  proved unwilling —until the last minute anyway— to arms its slaves, there were isolated 
incidents similar to those plotted by the man from South Carolina. As one twentieth-century 
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historian has pointed out: “White nostalgia for the good old-time darkies who hid the family 
silver from the hated Yankees has drawn justifiable ridicule in recent years, but it rested on 
widespread if exaggerated incidents. Slaves and freedmen often rallied to their white folks in 
time of danger. Since they had always expected protection as well as sustenance in return for 
labor and loyalty, some readily seized the opportunity to reverse roles and to protect those from 
whom they had demanded protection.”66  
 Flattering his Virginia audience, Beverley had Mr. B___ comment about the difference 
between Northerners and Southerners. The stranger argued that Northerners could never be made 
to understand the relationship between the master and his slave, because they could never 
understand black people. Yankees, with “‘their calculating selfishness’” could never be expected 
to understand such “‘disinterested devotion.’” The stranger believed that the differences between 
Northerners and Southerners preceded slavery, and had their roots in the different regional 
cultures of the old country. Northerners “‘know no more of the feelings of our slaves, than their 
fathers could comprehend the loyalty of the gallant cavaliers from whom we spring; and for the 
same reason. The generous and self-renouncing must ever be a riddle to the selfish.” The only 
thing the North had been correct about was the South’s degree of attachment to a Union that took 
more than it could ever give in return. With the aid of Douglas Trevor and his military prowess, 
the Yankees were about to be proven wrong on that score as well, said Mr. B____.67 
Henry Tucker disapproved of his brother’s southern nationalism. In 1841, when the 
University of Virginia again offered him the law professorship, Henry accepted and had the 
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opportunity to draft a rebuttal to his brother’s position. The University hired Henry because they 
needed someone to replace John A. G. Davis, the former law professor and president of the  
University, who had been shot to death by a masked student. In a letter to his brother, Henry 
gave three reasons for accepting the assignment this time around: a college education for his 
boys, the ability to keep the family together the whole year without needing to go on circuit court 
duties, and the felt necessity of retiring from the bench while still sound in mind and body. 
Henry kept the job for only four years. Ill health set in quickly, including an attack of paralysis. 
In a letter to John C. Calhoun, whose son was attending the University and living with the 
Tucker family in Charlottesville, Henry expressed the desire to take a position as the U. S. 
minister to France, since such a position “brings with it a trip across the water” and would be 
favorable to his position in Charlottesville of “which I am heartily tired, as my health is sinking 
under it.” Yet despite these health complaints, Henry was an active professor at the University 
and he managed to get much scholarship published during his few years there.68 
Beverley believed that the slaves would protect their masters, but Henry was not so sure. 
He feared northern activism on the slavery question and was quite certain that any northern 
attempt to eliminate slavery would result in the secession of the southern states and a violent 
civil war. The South would have no choice but to secede, for outside abolition pressures would 
“place a dagger in the hand of every domestic.” He noted that the French author and student of 
American institutions, Alexis de Tocqueville, had thought the southern states to be the part of the 
Union whose safety most depended upon the preservation of the Union.69  
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Henry did not think that the South could win a war for independence because “[o]ne half 
of our population can never be our defenders; but intrigue and tampering of northern fanatics, 
when no longer withheld by the trammels of the Constitution and the ties of brotherhood, might 
make them our deadliest foes.” Henry feared the slaves because he found a fundamental injustice 
at the very root of slavery. He cautioned his students not to count the silence of the slaves as 
evidence of their consent. The professor noted that the subjects of the Turkish Sultan as apt to be 
silent as were the subjects of Queen Victoria. Similarly the ancient Romans were as quiet under 
their good emperors as under their bad ones: “And coming home to our own institutions we have 
in the slave states an instance before our own eyes of the facility and the security too with which 
the organized power of a few may hold in the most abject subjection thousand of living beings 
until they lose the sense of degradation in the habits of servitude from generation to generation. 
Let it never be said then when we see a man degraded and oppressed that he is contented and 
happy, because he is submissive and quiet.”70 
Despite his dislike of slavery, Henry could barely bring himself to employ the 
fundamental principles of modern natural rights thought. In a book considering the subject of 
natural law, Henry delineated the basis of his political philosophy. He defined natural law as the 
“rule of rectitude which is prescribed to us by the author of our being and pointed out by our 
reason,” and he placed this law “at the foundation of all wise and salutary systems of positive 
law.” Aiming to convince his students that such a “rule of rectitude” actually existed, Henry 
argued that such law was “binding everywhere” and served as “the source from which all human 
laws derive their validity and value.” To make this case, Henry turned, albeit apologetically, to 
the state of nature construct. He backtracked and stated that by referring to “what is familiarly 
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called a state of nature” he did not mean to imply “that such a state has ever had existence.” The 
natural state for man “has ever been and ever must be a state of society….” Throughout history 
one may see some societies that are quite primitive in form, but they are societies nevertheless, 
for society is “coeval with created man.” Why then employ the state of nature concept at all? 
Henry believed that “in dissecting the human heart and exploring the laws which grow out of our 
nature and constitution, it serves to simplify our reasonings to proceed upon the favorite 
hypothesis of a state of nature in the primitive ages of the world.” 71 
Henry argued that “there is nothing in nature which has not its laws.” According to this 
interpretation, everything in nature follows laws, including man, and Henry believed that the 
human conscience could lead men to the knowledge of these laws. He argued that the “innate 
sense of right and wrong” could be improved if one gave the matter “judicious attention and 
cultivation.” Moving on to the methods by which one could determine which laws were natural, 
Henry proposed his first test of universality: “Where throughout the world, both savage and 
civilized, a principle has been adopted as a law of our nature; where the municipal institutions of 
every people both ancient and modern have recognized its authority, we may safely take it as one 
of the great principles founded in the nature of man.” The first law he could find of this type was 
“the law of self-preservation.” To demonstrate the working of this law, Henry proposed that one 
imagine a group of men with no common tie thrown upon an island by shipwreck; “the law of 
self-preservation must be the prevailing law among them.” Taking the matter one step further, 
Henry placed the “right of self-defense” as the proper inference from the law of self-
preservation. Following this same method, Henry proposed other principles of natural law: first, 
“the natural inclination between the sexes” from which he inferred the “social principle” of 
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family construction and the duties of parents to children; second, “the existence of a right of 
property.” Anticipating an objection on this score, Henry considered those societies that held 
property communally and found that even those societies respected the right of property: “[f]or 
though it is held in common among themselves, the society holds it in exclusion of all others; 
thus affirming … the principle for which we are contending.”72 
Henry thought that natural law should be knowable apart from the Bible. He believed that 
natural law applied to all humans, not just Christians; indeed, he stated that natural law applied 
even before Christian revelation occurred. Furthermore, without a “foundation for morality 
antecedent to revealed religion” there could be no way to test religion’s conformity “to a pure 
morality by which its claims to a divine origin is to be tried.” Yet in wishing to know natural law 
through reason alone, Henry did not hesitate to call on the Bible to refute the modern notion of 
the state of nature. The state “never could have had existence,” for man’s “helplessness in 
infancy and all his propensities contradict it.” The Bible stated that “men and women both 
sprung full formed into life and constituted the first society in the connubial state.” Soon 
thereafter Adam and Eve had children “and thus from the beginning society had existence.” Even 
if one were to set aside the Biblical account of creation, it would still be the case that “the natural 
wants of man” make society “essential” to man. 73 Although Henry had a rather ambivalent 
attitude concerning slavery, his understanding of a natural law, knowable by reason, and existing 
independently of any sort of social contract or state of nature would latter prove useful to a 
professoriate increasingly enamored with slavery. 
                                                          
72 Ibid., 3, 9-12. 
 
73 Ibid., 22, 31. 
 
 149
As in most matters, Henry’s younger brother Beverley took the arguments one step 
further, going farther than anyone else in this chapter towards the classic understanding of 
natural right. Only the revival of classic natural right could make possible what historians have 
traditionally called the “positive good” argument in favor of slavery. Beverley saw slavery as a 
way of civilizing the barbarous, singling out the aboriginal African’s predisposition to nakedness 
and the master’s necessity of teaching him to wear clothes. By doing so a “feeling of self-respect 
has been inspired, and this has brought with it pride of character, modesty, chastity, and, not 
infrequently, refined delicacy of sentiment.” He noted that these sartorial changes led to a new 
respect for marriage among the slaves, and he used anecdotal evidence to make his point: the 
“Episcopal minister of the village in which I live, celebrates the rites of matrimony between as 
many blacks as whites….” Beverley was certain that continuing progress in this direction would 
continue to be made, and that before long “this once degraded and brutish race” would be on the 
same level “with the lower classes of society in the most moral countries under the sun.”74 
For Beverley, law existed to subjugate the unwise to the wise. Believing that only an 
original severity of law could drive the unwise to acquire wisdom, he stated that “the heart may 
shudder” if one examined too closely the means necessary to subjugate inferior people. The 
results of subjugation, however, were worth it, for they allowed men to live “in relations best for 
the happiness of all,” namely, in an environment “where the wisdom of the enlightened, and the 
virtue of the good, and the prudence of the sagacious are wisdom, and virtue, and prudence for 
those who, in themselves, possess none of these qualities….” Finding the arguments concerning 
the profitability of slavery to be of little interest, Beverley asserted that happiness is more 
important than wealth, for in the pursuit of happiness “wealth is but an instrument.” He did not 
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believe wealth to be the most important instrument in the quest, however, for he found “order, 
harmony, tranquillity, and security” to be more important. Believing wisdom to be impossible 
without leisure, Beverley attempted to square this maxim with God’s curse on Adam that man 
could not eat but from the sweat of his own brow. He reached the conclusion that “the curse that 
dooms that mass of mankind to toil, dooms them also to ignorance. When the former penalty is 
recalled, the latter may be remitted. Not till then.”75 
Beverley stated that he, and most of the fellow masters he knew, would not give up their 
slaves “on any terms whatever.” For them, the relation between the master and his slaves had 
become “an affair of the heart.” Yet if the affection was there, why not then let the slave be free, 
for would he not go on working for his master as before? Beverley’s answer to this question 
involved a considerable digression. He asked the reader to consider “that dark time” when the 
medieval monasteries represented the sole place of learning in society, and Church laws forced 
monks to remain single. He believed that “the indissoluble nature of the connubial tie teaches the 
parties to put a curb on the heart and imagination which restrains their wanderings….” He noted 
that many astute non-Southerners could grasp this truth while nevertheless remaining perfectly 
incapable of understanding slavery. Beverley made a contorted argument, seeming to favor an 
approach that political thinkers would today label “communitarian.” If monks could marry and 
have families, then their communal form of organization could no longer survive. Similarly, if 
masters no longer owned their workers “a conflict of interests would have taken the place of a 
community of interests; and friendship …would no longer result naturally from the relation 
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between the parties.” Beverley admitted that his thesis had the aroma of “paradox and 
extravagance” as indeed it did.76 
Beverley Tucker wrote the way he did, in part, because circumstances had forced him to 
adopt extravagant and paradoxical forms of reasoning. His colleagues at other colleges and 
universities in Virginia saw and felt the lawlessness present on their campuses. They noticed the 
burgeoning sectionalism both within and without their state. These events forced these professors 
to question the political thought of their forefathers, but they had a great distance to go before 
reaching the new science of politics that would enable them to make sense of the sort of society 
that they had created. The next generation of professors would create this new science of politics 
for the slave South, and they would do so by restoring the ancient premises of political 
philosophy. But before this new way of thinking could emerge, the proslavery professors of the 
middle generation had to confront rising challenges to what they conceived of as the orthodox 
reading of the United States Constitution.  
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Chapter Four: Constitutional Orthodoxy under Siege 
I. 
St. George Tucker’ s children, Henry and Beverley, inherited an orthodox understanding of the 
Constitution of the United States from their father. Basing their interpretation upon a Whig 
theory of politics that they had also inherited, Henry and Beverley confronted the challenges that 
faced constitutional orthodoxy during the first fifty years of the nineteenth century. Soon after St. 
George Tucker’s death in 1826, political and legal thinkers in the North began a campaign to 
transform a voluntary union of free and independent states into a single nation. Spurred on by 
sectional disputes, and led astray by a changing conception of natural rights, the Tucker brothers 
attempted to defend their father’s interpretation of the Constitution and to pass this interpretation 
on to a new generation of college students. Although the brothers agreed in their premises, they 
often disagreed on the proper course of action to take. Both conceded the legitimacy of 
secession, but Henry thought such a course of action would be disastrous, while Beverley 
consistently lobbied for secession from the 1830s onward.   
Constitutional orthodoxy built upon a larger political philosophy, one which, as described 
in chapter two, could properly be described as a Whig political philosophy. As a law professor at 
the University of Virginia, Henry had the responsibility of teaching political philosophy to his 
students. He took this part of his job very seriously. He argued that the “flag of freedom” had 
been driven from the old world to the new. In order for this freedom to continue to thrive in 
Virginia and the United States, it would be necessary for college students to “to search out and to 
cultivate with care the genuine principles of well-regulated liberty, that we may steer the vessel 
of state safe from the destructive breakers of monarchy on the one hand, and the no less fearful 
whirlpool of licentious and unbridled democracy on the other.” Henry told his students that the 
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study of political philosophy was the only way to protect this type of liberty, and that an 
understanding of the general principles of political philosophy had to be commenced before a 
student could begin to study “the organization and structure of our own forms of government.” 
Beverley presented broadly similar arguments to his students at the College of William and 
Mary.1 
Both brothers had learned the fundamentals of this political philosophy from their father. 
St. George Tucker had guided them to the writings of Sir Edward Coke because he believed 
Coke’s writings an indispensable prerequisite for a proper understanding of the Whig theory of 
liberty that made constitutional orthodoxy possible. Henry proved to be a diligent, if not a happy 
student of Coke. In 1799, St. George began to pressure his son to work through the writings of 
the English legal theorist. Henry promised to do his best, and stated that “I shall not, if possible, 
misspend anytime whatever.” But he did not attempt to mask the difficulties from his father: 
“After reading Coke all day, you may easily suppose anything in the evening will be amusing.” 
At this time, Henry also directed his brothers in their studies, and had them read, at the behest of 
St. George, the writings of the philosopher David Hume. Henry sometimes wished that he could 
read these books rather than Coke. “Indeed when I look at a law book, I am delighted with the 
thought of reading it, unless it be old Coke; to him I declare, I have paid the utmost attention, and 
I do not perceive but a very trifling difference between my knowledge now, and when I began.” 
Henry hoped that after reading the more modern commentators, he would be able to return to 
Coke and mine the old text for information.2  
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It is worthwhile to consider why St. George Tucker would bother with making his son 
read Coke. As one scholar has pointed out, American constitutionalism draws from two 
traditions: the “rule-of-law” tradition and the “structure and balance” tradition. The former 
tradition attempted to square human law with a higher law. This conception had its roots in 
ancient Rome and medieval England. Although the Romans could conceive of the notion of a 
law higher than the laws made by man, they were incapable of using this notion to rein in their 
leaders. In medieval England, on the other hand, the rule of law was able to restrain even the 
power of a monarch: “Like other feudal lords, the king was bound by a web of contractual rights 
and obligations under the common law deriving from ownership of the land. These mutual 
obligations created a sphere of personal liberty and individual rights protected by the courts, 
which placed the king under the law.” With the addition of the English Civil War and the 
Glorious Revolution, Englishmen came to see government as being accountable to the people. 
This combination of fundamental law and accountability to the people represented the “first 
essential of constitutional government.”3  
In the English tradition “certain historic documents such as Magna Charta possessed 
special significance,” but generally speaking their constitution “was not a written instrument but 
an organically evolving assemblage of statute, belief, and institutional practice.” The English 
constitution limited government power by providing citizens with common law rights that were 
upheld by the courts and by contributing to a structure of government that had some institutional 
checks and balances. Coke’s famous decision in the 1610 suit that has come to be known as “Dr. 
Bonham’s Case” illustrates these safeguards. Parliament had given the London College of  
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Physicians an exclusive grant to license the practice of medicine in London. It also gave them the 
power to punish those who refused to honor this monopoly. Coke argued in the case of Dr. 
Bonham that the London College of Physicians had acted as a judge in its own case, and that it 
had thereby violated one of the fundamental principles of the common law. “Coke’s opinion 
nevertheless contained the idea of a fundamental or higher law restraining governmental acts.” 
During the seventeenth century as the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy took root, it became 
unclear exactly what the doctrine of fundamental law meant in this British setting.4 
Beginning with the Declaration of Independence, Americans made important 
modifications to the English higher law tradition. These modifications worked to resolve certain 
trouble spots in English law. Americans believed that in order to keep the government in check 
the “principles and rules” of the fundamental law had to “be given positive, written, documentary 
expression as a fixed standard —a higher law— against which to hold the government 
accountable.” During the years leading up to the American Revolution, the colonists used some 
of Coke’s seventeenth-century precedents to attack some of the navigation laws set forth by 
Parliament. The writings of the English jurist had planted one of the seeds that led to the 
America colonies declaring their independence. Not surprisingly then, Thomas Jefferson and St. 
George Tucker had looked to Coke as a means by which to convey the proper understanding of 
rights to young students of the law.5   
As a mature scholar, Henry returned to Coke’s writings whenever he discussed the 
origins of American law and society. Henry compared the challenge of practicing law to a great 
armored battle, and he named Lord Coke as the great provider of weapons. Coke’s “armory” 
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would provide students with “mail for your defense, and the battle-ax for assault….” After 
reading the master, students could turn to Coke’s “less distinguished successors,” who “unable to 
cope with him in massive weapons, boast at least their superior symmetry of array, and will teach 
the way to victory by the skill of these approaches.” Henry espoused a version of Coke’s higher-
law teaching. He believed that good laws do not change; they are “permanent, uniform, and 
universal.” Thus Henry approved of the power of precedent: “In it we perceive that veneration 
for antiquity, which leads the modern civilian to trace up his principles to the original fountains 
of the law.” The professor did not find it at all strange that one would need to “grope among the 
rubbish of the year books of four centuries ago, for the precious treasures of the law.” According 
to Henry, properly trained lawyers abhorred the idea of pushing for change merely for the sake 
of change. Because they opposed unnecessary change, lawyers provided a useful counterweight 
to “the disorganizing tendency which sometimes prevails in democratic institutions.”6 
In teaching constitutional orthodoxy, Henry Tucker built upon a tradition established by 
Coke. The Virginian defined a constitution as “a law to the lawgiver, a binding and obligatory 
rule for the government itself.” He described law as “a rule of action prescribed by a competent 
power commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong.” According to this 
interpretation, only the sovereign power could make law, for “if there be a power actually 
superior to that which declares the law, it is no law to that superior.” Admitting that men in the 
early stages of society shared sovereignty equally, Henry nevertheless argued that it would be 
impossible for modern societies to share legislative power equally among all the citizens. 
Societies therefore found it necessary to produce constitutions that delineated the design of their 
legislatures. In these terms, the people held sovereignty and they used this sovereignty in order to 
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produce a constitution that could bind those who governed them. The power of the government 
was not absolute, for the constitutions were higher than the government they created.7 
Luckily for Henry, not all of the sources of constitutional orthodoxy were as difficult as 
Sir Edward Coke. As a young man, Henry had enjoyed James Madison’s Report on the Virginia 
and Kentucky Resolutions, describing it as “most excellent,” and stating: “I would have rather 
been the author of them than of any piece I ever read of the same length.” Henry especially 
admired Madison’s “closeness of reasoning,” noting that such skill “must produce conviction on 
every mind, and … does the author immortal credit.” Throughout his life, Henry would continue 
to adhere to the interpretation of the Constitution manifested in the Virginia and Kentucky 
Resolutions and in Madison’s famous defense of them. He insisted that these documents 
“promulgate nothing which is not truly orthodox.” This constitutional orthodoxy came under 
increasing pressure, however, as the Union suffered from a burgeoning sectional divide. This 
divide became especially conspicuous during the crisis surrounding the admission of Missouri as 
a state.8  
II. 
Beverley had paid very close attention to the conflicts that marked Missouri’s admission to the 
Union. He had resided in Missouri at that time, and he had exercised a fair degree of political 
influence there. He took it upon himself  “to study the subject, to endeavor to acquaint the people 
with their rights, to rouse them to resist the proposed wrong, and to bear an active part in the 
controversy.” Believing that he “fully understood the reasonings which prevailed with the people 
to assert and maintain their rights,” Beverley enumerated those rights on the following basis: In 
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1803, France ceded the territory of Missouri to the United States. This treaty stipulated that the 
individuals residing therein must be admitted to the Union on “the same footing” as all other 
states that had been admitted. “Hence it was denied that Congress had the right to refuse 
admission to Missouri, because of a feature in her Constitution which was found in the 
Constitutions of nearly half the existing states.” In other words, since half of the existing states 
had slavery in 1803, Missouri should be allowed to enter the Union with slaves in 1820. 
Furthermore, all the other states had entered the Union as free and independent states, and 
Missouri therefore had that same right as well. Beverley defined the creation of a constitution as 
“the highest act of sovereignty,” and he did not think it proper for an outside power to dictate to 
the sovereign people of Missouri a method of constitutional construction.9  
After the dispute over Missouri, the next great challenge to constitutional orthodoxy 
emerged as a result of South Carolina’s 1832 attempt to “nullify” a federal tariff on imported 
goods. Beginning in 1830, the legislature of that state had issued a document that came to be 
known as the South Carolina Exposition. John C. Calhoun, a South Carolinian and the vice 
president of the United States at that time, had secretly written the document. In it he argued that 
the tariff was unconstitutional and that state governments had the right to “nullify” such laws. 
Unlike St. George Tucker and other men of the founding generation, Calhoun did not believe 
that sovereignty could be divided: either the states were sovereign, or they were not. In 
retrospect, nullification seems to be a predecessor of secession, but as historians have gradually 
come to realize, Calhoun was primarily interested in finding a way to secure minority rights 
within the American constitutional order. He did not want South Carolina to secede from the 
Union, and he devised nullification as a means to forestall that course of action. Whatever its 
                                                          
9 NBT to John C. Calhoun, 13 Nov. 1844, The Papers of John C. Calhoun, ed. Clyde Wilson, et al., (28 
vols., Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1959-2003), XX: 282-287. 
 159
merits as a mode of constitutional interpretation, the nullification movement did succeed in 
securing a lower tariff rate.10  
Beverley did not think very highly of what he called “the mysteries of nullification.” He 
agreed with those South Carolinians who believed the tariff to be detrimental to the interests of 
their state. He did not think, however, that a state could in any way nullify a federal law. At the 
time of the Nullification Crisis, indeed for the rest of his life, Beverley argued that the best 
course of action for South Carolina would be to leave the Union. He believed that South Carolina 
could establish a virtually tariff-free commercial treaty with England. Even if only two states 
formed a “Southern Confederacy,” the other states of the South would find it in their interest to 
follow. Beverley advanced this thesis with a rhetorical question: “Could Virginia raise a pound 
of tobacco if tobacco from North Carolina were admitted into England on such terms?” Beverley 
railed against Virginia’s politicians for their cowardice in refusing to take decisive action during 
the Nullification Crisis. Beverley wanted secession, and he believed that the crisis over 
nullification had presented the perfect opportunity. He would later note that he had been 
preaching this same gospel since the early 1830s, and that he had grown tired of hearing 
politicians say “now is not the time” to be quickly followed with “the time has now passed.”11  
Henry also opposed the doctrine of nullification, but he did not think secession would be 
a good idea. He believed that the states had the right to object to the constitutionality of an action 
of the federal government, and he used the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and Madison’s 
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defense of them as his precedent. Henry did not, however, think that these writings upheld a right 
of nullification. John Taylor of Caroline, in introducing the resolutions, had argued otherwise but 
his fellow legislators disagreed and altered his wording. Henry asserted that the state of Virginia 
had never supported the doctrine of nullification in any of her public acts. He believed the 
doctrine to be “inconsistent” in that “the opposing state may stand alone in its opinion, and while 
it resists the unanimous sentiment of all the rest, claim and receive the benefits of the Union.” 
Henry did, however, adhere to the tenth amendment’s guarantee that the rights not delegated to 
the federal government remained as the proper jurisdiction for the state governments, and that, 
therefore, the state legislatures could state their concern that a action of the federal government 
violated the Constitution. He wondered whether the state legislature, or a state convention 
perhaps appointed by the state legislature, should undertake this duty. He noted that South 
Carolina had established a convention for her nullification proceedings.12 
Because he adhered to the principles of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, Henry 
believed that the states had a right to protest, but he also believed that article three, section one of 
the Constitution gave the Supreme Court the final say in all cases arising under the Constitution. 
According to this interpretation, all cases involving questions of constitutional law, including 
those cases relating to the jurisdiction of powers, devolved upon the Supreme Court. In these 
cases, despite objections from the various states, the Supreme Court would have the final say. 
The verdict of the Supreme Court in such cases could be overturned only by the Supreme Court 
itself, in a later decision, or by amending the Constitution. In controversies between a state and 
the United States regarding “the extent of powers of the latter,” an individual state could voice 
objections through its legislature. If these measures did not bring about a change in the actions of 
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the federal government, then the state could resist these actions. In this case, “the obnoxious 
measure will be carried out, not, indeed, by action upon the state itself, through its several 
organs, but upon the individuals composing the state, according to the true theory and principles 
of the constitution.” If the individuals comprising the state still refused to comply, they had the 
option of secession, a remedy that exists “above” the Constitution. Only by “revolution, or 
secession, which is revolution” could the individuals comprising a state resist a law passed by 
congress and upheld by the Supreme Court.13 
Henry stated that he and his brother had “different views of the causes of the present 
dangerous crisis, and of the course it has rendered inevitable.” They agreed on the tariff, but 
disagreed about the issue of South Carolina. “Her course has been, I conceive, ill-advised, rash 
and unjustifiable; and if ‘we dream on till we wake in blood,’ hers will be the blame.” Yet Henry 
did not wholly approve of the President Jackson’s course of action either. Henry believed that 
Jackson’s threat to send in troops to enforce the tariff only aggravated the crisis. South Carolina 
should “have been warned, but she ought also to have been left to the operation of the law until 
her outbreakings had rendered submission to her dictates or enforcement of the law inevitable.” 
According to this interpretation, the president could not have altered the tariff, even if he had 
wished to do so. The Constitution, according to Henry, enabled the president to carry into 
execution the laws. The Constitution did not, however, give the president any right to declare the 
tariff unconstitutional. “Every state, indeed, as party to the compact, has a right to impugn the 
motion which led to it. But the judiciary cannot, nor can the executive officer who is called to 
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execute its judgment; for if he could, he would in effect exercise a veto which could not be 
controlled by any constitutional vote of two-thirds.” 14  
Believing that the real problem resided not in the activity or lack of activity by the 
president, but in a design failure in the Constitution, Henry argued that the “constitution has 
made no provision for the case of a state who opposes the law, different from those which apply 
to the opposition of a rabble or the insurrection of a mob.” He found it unfortunate that the 
Constitution gave the president the power to abuse a state that was only exercising a legitimate 
prerogative. Henry knew that direct attempts to countermand federal authority could result in the 
federal government prosecuting individuals. For instance, “if the governor of a state were to 
issue an order to the militia while in the actual service of the United States during war, the 
executive of the Union could not act, indeed, upon the governor, but a court martial would act 
upon the individual who should foolishly obey his orders.” The Constitution denied the president 
the power to declare a foreign war, yet by giving him “the duty of enforcing a law resisted by a 
state … it lights the torch of discord and spreads the flames of civil war throughout the land.”15 
Henry knew that it would take an amendment to correct such an oversight in the 
Constitution. He thought that South Carolina should have called for such an amendment, and that 
it would have been wise for that state to “withdraw her ordinances and propose it.” Perhaps even 
the Virginia legislature could propose such a measure. If the North refused to recognize this 
legitimate grievance, “it may then indeed become a question of the greatest importance whether 
the grievances complained of will justify and require a Southern convention.” If South Carolina 
thought her fellow Southern states were moving too slowly on this issue, her people could vote 
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to secede from the United States. “I for one would not object to her secession; though as to 
ourselves, I do not see clearly enough what is in the womb of time to induce me to say that we 
ought to follow her example.” Henry did not believe that the federal government had the power 
to act upon the state legislatures in any manner whatsoever. He knew that his approach to these 
questions was not typical. He prided himself on his ability to take the middle ground, to “occupy 
an isthmus that divides two great contending parties in the nation.” On the one side “is 
nullification, and upon the other centralization; the rocks of Scylla and the engulfing whirlpool 
of Charybdis.”16  
III. 
The greatest advocate of centralization was the law professor and Supreme Court Justice Joseph 
Story. Henry feared secession, but Story feared it even more. Story argued that secession was an 
illegitimate concept, and in searching for the source of this mistake, he fastened upon the 
writings of St. George Tucker. Writing from within the confines of the new law school at 
Harvard University, Story took a view of the crisis arising out of the nullification movement that 
differed from those espoused by the Tucker brothers. In doing so, Story articulated the definitive 
statement of the nationalist position. He also worked behind the scenes to aid some of the 
popularizers of this new view, such as Senator Daniel Webster.  
Story was born in 1779, just a year before Henry Tucker. The careers of both men 
followed similar trajectories. Story entered politics in 1805, when he won a seat in the 
Massachusetts legislature and began a fight for an independent judiciary in that state. In 1808, 
Story won a seat in the United States House of Representatives, but he had a difficult time taking 
politics seriously, and he quickly resigned. Before long, he found other work arguing cases 
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before the Supreme Court. In 1810, James Madison appointed the thirty-two year old Story to 
serve as a justice on the Supreme Court, making him the youngest man to ever win such an 
appointment. Nineteen years later, despite taking a very active role as a Supreme Court Justice, 
Story accepted a professorship at Harvard Law School. He held this chair in addition to his 
duties as a judge on the Supreme Court. Immediately after assuming his chair at Harvard, Story 
began work on his magnum opus, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States.17 
The same events that troubled Henry and Beverley pushed Story to write with a 
vengeance, for he wished to destroy the foundation of his enemies’ argument. He found this 
foundation in the constitutional writing of St. George Tucker. Story began his attack on Tucker 
with a series of rhetorical questions regarding the Constitution: “Is it a treaty, a convention, a 
league, a contract, or a compact? Who are the parties to it? By whom was it made? By whom 
ratified? What are its obligations? By whom, and in what manner may it be dissolved?” Story 
believed that these were important practical questions, not matters of metaphysics, noting that 
statesmen often gave contradictory answers to them. He then introduced Tucker, as “a learned 
commentator,” who had defined the United States Constitution as “an original, written, federal, 
and social compact, freely, voluntarily, and solemnly entered into by the several states, and 
ratified by the people thereof respectively; whereby the several states and the people thereof 
respectively have bound themselves to each other, and to the federal government of the United 
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States, and by which the federal government is bound to the several states and to every citizen of 
the United States.” Story correctly noted that Jefferson agreed with this interpretation.18  
Story then immediately proposed his counter-argument. He stated that: “The constitution 
was neither made, nor ratified by the states, as sovereignties, or political communities. It was 
framed by a convention, proposed to the people of the states for their adoption by congress; and 
was adopted by state conventions, —the immediate representatives of the people.” The 
Bostonian feared that under the Tucker model the Constitution acted as a “mere treaty” between 
the states, thereby giving each state the “right to judge for itself in relation to the nature, extent, 
and obligations of the instrument, without being at all bound by the interpretation of the federal 
government, or by that of any other state….” As a learned lawyer, Story knew that the term 
“compact” carried with it a clearly defined set of rights. In popular parlance, the word simply 
means an agreement between people or between nations, but in a legal sense the term implies 
“the notion of distinct contracting parties, having mutual rights, and remedies to enforce the 
obligations arising therefrom.” As a student of the law, Story knew that a compact gives each 
party to it “an equal right to judge of its terms, to enforce its obligations, and to insist upon 
redress for any violation of them.”19  
Story feared that the old constituional orthodoxy allowed for individual states to nullify 
any federal laws not to their liking, or even to leave the Union, should they so desire. “These 
conclusions may not always be avowed; but they flow naturally from the doctrines, which we 
have under consideration.” Feigning generosity toward his opponent, Story stated that Tucker 
failed to take his arguments through to their proper conclusions. As shown in chapter two, 
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however, this charge was false. St. George Tucker openly avowed the legitimacy of secession 
and had described numerous situations in which such a course of action would be necessary. 
Covering over Tucker’s conclusions, Story focused instead on the Virginian’s premises. The 
Harvard professor thought Tucker’s arguments to be absurd on their very face because they 
presented “the extraordinary spectacle of a nation existing only at the will of each of its 
constituent parts.” According to Story, Tucker’s theory “wholly failed to express the intentions 
of its framers, and brings back … all the evils of the old confederation, from which we were 
supposed to have had a safe distance.” Story did not think the power of the federal government to 
act upon individuals could be worth much, if the state governments could shield individuals from 
the federal leviathan.20 
 Discounting the role played by the states, Story viewed all political disputes in the Union 
as disputes between majorities and minorities. He thought that minorities should have no option 
save submission. For example, he noted that in the case of the American Revolution, a powerful 
minority of Americans had opposed the efforts of the majority who supported the Declaration of 
Independence. According to Story, the majority made the active support of the minority position 
into a crime. Thus, he drew the moral: “The truth is, that the majority of every organized society 
have always claimed, and exercised the right to govern the whole of that society, in the manner 
pointed out by the fundamental laws, which from time to time have existed in such society.” 
Story believed that the majority had the right to decide to what extent it would “respect the rights 
or claims of the minority; and how far they will, from policy or principle, insist upon or absolve 
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them from obedience.” In practice, Story argued that the majority will “is absolute and 
sovereign, limited only by their means and power to make their will effectual.”21 
Story disliked the theory of the social contract. He found an uncomfortable similarity 
between Tucker’s compact theory of the Union and the philosophical theory of the social 
contract. Story knew that Tucker saw the Constitution, in part, as “a social compact.” According 
to the parlance of the day, a social compact acted upon people while a federal compact acted 
upon states. Story disagreed with Tucker. He feared that many other “statesmen and jurists” 
agreed with Tucker’s positions, and that these positions had been “recently revived under 
circumstances, which have given them increased importance, if not a perilous influence.” Story 
believed that social contracts are not real contracts, and that that they should not be treated with 
“the same constructions and conditions, as belong to positive obligations, created between 
independent parties, contemplating a distinct and personal responsibility.” Even if one wished to 
consider the Constitution as a bona fide compact at its time of adoption, Story doubted that it 
would be prudent to continue to see the document in those terms.22 
In order to bring his readers over to the nationalist interpretation of the Constitution, 
Story had to disguise the fundamental principles that had guided the framers and the ratifiers of 
the Constitution. He believed that by demolishing the compact theory of the Union that he could 
also defeat nullification and secession. In his narrow view, the fact that the states sent delegates 
to draft the Constitution, that the Constitution was ratified by the states, and that the states played 
essential roles in the working of the Constitution’s design were all of minimal importance. Story 
believed that these facts could be re-interpreted if he could convince his readers to abandon St. 
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George Tucker’s interpretation of the Constitution and cease to see that document as a social 
compact. 
Fundamentally, the debate over the nature of the Constitution had become a debate about 
the origins of natural rights. The constitutional orthodoxy of the Tuckers built upon the modern 
theory of natural rights. Proponents of this theory argued that humans originally existed in a state 
of nature, and that they came together in order to form a government that could meet their needs. 
By doing so these humans exchanged natural rights for civil rights. The contracts that enabled 
such an exchange relied upon the consent of those who agreed to live under them; without such 
consent, the people could overthrow their government, thereby converting society back into a 
state of nature. In the state of nature, humans could recommence the effort, make a new contract 
and thereby form a new government. Thinkers who viewed the Constitution in such terms, such 
as the Tuckers, had to disagree radically with those who, like Story, saw the Constitution as a 
permanent and irrevocable supreme law of the land. As the last chapter indicated, however, the 
very basis of the modern natural rights theory was coming under increasing attack. Both northern 
and southern thinkers were moving against the old way of understanding natural rights, yet the 
old idea retained a considerable influence. This state of affairs produced confusion, among both 
the defenders and the besiegers of constitutional orthodoxy.23 
 Henry Tucker had problems with the idea of modern natural rights. In his Lectures on 
Government he attacked the idea of the state of nature construct and replaced it with an 
expression of patriarchy that owed much to the arguments made by the seventeenth-century 
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English philosopher Sir Robert Filmer.24 Henry believed that “the natural state of man has ever 
been and ever must be a state of society.” He based this conclusion upon his reading the Bible. In 
the holy book, Henry found the “first germ of the exercise of power on the one hand, and of the 
duty of obedience on the other” arising in the “connubial state” that came into existence between 
Adam and Eve. Henry believed that the dominion of man over woman continued in his time, and 
that “no serious or successful effort has even been made to throw off this subjection,” or “to give 
to the gentler sex an equal influence with man in the conduct of public affairs.” He regarded 
exceptions to this patriarchy as mere fables. According to Henry, the “very natures” of men and 
women inclined them to their respective roles.25 
 Despite the precedence Henry gave traditional gender roles, he thought that “parental 
authority” provided an even better example of the early action of the “principle of government.” 
Nature, according to Henry, made it so. The character of a human infant  “renders the authority 
of the parent indispensable on the one hand and the obedience of the child unhesitating on the 
other.” The ability of a parent to govern over many children indicated, in Henry’s mind, that “the 
disposition to govern, together with the habit of being governed,” exists in human beings by 
nature. From this premise, Henry concluded that patriarchal governments are in accordance with 
human nature. He believed that the Bible justified this form of government, and he provided an 
example: Noah lived for 350 years, and in that time his children and his childrens’ children must 
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have reached a very high number. Yet “his patriarchal government over the whole is not 
intimated to have been impaired, at least as far as it could extend itself.”26  
Henry noted that the ancient Jews followed the authority of priests as well as the 
authority of their patriarch. The other ancient races of their day often followed kings. The 
Assyrians, the Egyptians and the Chinese all followed monarchs, even before God revealed 
himself to the Jews. “The earth then has been for ages subjected to the dominion of a monarch, 
and it is only here and there, that we see man asserting the prerogative of self-government in 
comparatively small and insignificant societies.” Ancient Greek history provided Henry with 
some examples, but he also singled out Carthage before her defeat by Rome. In the middle ages 
Florence, Genoa and Venice all tried to function as republics but soon reverted to aristocracy. Of 
course, Henry did not wish his students to think that monarchy was so natural that Virginia 
should abandon her republican form of government.27 
 Attempting to qualify his Filmerian philosophy with a Lockean dose of modern natural 
rights, Henry acted as if the idea of natural equality could be divorced from its origins in a 
presumed state of nature. He moved to “consider the effect of the structure of society upon the 
rights of those who constitute it, whether it be regarded as arising out of actual compact, or 
consider it as only kept together from a sense of its necessity, upon those principles on which 
alone its original organization could have been justly bestowed.” Unlike a typical Filmerian, 
Henry asserted that all inequalities “spring from the institutions of society.” Proposing the 
example of two children born at the same time, Henry argued that they were in all ways equal. 
Even if one child was stronger or smarter or more attractive than the other, that would not give 
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him a “superior right,” for if it did then the laborer could be superior to the lord, the clown to the 
nobleman or the maid to the mistress. Despite his modified Filmerian philosophy, Henry proved 
completely unwilling to consider the possibility that all men were not, in fact, born equal. Henry 
regarded the statement that “all men are created equal” as “a truth which with us is no longer 
held to be debatable, but is placed among the aphorisms of politics, upon the footing of those 
axioms, which serve as the firm foundations of mathematical science.”28   
If, as Henry supposed, men were equal by nature, then society could not “consistently 
with the principles upon which it was founded, create an inequality in respect of natural rights 
among those who compose it.” Henry believed that society was “bound,” as if by contract, to 
protect the rights of its citizens, and “if bound to protect my rights, it is bound to protect my 
equality which is one of my rights.” The problem was, that by positing a Filmerian construction 
of the basis of society and government, Henry had abandoned the old contractual way of 
understanding these matters. Under the terms he had set forth, government was not “bound” to 
do anything. Faced with the intractability of this dilemma, Henry posed a construct that was, by 
his own terms, fictive: “our business being to enquire into the legitimate principles upon which 
society may organize government, we must treat the matter as though there was a voluntary 
association of individuals in the act of forming a regular government.” All of a sudden, with the 
aid of one fictive construct, Henry the Filmerian became Henry the Lockean, arguing that “the 
very act of entering into society supposes the right in man to surrender some portion of his 
natural rights in return for benefits received.”29 
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Henry argued that of all the governments in the world at the time, only the United States 
possessed a written constitution, and only the American experience had approached the ideal of a 
regime established in terms of a social compact. The other governments of the world, including 
the government of England, existed as governments of force and were therefore illegitimate. 
Henry argued that in Virginia, the people themselves, in their capacity as a “society,” possessed 
sovereignty over the “government” which existed only as their creation. According to this 
interpretation, if ever the government should cease to serve their interests, the people had the 
right to change it or abolish it. The Virginia Constitution created the government of the state, and 
that government existed as the agent of the people. The government of Virginia had no power to 
alter the Virginia Constitution, and if they tried “they would with their own hands have destroyed 
the vital principle of their own existence.”30  
Henry spent so much time demonstrating this truth because he had too often heard the 
sovereignty of the people “sneered at, if not openly denied….” He wished to emphasize, 
however, that this “sanitary power” should only be applied when absolutely necessary. Some 
would argue that Henry hereby made the case that the laws of the state could not bind the 
individual. But he protested this assertion. He argued for the supremacy of the American 
Constitution to its English rival on the ground that “with us the alteration, amendment and 
change of our constitution and forms of government is mainly provided for by the fundamental 
law itself; whereas in Great Britain those grievances for which there is no stated remedy or 
express legal provision, are only to be redressed by revolution….” The Virginian found it 
fortunate that thus far in American history, disagreements had followed party lines rather than 
sectional lines. Should the rights of a sectional minority be disregarded, Henry feared that 
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secession would result. Henry had good reason to fear that forces were tending in that direction. 
At this very time, Story provided intellectual guidance to those nationalists who were searching 
for ways to override the rights of the southern states.31 
IV. 
Story feared the consequences of giving minorities constitutional protections. On this subject, 
Henry disagreed radically with his northern colleague. In fact, Henry believed that constitutions 
exist, by their nature, to protect the rights of minorities. Specifically mentioning the French 
political writer Alexis de Tocqueville, Henry stated that the question of “how to restrain that 
majority, whilst in the exercise of its powers, from excesses destructive of the rights of the 
majority, is the great problem which, it would seem, is yet to be reached.” Some people believed 
that representative democracy worked to mitigate this danger. Unfortunately, Henry believed that 
party politics had lessened the safeguard supplied by representative democracy: “The successful 
party has swept from office, as with a besom, the adherents of its adversaries and even on the 
floor of the legislative assembly, the freedom of debate has been stifled … by the adoption of 
that unprecedented novelty in parliamentary proceedings, familiarly called the one hour rule.”32 
Henry noted that immediately after the Constitution had been adopted, two great political 
parties emerged: “The federal party (so called by a strange perversion of the use of terms) have 
always been inclined to represent the United States as constituting one people, instead of a 
confederacy of states; while their opponents (formerly called anti-federalists, but more recently 
known as the democratic or republican party) have ever strenuously contended that the 
constitution was a compact, or the result of a compact between the states; who retain their 
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sovereignty, and all the rights of sovereignty, which they have not expressly transferred to the 
federal government.” Story argued that the Constitution, in its opening sentence, declared that it 
was the creation of the people of the United States. Daniel Webster followed this interpretation 
in a number of his speeches. Henry believed that the Federalists had fallen from power “in no 
small degree” because of their “strenuous maintenance of this political heresy….”  Story had 
offered the most advanced defense of this theory, and Henry proceeded to take this argument 
apart.33 
 Story was more radical than many Federalists, for he argued that the people of the United 
States were one people not only at the time of ratification, but in 1776 when they issued the 
Declaration, and indeed even when they had been contented colonials. To refute Story, Henry 
turned to William Blackstone. This English commentator had noted that Scotland, Ireland, and 
Hanover, though nominally under British control, were distinct and separate dominions. They 
were distinct not only from Britain, but from each other as well. Henry applied this same 
reasoning to the New World colonies. “If they were not one with the realm, it is difficult indeed 
to imagine how they could as distinct dependencies be one with each other.” Henry demonstrated 
Story’s subtle admission to these truths, for even Story admitted that the individual colonies had 
no right to make laws for each other.34 
The colonies were different “peoples,” said Henry. He here demonstrated the power of 
new words to convey new ideas. The plural form of people did not exist in the English language 
at the time, but Henry justified its use by appealing to a precedent set by de Tocqueville. Henry 
noted that the colonies had different origins, produced types of settlements, and followed 
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different “forms of civil polity.” He believed that each colonial government had possessed a 
distinct character. Some “were provincial, some proprietary, and some were chartered.” Indeed, 
some of the colonies, such as New York and New Jersey, had been conquered by the British and 
in accordance with “the principles of the common law,” these colonies continued to possess their 
original legal systems until they were “changed by the stern fiat of the conquerors.” Thus, in 
explaining the diversity of the various new world sovereignties, Henry employed the plural form 
of the word “people”: “These various peoples were, therefore, essentially distinct and separate, 
and utterly incapable of amalgamation or oneness: and we must remember that the question is 
not whether they were sovereign in respect of foreign nations, but whether they were one in 
regard to each other.” With a flurry of rhetorical questions, Henry indicated that they were not. 
They did not even have the power to call upon the militias of their fellow states when in 
danger.35 
According to Henry, the colonies were not only separate from each other, but largely 
separate from the King as well. For instance, the colonies often made independent treaties with 
neighboring Indian tribes. Henry classed this ability for independent action as an indispensable 
attribute of a people. “To constitute one people, those who compose it must act as one people. It 
is the unity of action which alone makes those one, who, without it, would be several.” He 
further noted that a society, which has the power to make law for itself, possessed, by definition, 
sovereignty. “Thus, it is that two peoples may have the same king, and yet be a separate people: 
as in the case of Great Britain and Hanover now, and of England and Scotland before the union.” 
Henry cited Jamaica, Canada, and England as further examples, noting that “if these portions of 
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the empire are foreign to England, the thirteen colonies must have been foreign to her, and if 
foreign to her, how much more foreign to Hindostan, or Antigua, or to one another?” After 
reviewing the different origins, the separate institutions, and the ability for separate action, Henry 
concluded that the thirteen colonies “did not in any sense whatever constitute one people.”36  
 Henry believed that the various colonies had been related to each other only to the extent 
that they all owed allegiance to the King. When they broke this allegiance, they became free and 
independent states. By cutting off the head the colonies did not, by that act, become one body. 
Furthermore, the Congress assembled by the representatives of the various states “represented 
states alone, and acted only upon states.” Henry also noted that Virginia declared her own 
independence on 15 May 1776. According to Story, the united colonies were, “a nation de facto, 
having a general government over it created, and acting by the general consent of the people of 
all the colonies….” Henry would have none of this argument: “These opinions are utterly at war 
with the first principles of our federal government, as they have been received and handed down 
to us by the wisest and purest statesmen of both parties.” Henry and Story agreed that 
sovereignty passed from the crown to the people; they differed in that Story thought that this 
sovereignty went to the people as whole, while Henry believed that the sovereignty went to the 
people of each individual state.37 
To make his case, Henry noted that each state had one vote in the Continental Congress: 
“a test of confederate character which has been universally admitted.” The individual states had 
the power to remove their representatives at will, and Henry thus compared these early 
representatives to ambassadors. Perhaps most importantly, this Congress “acted by 
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recommendation mainly.” During this period the Congress “exercised its powers by a sufferance 
growing out of the situation of the country, which had not yet been able to form any regular 
government; and the acquiescence of the states constituted its justification for the broad powers it 
often felt itself compelled to exercise.” Any state that had rejected the authority of this 
government could have simply withdrawn its representatives. According to Henry, Story 
seriously misrepresented the reality of this situation by arguing that the states had been under the 
control of this government. Henry seemed nonplused that anyone could regard the delegates of 
the states, who existed to serve the interests of the states, as under the control of a national 
government. Henry also had problems with Story’s use of the word “union.” “We speak of 
forming or dissolving a union in reference to states, but no one ever dreamed of calling a national 
government a union, or of breaking up the very foundations of society itself, when he speaks of 
the dissolution of a union.”38    
Story argued that the Declaration of Independence did not create thirteen free and 
independent states, but rather created a free American people. He believed that the moment the 
Declaration was issued, the United States became “a nation de facto, having a general 
government over it created, and acting by the general consent of the people of all the colonies.” 
Henry disagreed. He noted that although the states acted together in issuing the Declaration of 
Independence, the document illustrated in its wording, over and over again, the plurality of states 
it created. Furthermore, “when the treaty of peace was made, each state is distinctly named in the 
treaty, and the independence of all is distinctly acknowledged.”39 Henry then turned his attention 
to the specific role played by Virginia.   
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 Henry’s home state had seceded from the Empire in May of 1776 and had created its own 
constitution by June of that year. Virginians did not replace that constitution until 1832. Thus, 
Virginia had already taken the necessary steps to become a free and independent state before the 
Declaration of Independence had even been written. Henry thought that Vermont offered a 
peculiar instance of these same forces. She did not participate in the original Declaration of 
Independence. Instead, she issued her own one year later. The states that did issue the 
Declaration did so “in their character of separate communities, dependent on each other only so 
far as common danger and their own consent had made them so.” Turning to the Articles of 
Confederation, Henry used this document to enforce his reading of the Declaration. It 
specifically listed the various states. “The style of the confederacy was the United States of 
America, a name which very plainly indicates the union of political bodies, and not the oneness 
of a single republic.” The Articles of Confederation not only declared the freedom and 
independence of each individual state, it went further by avowing “their anterior independence 
and sovereignty, by the declaration that they retained them.” Story had made much of the fact 
that the Articles called for “perpetual union.” Henry replied that this expression negated Story’s 
“favorite notion of oneness, since union implies the connection of those who before were 
separate.”40  
Apologizing to his readers for spending so much time demonstrating the sovereignty of 
the states, Henry justified himself: “I have devoted more time to these investigations, because the 
opposite opinion has been so industriously maintained by an able writer, obviously with the view 
of influencing certain great political questions which have arisen under our constitution.” If 
Story’s theory were correct, Henry believed that the Continental Congress could well have 
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proposed getting rid of the states altogether. Henry admitted that “according to the theory of our 
government, the people are the sovereign.” This statement, however, lead him to inquire who, 
exactly, these people were. Henry gave his answer: “The people of each state, distinct from the 
other states,” are the people. When the time came to delegate power “the people of each state” 
did so, not the people considered as a whole.41  
Henry wished to prove that he was “neither a nullifier nor [an] anarchist….” He conceded 
that Story sometimes merely drew incorrect conclusions from correct premises. For instance, 
Story had stated that St. George Tucker’s doctrines made it possible for any individual state to 
destroy the Union. Henry protested this interpretation: “Such a heresy will not be found in these 
pages.” Instead, Henry argued “that every party to a compact has a right to judge of its infraction, 
and to refuse longer to be bound by it when broken,” but that “every other party has an equal 
right to judge, and that the recusant acts upon his own responsibility, in undertaking to decide 
and to act contrary to the prevailing opinion of the other parties to the contract.” He argued that 
the Constitution was not an agreement between the states, but the result of an agreement. The 
actual agreement is the “We, the people” clause in the preamble. Henry agreed with Story’s 
assertion that the Constitution of the United States must be as permanent as any state 
constitution, but “with this modification,” namely “that though irrevocable by the ordinary forms 
of government, it may by revocable by the exercise of rights paramount to all constitutions….” 
Henry believed, however, that “the state which asserts these rights, does so on its own 
responsibility, since in matters between states, if one has a right to judge, others have also.” 
When Story asserted that the people of the United States possessed the right to alter or abolish 
the Constitution, Henry entered a disclaimer: “If all the people in six of the largest states were to 
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concur, they would have no right to alter or abolish the constitution, though they would 
constitute a majority of the Union.” Similarly, Henry did not think that only one or two states 
could abolish the Constitution “except upon the principles of revolution, which are above the 
law.”42 
 After considering the meaning of the name the “United States,” Henry argued that the 
name implied that several political bodies had come together for their common defense. “Such is 
its true meaning philologically, for when we speak of things united, we imply a previous 
separation of the parts.” The name therefore “does not mean one people, but several peoples 
united, and in this sense must the delegates appointed under that confederation have used the 
language.” Even more telling is the language used by the state ratification conventions, and 
Henry provided examples from each of these assemblages. In sum, “with all deference to the 
learned commentator, it appears to me that in the origin, progress and adoption of the 
constitution of the United States, the states, free, sovereign and independent, were the actors, and 
emphatically the parties.” Henry regretted that Story had not paid more attention to the state 
ratification conventions. Yet even without giving proper attention to the means by which the 
states ratified the Constitution, Henry believed that the true nature of the Constitution showed 
through. For instance, three-quarters of the state legislatures could ratify an amendment to the 
Constitution. Henry pointed out that three-quarters of the people of the United States did not 
have such a power. Henry also quoted from the very explicit language in the Tenth 
Amendment.43  
V. 
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Henry and Story did, however, have one thing in common: they both feared the breakup of the 
Union. Story thought that minorities, sectional or otherwise, had no alternative save complying 
with the will of the majority. Henry knew that such a formula would not work. He offered up a 
general principle: “Where the interests, the feelings or even the prejudices of two different 
sections of a confederation are distinct and conflicting, where one regards as essential, what the 
other looks upon as ruinous, and where the line of demarcation is as plain territorially as it 
unfortunately is in point of interest or opinion, it may be confidently pronounced that the union 
of the respective portions must speedily be dissolved, unless there be co-existing causes of an 
opposite tendency more than adequate to control the repellent principles.”44  
Henry knew that if the South were to face the “intolerable evil” of majority tyranny, it 
would inevitably “drive the injured states to the sad alternative of dissolution.” He quoted de 
Tocqueville’s view that the American states stuck together out of a certain kind of like-
mindedness. Henry hated the idea of secession, and he attempted to convince himself that the 
national consolidation so feared by his fellow southerners would never come to pass: 
“Consolidation can only be effected, first, by usurpation; second, by changes of the constitution, 
to which the state shall assent for their annihilation; third, by subjugation by overgrown members 
of the union; fourth, by combination of sectional divisions of the residue of the states.” Henry 
confidently expressed his prediction that such occurrences would never come to pass. “The 
danger of the usurpation of the government by an ambitious individual appears to me to be an 
idle dream, unless we should be involved in desolating wars, which to often result in investing 
dictatorial powers on the hands of one man.” Henry believed that American leaders lacked the 
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“pretext for raising standing armies,” and he believed that the navy could do the primary work of 
defending the country.45  
Henry thought “tyranny and absolutism” would be more likely if the Union were broken 
up, than if the confederacy of states remained together. Secession, according to Henry, would 
surely lead to the creation of “standing armies, to which neighboring nations not united in 
confederacy, must sooner or later resort….” Such armies would indeed be necessary, for 
disunion would provoke “the great northern hive” with its “vastly superior power” to attempt to 
subdue the South. Henry feared “absolutism” would be the consequence of having two nations in 
a position of “perpetual collision and strife,” and he thought it would be especially sad if the 
North and South were to become enemies of that nature. Henry feared the day when southerners 
would have to beat their ploughshares back into swords and face off against “our pristine 
brothers, with whom in two heroic and glorious wars we successfully fought, shoulder to 
shoulder, against the enemies of our common liberties.” He echoed the language of the 
Declaration, that men should suffer injustices, so long as those injustices could be endured, 
rather than facing the challenge of unknown crises. “Try it when we may, we shall find the 
remedy worse than the disease, unless some important part of the constitution has been attacked 
in its recesses, or its vitals been impaired by systematic violation.”46 
 Believing that a proper understanding of the American constitutional order would make 
Southerners less fearful of sectional tyranny, Henry emphasized that the president’s veto power 
could help keep northern interests in check. “There has probably never been a president since the 
foundation of the government, not even the Adams’s, who could have been persuaded to sanction 
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a bill for the promotion of the schemes of the fanatical friends of abolition.” Henry expressed 
confidence that the South would continue to have a friend in the oval office based upon the 
“simple fact that a president never has, and perhaps never will be elected by a party purely 
sectional.” The nature of the American electoral system compelled the president to seek votes 
from all quarters of the Union, and indeed, tends to draw its candidates from a middle point 
between North and South: “to this cause, perhaps, may in part, be attributed the fact that in fifty-
eight years, the presidential chair will have been filled forty-six years by five Virginians and one 
Tennessesan.” Henry therefore believed that the veto would always aid the South, for he did not 
think the North would ever muster a two-thirds vote in either house of Congress. He also thought 
that even with a significant northern majority in the Senate, there would always be “high-
minded” Northerners willing to side with the South.47  
Despite his dislike of the idea of secession, Henry knew that such a course of action 
existed as the inevitable concomitant “of the government being composed in effect of 
independent states.” Henry examined those parts of the Constitution that kept the United States 
from breaking into a number of confederacies. First, he noted that the members of the various 
state legislatures had to swear to an oath to protect the Constitution. Unfortunately, he feared that 
these oaths would have little force once politicians convinced themselves that violations of the 
Constitution by another party had justified secession. Contrary to the general perception, Henry 
argued that dissolving the Constitution, even if someone else had violated it, would still be a 
breach of the oath. Instead of dissolving the Constitution, Henry thought it better “to repair the 
breach,” and to attempt to do so through constitutional means: elections could remove inadequate 
leaders, and state legislatures could issue “remonstrances and appeals to our sister states….” 
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Henry hoped that “the moral influence of truth and the sanative operation of time itself” would 
work to keep the Union whole. He again appealed to the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions as 
the proper model. Henry believed that affairs would have been much worse if Virginia had 
seceded instead of offering up her resolutions, for Virginia’s leaders would have thereby violated 
their oath. “I hold, therefore, that it is a sacred duty on the part of every man who has taken this 
solemn oath, if the constitution be violated in part, to hold on strenuously and faithfully to the 
rest, and to strain every nerve to restore it to its integrity and purity.”48  
Henry wanted to have it both ways: “Let it not be supposed, however, from what is here 
said, that I am an advocate for passive obedience and non-resistance to all unconstitutional 
legislation.” If affairs were worse within the Union than they would be outside of it Henry would 
advocate “‘resistance and revolution,’” in other words, in that circumstance he would support 
secession. Henry defined secession as “‘an appeal from the canceled obligations of the 
constitutional compact to original rights and the law of self-preservation….’” He believed that 
even English conservative writers such as William Paley and William Blackstone supported such 
a right. Henry did not, however, think that any actions which a “succeeding administration would 
remove” could be grievous enough to support secession. He referred his students to 
Washington’s farewell address, noting that “[a]ny disputation on the nature and character of our 
government must indeed be imperfect, which does not avail itself of the parting advice of the 
father of his country on this important subject.”49  
The people of the United States had come to love the Union, and Washington’s words 
spoke to that love. Henry was convinced “that however a doubt of the value of the union may 
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exist in the bosom of the ambitious or disappointed, it has never yet found its way to the great 
body of the people.” Henry noted that all prominent politicians spoke publicly in favor of the 
preservation of the union. He believed that if any politician were to think otherwise “he would 
soon find the policy of locking up his opinions within the recesses of his own heart,” or else face 
defeat come reelection time. Even if a state could reach a majority vote in favor of secession, 
Henry believed that the minority opposing it would “manfully” resist what he called “treason to 
the constitution.” If secession were ever to arise in an individual state, Henry predicted that that 
state “will most probably find her own bowels torn by civil dissensions within, while pressed by 
enemies from without.”50 
Henry did not believe that “peaceable secession” existed “within the ordinary laws of 
human action.” He did not think it possible that the “five and twenty members of this great 
confederacy would tamely submit to the destruction of the great and magic arch by striking out 
its keystone, or even pulling away its least important fragment.” He never thought more than one 
state would secede at a time, but he did prove correct on one point: “come when they will, 
disunion and secession must result in civil wars, and end at last, perhaps, in ruthless 
despotism….” He concluded by praising The Federalist, which he noted that his students had 
recently read. “Those papers have been, with great propriety, made a manual for our youth, and I 
have only to express a hope that their wise and wholesome councils have made a due impression 
upon your hearts, and that that impression may be as indelible as it is salutary.” Henry thought 
that the best way to preserve the union would be “to imbue the minds of those who are at some 
future day to be the legislators of the land, and the leaders of the democracy, with a just sense of 
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the dangers to which our institutions are exposed, and the weighty duties which will devolve 
upon them for their prevention.”51 
VI. 
Beverley’s position on the issue of sectionalism caused him to disagree with Henry. Both 
brothers imbibed the principles of constitutional orthodoxy from their father, and they largely 
agreed on fundamental principles. For instance, Beverley believed that his brother had done of 
good job of presenting the federal character of the United States government. “If I were now to 
resume the pen I should begin where he left off.” They disagreed, however, on the merits of 
secession. Beverley complained that his brother’s “passion for the Union was almost 
monomaniacal.”52 
Henry argued that only the overly ambitious wanted secession, but Beverley insisted on 
exactly the opposite. By the early 1850s, Beverley had grown convinced that most southern 
politicians thought their continued importance depended upon the South staying in the Union. 
The very ambition of these politicians kept them from doing the right thing for their home states. 
He thought that the Unionist sentiment so revered by his brother had degenerated into so much 
buncombe; it had become a mere applause line that no one really believed in anymore. Southern 
politicians were “much in earnest in their stereotyped declamation about this great glorious and 
happy union, and because there is a certain amount of stereotyped applause always ready to greet 
such displays of hackneyed eloquence, they persuade themselves that the people are as much in 
earnest as they are.”53     
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Much of Beverley’s drive for secession came from his powerful instinctive grasp of what 
Carl Schmitt, a twentieth-century philosopher, called the friend/enemy distinction in politics. 
Schmitt stated that an enemy only exists “when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of 
people confronts a similar collectivity.” In such a conflict the enemy “intends to negate his 
opponent’s way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one’s own 
form of existence.” Schmitt believed that a just war could only be fought when a people face an 
“existential threat” from a “real enemy.” Beverley wished the South to break free from the 
Union. He did not see the United States as a real country, but as “a mere creature of 
convention….” Only outside of the Union would the southern states be free to “regard as 
enemies those who hate us and whom we hate.” Beverley had reached what Schmitt would call 
one of the “high points of politics,” that moment “in which the enemy is, in concrete clarity, 
recognized as the enemy.”54 
Beverley believed the people of the North to be the sworn enemies of the people of the 
South. He therefore espoused a hatred of Yankees that his biographer aptly described as 
“antisemitism without Jewry.” Beverley argued that northerners combined specious piety with 
materialism. He stated that he could have “no fellowship with him who worships mammon, and 
least of all, when he pretends to combine that worship with the worship of God. Spiritual pride 
and purse pride both disgust me: the combination of the two is intolerable.” The Virginian 
referred to the people living between the Ohio and Mississippi rivers as “vile mercenary rabble.” 
He compared the manners of northerners to those of a “badly-trained dog, who comes to you 
with his tail tucked, and his ears back to neck, and is no sooner relieved of his fear of being 
kicked, then he paws you with his dirty foot.” Beverley thought that Southerners had a better 
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understanding of what it meant to be a gentleman. According to his definition, a gentleman 
“bears himself equally toward equals, deferentially toward superiors, and mildly toward 
inferiors….”55 
Beverley sensed that a new form of what we today call multiculturalism was on the rise 
in the North, and he did not approve of this development. Yet Beverley noted that he did not 
wish to introduce slavery to Ohio either. “No, sir. I would not so wrong the Negro.” Beverley 
saw Ohio as a bastion of multiculturalism, and therefore incapable of producing a gentleman. 
Black people were, according to Beverley, superior to Ohio’s agglomeration of immigrants. He 
believed that northerners were  “sensible of the negro’s superiority, and they are jealous of it.” 
He stated that northerners “steal our slaves from us, and when they have made them what they 
call free, they harass them, they persecute them, they combine to shut them out from all credible 
or profitable employment….” Ohio, with her factories, had the elements of civilization, but she 
lacked “the refinements and courtesies of life” that made civilization worthy of the name. The 
Southerner, according to Beverley, made his slaves into gentlemen. “The man of Ohio has 
nobody below him but his hog.” And Beverley did not believe that a hog could ever be made into 
a gentleman. After traveling to Ohio, Beverley was shocked to hear more German spoken than 
English. Ohio was, said Beverley, a “cesspool.”56   
In the years after the death of his father in 1826, and then his brother in 1848, Beverley 
Tucker saw it as his duty to carry forth teaching the proper understanding of the Constitution. 
Unfortunately, he became so preoccupied with secession, that he spent more time preaching that 
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doctrine than he did interpreting the Constitution. Indeed, he even came to believe that 
disingenuous representatives at the Philadelphia Convention had corrupted the document. The 
consolidationists wanted to declare the United States a nation but they were voted down “and the 
words nation and national [were] everywhere stricken out of the draught of the Constitution.” 
The consolidationists did not, however, allow this defeat to destroy their dream. They acquired a 
majority in the first Congress and “made a mystery of the journal of the convention,” and thereby 
managed to hide their defeat “until they had given all the authority of contemporaneous 
exposition to their centralizing constructions.” Beverley believed that “[w]ords are things; and 
had the testimony of the journal of the convention been the other way, it would have been 
published.”57  
Beverley wanted a public venue from which he could spread his message of secession. 
He believed that he needed an audience equivalent to that available to a senator of the United 
States. In 1850, he finally won such an opportunity, when the General Assembly of Virginia 
choose to him attend a convention of the Southern states in Nashville, Tennessee. Beverley knew 
that the great mass of the people were not yet ready for secession. He therefore argued that the 
convention should merely propose amendments that they knew the North would never adopt as a 
means of stalling and covering over their true intentions. He proposed two such amendments: 
one requiring a two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress in order to change trade laws, and 
another explicitly stating the right of a state to secede. He hoped that the South could thereby 
keep the issues alive until the next presidential election, at which time the South could sabotage 
the election in such a manner as to leave the Union without a chief executive.  
In private letters to friends, Beverley had long advocated this passive-aggressive 
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approach to disunion. “Look at the Constitution and you will see what no one has ever remarked 
upon, that the absence of all the Representatives and Senators from ten states will make an 
election impossible.” If the date for the inauguration of a president passed without a president 
actually being inaugurated, the government would, according to Beverley, cease to exist. He 
noted that this part of the Constitution demonstrated the supremacy of the state governments over 
the federal government. This confirmation of theory with practice would mark an auspicious 
beginning for a new southern union: “There will be no commander-in-chief to send his navy to 
blockade the port of Charleston, and no means by which the power of the Union can be brought 
to bear on the dissenting States. In any controversy that can arise it will be state against state, not 
a state against the federal government.” Beverley thought that southerners would do well to keep 
this plan to themselves until the time came to move for independence.58 
 In his speech before the Nashville Convention, Beverley stated that no one should fear 
secession and that separation could be brought about without a fight. He did not think well of 
those men “who would rather not know their rights,” for fear that they would “be obliged to 
defend them at all hazards and to the last extremity.” Using a metaphor, Beverley compared the 
Union to a patient with a gangrened limb. The patient was not yet willing to amputate, but he 
was not in any mood to die either. Beverley knew that “when put to choose between the loss of a 
limb and the loss of life,” the patient would choose to lose the limb. The Virginian then drew the 
moral: “So let the people of the South once see distinctly they must choose between the Union, 
and all the rights and interests that the Union was intended to protect, and they will not hesitate 
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to renounce it, even though a bloody war should be the consequence.” With that said, however, 
in the next breath Beverley argued that secession could be brought about in a peaceful manner. 
Daniel Webster, a senator from Massachusetts, had asserted that a peaceful separation would be 
impossible. According to Beverley, Webster “has no right to speak for the South. We are not his 
clients.” Webster had only a right to speak for Massachusetts. Beverley countered that a 
Southern Confederacy would have no good reason to make war upon the North. “Sir, no man 
among us dream of such a thing —no northern man apprehends it.” Therefore, he interpreted 
Webster’s words as “words of menace.”59 
 Like his brother, Beverley posited George Washington as the model southern politician. 
Beverley called upon his listeners to bring forth again statesmanship on such a model. He 
believed that secession could best effect such a goal. The last time the South made a bid for 
independence, her great leaders were still obscure men: “Washington was a surveyor, Patrick 
Henry an obscure county court lawyer, Green was at his forge….” Beverley hoped that “even 
now, in the depths of your forests, are other such men, wanting nothing but a righteous cause, 
and brave men resolute to support it, to secure independence and freedom to you, and immediate 
honor to themselves.” In a rare use of understatement, he noted that the “genius of Jefferson, the 
virtue of Madison, the strong will of Jackson, served the times pretty well.” Unfortunately, many 
other Virginia politicians had been false idols. Beverley wanted his fellow southerners to turn 
towards the true God: “seek for men distinguished by private virtue as well as talent—men 
worthy to minister between God and you, in the great concerns of duty as well as right.”60   
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Beverley asked his listeners to imagine a situation in which only five states —namely 
Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, Alabama and Mississippi— had left the Union. He believed 
that these states would have peaceful intentions in doing so, and that it would be foolish for the 
North to stand in their way, for if they did, the job of carrying their cotton to Europe would fall 
to some European power. Furthermore, were the North to intercede against the South, she would 
lose the flow of cotton into her own mills. Like his friend senator James Henry Hammond of 
South Carolina, Beverley seemed quite certain that the North would never dare to act against 
King Cotton. If the North tried to subjugate the South with a war of desolation, “such a war 
would re-act upon the North like the bursting of a cannon in a crowded ship, working ten times 
more mischief there than on the enemy.” Beverley did not think that Northern plutocrats could 
trust that the laboring classes would remain loyal to a system that exploited them. He compared 
the voluntary southern restriction of her cotton crop to the Dutch trick of flooding the country to 
keep it from falling to invaders. Beverley thought that the South could give up growing cotton 
and plant only wheat without too much domestic suffering, but that the industrial nations of the 
world would never be able to accommodate the change. “Sir, the pillars of the earth would be 
shaken; and here stands the South grasping them in her strong arms.”61  
Beverley did not believe that the upper South would ever participate in a military attack 
on the lower South. If a military conflict did erupt, and the struggle took an extended amount of 
time to finish, Virginia would, he believed, be willing to leave the Union that she had done so 
much to help create. Virginia had not sided with South Carolina in 1832 and 1833, but she never 
would have let northern forces move across her soil to put down nullification. Even if the matter 
never came to war, “how long would those states be content to remain under the grinding 
                                                          
61 Ibid., 19-20. 
 
 193
misgovernment which taxes them for the benefit of their masters in the North, while witnessing 
the prosperity of their Southern brethren living under a revenue tariff and enjoying the blessings 
of free trade.” According to Beverley, the South, left to its own devices, would adhere to a policy 
of “free trade.” He believed that such a policy would hold out a great incentive to the border 
states. He even went so far as to claim that Pennsylvania might join the southern confederacy. 
After all, the tariffs did more to help New England that they did to help her. In addition, he 
hoped that the Mississippi might tie Illinois to the future of the Confederacy.62 
 According to Beverley, the North had stolen “seven hundred millions” from the South 
with the operations of the national tariff system. This wealth had been invested in shipping and 
factories, and in speculation on “barren lands at high prices….” Without cotton to drive the 
factories, the ships would have nothing to deliver. Beverley painted a gloomy scene: “The ships 
lie rotting at the wharves; the factories tumbled into ruins; and skulking in corners of their 
marble palaces, the merchant princes, like those of Venice, live meagerly on contributions levied 
on the curiosity of travelers.” He predicted that these regions would succumb to the doctrines of 
“communism,” but that the change would be ineffectual for “communism is of little worth where 
there is nothing to divide, and that what they call the rights of labor cannot be enforced against 
those who have nothing to pay.” He reiterated that Bostonians should look to the history of 
Venice — “a wilderness of marble in a waste of waters”— before being so bold as to attack the 
South. Beverley believed that England could, in theory, be self-sufficient, but that without cotton 
her entire social structure would fall apart. “The play of the shuttle is the pulse of life to her.” 
The rest of Europe faced a similar situation. Material forces demanded that no one make war 
upon the South: “the immense fixed capital invested in manufacturing establishments, and the 
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multitudinous population whose bread depends on them, compel the world to peace.” Europe, 
according to Beverley’s prediction, would force the North to make peace with the South.63  
The very word “Union,” according to Beverley, could cast a magic spell on most 
southerners. “In the South, attachment to the Union is a matter of sentiment. In the North it is an 
affair of calculation.” Beverley argued that if the Union had asked as much of the North as it did 
of the South, the North would have backed out the agreement by 1800. He described the Union 
as a friendship between a southern giant and a northern dwarf, in which the former did all the 
work and the latter accrued all the benefit. “In our case it is the Giant that has been maimed and 
crippled, and the dwarf, taking advantage of his helpless condition, has cheated him of the 
purchase of his prowess and his blood.” To help make this case, Beverley described the battles 
with Mexico that the United States had won with Southern blood. The northern dwarf told the 
Southern giant that he could have the scraps, if he stayed, but that if he left he would be thrown 
into the fire.64  
Beverley believed that Virginia would sacrifice much to a just cause, but that she had 
grown impatient with Yankee demands. He clarified this warning by stating that he and the 
fellow members of the delegation did not speak for Virginia, but only of her. Indeed, Beverley 
believed that in his own case, he spoke only for himself. But “Virginia will never disavow those 
who pledge her honor in defense of honor.” Beverley believed it to be his mission to assure that 
Virginia acquired either “[e]quality or independence.” He insisted that Virginia would have 
either one or the other of these features. He asserted: “if I can be at all instrumental to such an 
achievement, I shall not have lived in vain.” And even if Virginia had lost the “just principles 
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and elevated sentiments” that made her great, Beverley was still prepared to go home to her 
bosom to die.65  
In the end, both Henry and Beverley would prove themselves to be poor prophets. 
Henry’s hope that the United States Constitution would prevent a purely sectional party from 
putting a man in the White House proved entirely too optimistic. Beverley’s hope that Britain 
would recognize the Confederacy proved similarly illusory. But no one ever claimed that 
constitutional orthodoxy could predict the future. Both Henry and Beverley did an excellent job 
of teaching constitutional orthodoxy to a new generation of college students, and by so doing 
they carried on the legacy of their father. Had they lived to see it, one can be sure that the Tucker 
brothers would have been extremely disappointed at the bloody and destructive way in which the 
conflict between North and South eventually resolved itself. Neither of them, however, would 
even live to see secession: Henry died in 1848 and Beverley in 1851. The task of seeing Virginia 
through those terrible years would fall to the next generation, and that generation would contain 
other prominent members of the Tucker family.    
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Chapter Five: Slavery and A “New System of Political Science” 
I. 
Many historians have noticed the reverence with which southerners held the culture of the 
ancient world. Fewer historians, however, have noted the ways in which this reverence changed 
over time.1 The preceding chapters have demonstrated the changes in political thought between 
the generation of St. George Tucker and the generation of his children. But the sharpness of this 
change is even more evident in the contrast between the two leading political figures of these 
respective generations: Thomas Jefferson and John C. Calhoun. Jefferson, a member of St. 
George Tucker’s generation, argued, in the words of the Declaration of Independence, that “all 
men are created equal,” and that people thereby possess rights that cannot be taken away from 
them. Jefferson counted life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness among these rights. Calhoun, a 
member of Henry and Beverley Tucker’s generation, disagreed with this theory. He expressed 
his rebuttal succinctly: “All men are not created. According to the Bible, only two, a man and a 
woman, ever were, and of these one was pronounced subordinate to the other. All others have 
come into the world by being born, and in no sense…either free or equal.”2 
Finding the first premise of natural rights absurd, Calhoun moved to establish 
humankind’s real state of nature. Distinguishing among three states —a state of individuality, a 
state of society, and a state “under government”— the South Carolinian argued that the first of 
these cannot be the state of nature since it is “so opposed to the constitution of man as to be 
inconsistent with the existence of his race and the development of the high faculties, mental and 
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moral, with which he is endowed by his creator.” He found the second of these states incapable 
of being a state of nature, since “society can no more exist without government, in one form or 
another, than man without society.” Calhoun concluded that the political state alone is attuned to 
man’s nature. “It is the one [state] for which his creator formed him, into which he is impelled 
irresistibly, and in which only his race can exist and all its faculties be fully developed.”3 
According to this interpretation, God made humans such that they required government, and 
therefore any form of government would be better than anarchy. Calhoun might have well have 
said, quoting Aristotle, that man must be either a beast or a God if he wishes to live outside the 
city.4 
Thomas Jefferson, like many highly educated men of his day, possessed a fair degree of 
familiarity with the ancient writers, but he did not take these writers seriously. For instance, in 
1814, Jefferson decided to read Plato’s Republic. He described the endeavor as “the heaviest 
task-work I ever went through.” He did not think the end had been worth the effort. “While 
wading thro’ the whimsies, the puerilities, and unintelligible jargon of this work, I laid it down 
often to ask myself how it could have been that the world should have so long consented to give 
reputation to such nonsense as this?” Jefferson hoped that colleges and universities would 
abandon the study of Plato in favor of schools where “every branch of science, useful at this day, 
may be taught in its highest degrees.”5 Jefferson did not think much of Aristotle either. When 
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asked what translation of Aristotle’s Politics he thought the best, Jefferson responded that the 
matter was of no great importance, because “the style of society” differed so greatly between the 
ancients and the moderns that “little edification can be obtained from their writings on the 
subject of government.” Jefferson argued that the “new principle of representative democracy” 
had “rendered useless almost everything written before on the structure of government….” He 
therefore thought it a matter of little importance “if the political writings of Aristotle, or of any 
other ancient, have been lost or are unfaithfully rendered or explained to us.”6  
In the years after Jefferson’s death, the South underwent a transformation in political 
thought, characterized by a critique of the idea of modern natural rights, and a restoration of 
either the biblical theory of moral right or of classic natural right. Calhoun’s remarks on Aristotle 
demonstrate this change. Responding to an inquiry made by a young man seeking the proper 
reading material for a better understanding of politics, Calhoun replied: “I would advise a young 
man with your views to make himself thoroughly acquainted with the history of the five states of 
antiquity and the history of England and our country, and to read the best elementary treatises on 
Government, including Aristotle’s, which I regard, as among the best.”7  
Clearly, between the generation of St. George Tucker and his children some changes in 
favor of an older understanding of natural right had occurred. But most thinkers of this second 
generation did not understand as clearly as Calhoun the meaning and significance of these 
changes. Not until the third generation reached maturity, did the conventional wisdom on 
political questions become more Calhounian than Jeffersonian. Circumstances moved the young 
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men of this generation, even those who began as Jeffersonians, toward a critique of the modern 
idea of rights, and in the direction of a self-consciously conservative appropriation of older ideas 
on this subject. 
II. 
One of these men would be Albert Taylor Bledsoe. Descended from Virginia Baptists who had 
moved to Kentucky at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Bledsoe was born in Frankfort, 
the new state capital, in 1809. Bledsoe’s parents owned a handful of slaves whom they referred 
to as “servants.” When Bledsoe entered West Point in 1825, his parents moved to Illinois. In 
1827, a wave of religious sentiment swept through the cadets at West Point, and Bledsoe, 
responding to the trend, made a public confession of faith. The young Kentuckian had taken the 
opportunity to study at West Point without really considering if he wanted to be a career officer. 
He discovered soon after graduation that life in the peacetime army did not suit him. After 
several years of service in Indian Territory, Bledsoe resigned from the army and moved to 
Kenyon College in Ohio where he taught mathematics and studied theology. Graduating in 1835, 
he married and soon thereafter received the Deacon’s Order in the Episcopal Church. Deciding 
not to take on the life of a minister, Bledsoe instead accepted a job at Miami University in Ohio. 
Before long he had a professorship in mathematics, and became close friends with William 
Holmes McGuffey of “McGuffey’s Reader” fame. The two would also work together later at the 
University of Virginia.8 
Bledsoe’s conservative beliefs on the question of student discipline caused him problems 
at Miami University, where he became involved in a controversy with the president of the 
University over this issue. Bledsoe favored strict and traditional discipline, while the president 
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adhered to more liberal ideas. The president’s views held sway and as a result, students often got 
into fights, sometimes even fights involving whips or firearms. Bledsoe found this situation 
intolerable and called for the removal of the president. When his effort failed, Bledsoe resigned 
and moved to Springfield, Illinois, to practice law.9 
 Springfield had recently become the capital of Illinois, and this change in status attracted 
many young lawyers to the town; the most notable, of course, being Abraham Lincoln. Bledsoe 
and his family lived at the Globe Tavern in Springfield, the same establishment where Lincoln 
and his family lived. In 1840, Bledsoe watched as Lincoln destroyed Bledsoe’s law partner in a 
political speech. The attack reduced the man to tears. Soon thereafter, Bledsoe ditched this 
partner in favor of Edward Dickinson Baker, who would eventually become a senator from the 
State of Oregon and then die fighting for the Union during the Civil War. Bledsoe had little 
regard for William H. Herndon, Lincoln’s longtime partner, whom he regarded as a “little man” 
incapable of understanding Abraham Lincoln’s greatness.10 
Lincoln and Bledsoe were both members of the Illinois Whig party. In 1843 they 
combined with another local Whig, Stephen Logan, and drafted a statement of Whig principles 
that called for the adoption of a convention system. Bledsoe also became involved with a pro-
Whig newspaper, the Sangamo Journal, for which he wrote editorials and did some editing. He 
remained critical of slavery and state sovereignty during his Illinois years, but in his editorial 
columns he developed an analysis of the history of political thought that he would later turn to 
use in his proslavery writings and his post-war defenses of secession. Bledsoe would look back 
at his years in Illinois with nostalgia, but in 1848 he proved himself willing to leave the North. 
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He accepted a job as professor of mathematics at the newly-formed University of Mississippi and 
began to rediscover his southern roots. 
 By 1856, Bledsoe had completed the process, for in that year that he published An Essay 
on Liberty and Slavery. In 1860, this book would earn a place in a classic collection of proslavery 
works entitled Cotton is King and Pro-Slavery Arguments.11 Ironically, the work says little about 
the actual institution of slavery. Instead, it offers a critique of the anti-slavery arguments made 
by abolitionists. Bledsoe focused on a variety of fallacies in abolitionist reasoning, but he 
commenced the book with an assault on the idea of modern natural rights. Regretting that liberty 
generally served as “a theme for passionate declamation, rather than of severe analysis or of 
protracted and patient investigation,” Bledsoe feared that the word had come to serve merely as a 
“a vague and ill-defined something which all men are required to worship, but which no man is 
bound to understand.” He thought that the world would be better off if only those people “who 
had taken the pains to understand it” would speak about it, but he knew that too many men 
“believed that they could understand liberty merely by instinct.” Bledsoe had little regard for 
instinct, finding it “a blind guide” and a false oracle.12  
 In his book Bledsoe undertook a search for the origins of the conventional wisdom 
regarding civil liberty, and he found it in the political thought of William Blackstone and John 
Locke. These Englishmen established the idea that “civil liberty” consists in “a certain portion of 
our natural liberty, which has been carved therefrom, and secured to us by the protection of the 
laws.” Quoting from their writings, Bledsoe demonstrated that these philosophers regarded 
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natural liberty as a state of perfect freedom for man, albeit one hedged in by the “laws of nature.” 
Detecting an inconsistency, Bledsoe noted that Blackstone and Locke referred to natural liberty 
as both as something highly exalted, a “gift of God to man,” as well as something “wild and 
savage” that men should give up in favor of civil liberty.13  
Tracing this error to its source, Bledsoe found it in the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. 
According to Hobbes, an individual in the state of nature “may set up a right to all things, and 
consequently to the same things.” In Hobbesian terms, “there is no law” in the state of nature 
“except that of force.” Wanting to foist “despotic power” upon man, Hobbes delighted in scaring 
his readers with the “wild and ferocious liberty” of the state of nature. According to Bledsoe, the 
“atheistical philosophy of Hobbes” had no place for a divinely given law of nature. The professor 
found it deplorable that Blackstone, as a “Christian jurist,” should forget “the great central light 
of his own system” and make an appeal to the Hobbesian “abyss of darkness.” Hoping to restore 
a correct understanding of the law of nature, Bledsoe argued that no man can possess a natural 
right to do wrong, and that, therefore, the law that forbids man from doing wrong does not 
thereby “diminish the natural liberty of mankind.” Bledsoe did not think that one should place 
“the evil passions of men” among their rights and liberties. According to him, government 
implied restriction not of man’s natural liberty, but of his natural tyranny: good government 
recognizes man’s “natural rights, and secures his freedom, by protecting the weak against the 
injustice and oppression of the strong.” 14 
 Bledsoe believed that Hobbes had caused generations of Englishmen to identify their 
will with the will of God. “If there be no God, if there be no difference between right and wrong, 
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if there be no moral law in the universe, then indeed would men possess a natural right to do 
mischief or to act as they please.” If the divine law did not exist, then there would be no law in 
the state of nature, and individual liberty would enable one to do whatever one had the power to 
do. “Right would give place to might, and the least restraint, even from the best laws, would 
impair our natural freedom.” Bledsoe posited instead the following maxim: “No good law ever 
limits or abridges the natural liberty of mankind.” To develop this thesis, Bledsoe began with the 
right to defend oneself. This right existed both in the so-called state of nature and in civil society. 
But what of the right to punish a transgressor? According to the divine law, that right belonged 
not to the individual, nor to society, but to God alone. Thus it could not be said that the right to 
punish was transferred from the individual to society, since the individual never had that right in 
the first place. Society received the right to punish a transgressor from its natural duty to prevent 
the strong from oppressing the weak. The individual should never punish the person who 
transgressed against him, for that would be to serve as a judge in one’s own case. Building from 
an erroneous state of nature, wherein man is said to have the right to punish transgressors, the 
“imagination of theorists” had produced a false God; a deity called upon by those who wished to 
subvert “institutions and laws which have received the sanction of both God and man.”15  
 Rights, argued Bledsoe, came from God, and the state protected human liberty. “Civil 
society does not abridge our natural rights, but secures and protects them.” If the state of nature 
of the political philosophers could be found to exist, it would be one in which men had rights but 
possessed no liberty. It would be a “reign of terror” not a “reign of liberty.” Thus “the state of 
nature, as it is called, would be one of the most unnatural states in the world.” Human reason can 
conceive of the state of nature, “but if it should actually exist, it would be a war with the law of 
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nature itself.” According to Bledsoe, man, by nature, is social, for “God himself has …laid the 
foundation of civil society deep in the nature of man.” Thus societies are not “accidental or 
artificial”; they are the outgrowth of a “decree of God; the spontaneous and irresistible working 
of that nature, which, in all climates, through all ages, and under all circumstances, manifests 
itself in social organizations.”16 
 Bledsoe understood that the rejection of the so-called state of nature would entail a 
reconsideration of the idea of inalienable rights. Such rights could be either rights which “the 
possessor…cannot alienate or transfer” or rights which “society has not the power to take from 
him.” Bledsoe argued that the power and authority of society do not derive from the individual’s 
transfer of his rights, instead society fulfills and protects those rights. Thus, an inalienable right 
must be “one of which society itself cannot, without doing wrong, deprive the individual….” 
Bledsoe stated that society did not have the right to deprive a person of life or liberty without 
“good and sufficient cause or reason.” For instance, if the state were to imprison or execute a 
murderer, it would do so not because it wanted to cause the criminal pain “but simply to protect 
the members of society, and secure the general good.” A society can, with justice, take away 
both an individual’s liberty and his right to liberty, if doing so served the general good. Bledsoe’s 
axiom “that no unjust law can ever promote the public good” seems overly optimistic, but he 
based it upon the notion that an inalienable right to life and liberty implies an inalienable duty to 
protect the life and liberty of others, by fostering a society that protects the general good. In 
summary, “public order and private liberty …. are not antagonistic, but co-ordinate principles.” 
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Private liberty cannot exist without public order, and since liberty is not license, order cannot be 
despotism.17 
III. 
The publication of Bledsoe’s work coincided with, and may well have contributed to, his getting 
the job as professor of mathematics at the University of Virginia. There he was able to work 
again with a former colleague from the University of Mississippi, George Frederick Holmes. 
Born in British Guiana in 1820, Holmes had grown up in England before moving to the South as 
a young man. In the early 1840s he settled in Orangeburg, South Carolina, where he attempted to 
make a living as a lawyer. His law practice never flourished, but he embraced southern attitudes 
about slavery and became increasingly interested in philosophical issues. In 1845, he married 
Eliza Lavalette Floyd, the daughter of a former governor of Virginia. To support his new wife, 
Holmes lobbied for the job of professor of Greek at South Carolina College, but ended up 
teaching the ancient languages at Richmond College in Virginia. Unimpressed with the facilities 
available at this small Baptist institution, Holmes eagerly accepted an academic chair at the 
College of William and Mary in 1848.18  
  Holmes’s excitement did not last long. The college had been struggling for some time. It 
had begun to seek public funding in 1836, but despite connections with numerous public men in 
high offices, the college did not succeed. Thomas Dew had managed to keep the school 
operating despite inadequate funding, but with his untimely death in 1846, tensions broke out 
among the remaining faculty. The public of Williamsburg also voiced complaints about the 
number of foreign-born professors at the college. After less than a year at William and Mary, 
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Holmes realized that he had stepped into an unworkable situation. In 1849, he resigned and 
assumed the presidency of the newly-founded University of Mississippi. He had an equally 
difficult time there. The campus had few resources at that time, and Holmes faced the usual 
difficulties with student discipline. When he took a leave of absence to return to Virginia in order 
to recover from health problems, the trustees of the university took the opportunity to depose of 
him as president. Holmes fought, unsuccessfully, to be re-instated. During the first three years of 
his academic career, Holmes, in the word of his biographer, “crowded more frustration and 
disappointment than many experience in a lifetime.” He moved into his wife’s family home in 
Virginia where he spent the next nine years doing little but studying philosophy and writing 
articles, before finally winning a professorship in History and General Literature at the 
University of Virginia in 1857.19  
By the time of his appointment, Holmes had transformed himself into one of the leading 
Aristotelians in the South. “The more I study Aristotle,” he wrote, “the less necessity do I 
discover for any other philosophy than modernized and Christianized Peripateticism. Aristotle is 
still, as in the thirteenth century, ‘il maestro di che chi sanno.’”20  Holmes’s reading of Aristotle 
profoundly shaped his view of the slavery question. Like the ancient philosopher, Holmes 
believed slavery a fundamental problem of political thought. He placed the question of slavery at 
the center of political philosophy, for “[t]he question of labor… lies at the basis of all political 
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and social speculation.” The professor had long doubted “whether the time had yet arrived when 
a fair and candid hearing could be expected for the sedate and cool language of philosophy,” but 
he predicted that such a time might finally occur as a reaction to “the mania against slavery 
produced by Uncle Tom’s Cabin.”21 
 Holmes mourned the divisiveness of the sectional debate on slavery, but he praised the 
philosophically rich results of the debate. The controversy made possible “the creation of a 
genuine southern literature —in itself, an inestimable gain to our people.” In Holmes’s mind, the 
jewel in the crown of this southern literature would be what he called “a new system of political 
science.” He thought that the old system had too many fallacies that served the abolitionists. 
Placing the distinction between natural liberty and civil liberty chief among these fallacies, 
Holmes attacked the idea of natural liberty, arguing that it led “by a necessary deduction to the 
state of nature advocated by Rousseau and to all the orgies, the frenzy and the tyranny which 
sprung from the principles of the Genevan sophist.” Holmes believed that morals exist in all 
times and places, and that civil society did not take away natural rights. Instead, he argued, 
society secured and protected morals and freedom. Holmes’s “new system of political science” 
owed a great deal to the political teachings of Aristotle.22     
 Some might argue that Holmes and others who thought like him were not rediscovering 
the ancients so much as recreating them. At the center of this dispute rests the question of 
slavery. Although the subject remains controversial, the existence of slavery did not seem to 
present too great of a challenge to the ancient conception of human nature. The ancients always 
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remained reasonably hospitable to slavery. To understand their attitude on this question it is 
necessary to step back from the idea of individual rights and liberties that are a defining mark of 
life in the modern western nations. In most civilizations in world history, slavery represented not 
the antithesis of individual liberty, but its close cousin. As sociologist Orlando Patterson 
explains, “there was no word for freedom in most non-Western languages before contact with 
Western peoples.” Most traditional societies demonstrate a fear of life outside of the community 
bond, a fear of life without a master. In the West African societies that Patterson discusses, to be 
masterless was to be confronted with a death sentence. For in traditional societies, the opposite 
of slavery is not freedom, but “countervailing power”; therefore, people are more likely to seek 
to “become embedded in a network of protective power,” than they are to seek individualistic 
freedom. Ironically, in most civilizations in history individualistic freedom is “the surest path to 
slavery.”23 
 Although modern scholars frequently think of the ancient Greeks as the inventors of 
democracy and as being, at their best, very similar to modern democrats, the ancients generally 
conceived the idea of freedom the same way people in traditional societies have always 
conceived it. For instance, the Greek writer Xenophon wrote a dialogue describing a debate 
between Socrates and Aristippus on this question. Aristippus argued that just as he would not 
wish to be a slave, so would he not want to be a master. Socrates replied that no middle ground 
can exist between these two states. Unconvinced, Aristippus reiterated that he did not want to be 
a master or a slave, asserting that he would go about the world as a stranger to other men. 
Unsatisfied with this argument, Socrates pointed out that a stranger is always an easy target, and 
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that those who strive to escape from social bonds in a quest for personal freedom are likely to 
end up as slaves.24 Socrates’s students would carry forth similar views in their latter teachings. 
 Plato became the most famous of Socrates’s disciples. In his greatest dialogue, entitled 
The Republic, Plato had Socrates posit a cyclical pattern of decline for all regimes. Socrates 
persuaded his interlocutors that aristocratic regimes become timocracies, timocracies become 
oligarchies, oligarchies become democracies, and democracies become tyrannies. He described 
these regimes in terms of an anthropological principle, in which the characteristics of the regime 
are the characteristics of the type of person that predominates in that regime: the polis is the man 
writ large. Considered in terms of Socrates’s declension model, a certain type of man would be 
dominant in each regime respectively. One way to gauge the character of these men would be to 
consider how they treated their slaves. Passing over the character of the aristocrat’s relation to 
his slaves, Socrates noted that the timocratic man treated his slaves brutally, “not merely 
despising slaves as the adequately educated man does.” Yet when confronted with freemen, the 
timocratic man is “tame,” and in relations with rulers he is “most obedient.”25  
As regards the rule of the oligarch as a slave master, Socrates again fell silent. Only with 
his consideration of last days of democracy as that regime slid into tyranny did Socrates return to 
the subject of slavery. He did so in order to criticize the idea of a society without slaves. 
Appearing to have little regard for a masterless society, Socrates described the myriad freedoms 
prevalent in a democracy. He noted that these freedoms made the rise of tyranny necessary, 
asking: “do you notice how tender they [the myriad freedoms] make the citizens’ soul, so that if 
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someone proposes anything that smacks in any way of slavery, they are irritated and can’t stand 
it?” As a result, the citizens of a democracy end up “paying no attention to the laws, written or 
unwritten, in order that they may avoid having any master at all.” This sentiment, according to 
Socrates, prepared the ground from which the tyrant would arise. The tyrant would find it 
necessary to keep his city constantly at war. He would get rid of all the men in the city who were 
of any worth, and then he would proceed to free the slaves held by the citizens. These freed 
slaves would become the tyrant’s bodyguard, and the citizens of the state would find themselves 
in the unwonted position “of the harshest and bitterest enslavement to slaves.”26   
 Aristotle carried the Socratic legacy forward to the next generation. The ancients placed a 
high premium on wisdom because their view of the nature of man required them to do so. 
Aristotle, the most systematic and comprehensive of the ancient philosophers, believed that all 
things have an inherent and unchanging nature which dictated a specific end, or to use his term, a 
telos. According to this account, virtue consisted in doing the right thing in accordance with 
nature. To be virtuous would be to enjoy good things and hate bad things. In these terms, each 
animal had its own proper activity, and thus its own proper pleasure. Aristotle recognized that 
what people considered pleasurable varied a great deal, yet he argued that just as one should not 
call something sweet because a sick person thought it tasted sweet, so one should not call a bad 
action pleasurable just because a bad person enjoyed doing it. The proper activity for man would 
be something pursued for its own sake, not something pursued for some other good. It would 
make man happy. Aristotle found something divine in human intellect, and he believed that in 
pursuing the intellect man moved after the immortal, or indeed strove to become immortal. Thus 
he believed that the proper activity for man must involve rationality and contemplation. He 
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believed that to live the life of contemplation would be to live in accordance with what is highest 
in man, and thereby to live in accordance with what is best and most pleasant for man. He 
believed that such pursuits were not possible outside of society. Therefore man could not exist in 
accordance with nature outside of society.27 
Aristotle thought that the despotic rule of the wise over the unwise, or of the virtuous 
over the unvirtuous, existed in accordance with nature. Aristotle’s modern critics, by contrast, 
hold that all forms of despotic rule are unjust, for they believe despotic rule to be based upon 
arbitrary conventions. When Aristotle said “by nature” he did not mean something existing in a 
primitive or undeveloped state; he instead meant something conforming to, or moving toward the 
ideal implied in man’s telos. Aristotle believed that masters ruled their slaves in a sort of 
“despotic partnership,” whereby the slave helped to provide the master with leisure to pursue 
those things that conform to the highest nature of man. The master, in turn, should work to 
convert the slave to a proper understanding of the ends of human existence. According to 
Aristotle, the master and the slave are a team: “that which can foresee with the mind is the 
naturally ruling and naturally mastering element, while that which can do these things with the 
body is the naturally ruled and slave; hence the same thing is advantageous for the master and 
slave.” For Aristotle, slavery existed in accordance with nature because the slavish qualities that 
necessitate slavery went against nature and needed to be corrected through slavery. Aristotle 
argued that a master who owned a slave by nature would be doing both himself and his slave a 
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service. He asserted that the slave by nature would therefore feel affection for his master, while 
the slave by law would not.28 
 Holmes based much of his interpretation of slavery on the following quotation from 
Aristotle: “Nature has clearly designed some men for freedom and others for slavery: —and with 
respect to the latter, slavery is both just and beneficial.” In explaining this statement, Holmes 
argued that Aristotle found “a natural inherent difference between the master and the servant….” 
Holmes rejected the sentiment that condemned Aristotle for justifying the practice of making 
men slaves, and thereby reducing them to the status of mere things, but he admitted that “the 
natural relation between master and slave, in the tenor of Aristotle’s remarks, is exhibited by him 
in a form abhorrent from the general feelings and opinions of modern times, but this may be 
traced, in a great measure to the peculiar prejudices of the Greeks.”29 Holmes noted the many 
vices of the Athenians: the poor status of women, the practice of pederasty, faithlessness coupled 
with an imitation of the dissolute character of the Greek gods. Perhaps worst of all was the Greek 
vanity that “led them to claim honors for those merits which they were furthest from possessing,” 
namely the virtues of compassion and pity. Despite all these failings, however, Holmes found the 
Athenians free from a “settled malignity of a corrupt design,” suffering instead from “their 
recklessness, their volatile disposition, their love of change and their systematic rejection of all 
restraint.”30 
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According to Holmes’s interpretation of Aristotle, “there are certain races designed by 
nature for servitude, as there are others as manifestly designed for freedom and command.” 
Holmes clamed that the philosopher placed “the Asiatics” and “the Barbarians” in the former 
class and “Europeans” in the latter. According to Holmes, Aristotle favored with “a marked pre-
eminence” the Greeks, but not without distinctly asserting “the similar claims of the uncivilized 
races of the North of Europe.” Holmes tried to place Aristotle’s contempt for Asiatics in context, 
noting that the wars between the Athenians and the Persians left the philosopher prejudiced 
against the populations to the East: “Yet we may remark, that the experience of forty centuries, 
and the permanence during the whole of that time of despotic governments and servile 
institutions throughout Asia, indicates sufficiently the existence of a servile character in the 
Asiatics, to redeem the language of Aristotle from the appearance of sciolous or malignant 
generalization.”31 On these racial issues Holmes moved beyond a strict interpretation of 
Aristotle’s words. Aristotle always sought to praise the middle way, the path of moderation. He 
noted that the Greeks occupied the middle position between Europe and Asia. The philosopher 
stated that Europeans possessed “spiritedness,” but that they remained “relatively lacking in 
thought and art.” Therefore he believed Europeans to be free, but “incapable of ruling their 
neighbors.” He argued that Asians, possessed both thought and art, but lacked spiritedness, 
“hence they remain ruled and enslaved.”32  
Aristotle would probably have objected that new world slave populations in the 
nineteenth century were almost solely of sub-Saharan African descent. Holmes, by contrast, 
thought that the moderns had outdone the ancients on this score. A chief difference between  
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ancient slavery and modern slavery, according to Holmes, was that in ancient times “the 
enslaved people were, for the most part, of the same grade of intellectual and moral capacity with 
their enslavers.” Holmes mentioned instances in which certain slaves were clearly superior to 
their masters, Plato’s enslavement being the most famous example. Despite this example, 
Holmes’s definition of intelligence seems almost entirely culture-bound. Noting that the ancients 
often found their slaves among the barbarian tribes, he argued that “Thracians, Syrians and Goths 
approximated much more closely to the capabilities of the Greeks and Romans than the 
Ashantees and Mandigoes do to the culture and intelligence of the Anglo-Saxon and Spanish 
families.” 33  
The extent to which Aristotle’s conception of the slave by nature should be understood in 
racial terms has long puzzled his commentators. Aristotle believed that  “barbarians” needed to 
be ruled, but the question of who or what qualifies as a barbarian has long troubled scholars. St. 
Thomas Aquinas, the best-known of Aristotle’s western commentators, considered three 
possibilities. The barbarian could be anyone who speaks a different language, or anyone who 
speaks a language that has no written counterpart, or anyone who is “not ruled by any civil 
laws.” Aquinas noted that a barbarian must in some sense be considered foreign, either in 
absolute terms, or in relative terms. A foreigner in relative terms would be someone who merely 
spoke a different language, a foreigner in absolute terms would be illiterate and from a 
civilization without laws. In speaking of the slave by nature Aristotle referred, according to  
Aquinas, to “those who are barbarians absolutely.” Among those who are barbarians absolutely 
there is “no rule according to nature.” These barbarians have the physical power of the slave, but 
not the reason of the master. It would therefore be natural for the Greeks “who were endowed  
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with reason,” to rule over the barbarians. The converse situation would be against nature, and 
Aquinas turned to scripture to describe why: “But when the converse takes place, there ensues a 
perversion and a lack of order in the world, according to the words of Solomon, ‘I have seen 
servants upon horses and princes walking on the ground as servants.’”34  
Aristotle, Aquinas, and Holmes all sought to explain a situation in which enslavement 
could be considered just. Acknowledging that not all slaves were slaves by nature, Aristotle 
admitted that slavery was not always just, since “no one would assert that someone not meriting 
enslavement ought ever to be a slave.” Believing that Aristotle clearly distinguished between 
“that servitude which is according to law and that which is according to nature,” Holmes praised 
the philosopher for recognizing slavery as “an established fact,” and inquiring into its 
naturalness. According to Holmes, the “injustice of the origin in particular cases has nothing to 
do with the general justice and natural character of the relation” in general, and he believed that 
Aristotle clearly perceived this fact. Even Plato, who had suffered from unjust enslavement, “is 
as sedulous as Aristotle in encouraging and extending it in his model republic.”35  
Holmes correctly understood the ancient’s position on this question. Aristotle had 
conceded that the opponents of slavery had a case. He held that the slave by nature did exist, but 
he also admitted that some slaves were slaves only by law. These unfortunate people usually  
became slaves only when captured in war. Some would argue that such a process should be 
illegal “on the ground that it is a terrible thing if what yields to force is to be enslaved and ruled 
by what is able to apply force and is superior in power.” Aristotle did not wish to make a brief 
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for the case that might makes right, but he did consider the possibility that a person possessing 
virtue should rule against the will of a person lacking in virtue, so long as the virtuous person 
ruled benevolently. Aristotle saw the military arts as inextricably bound up with the practice of 
slavery. For instance, he listed three reasons why the citizen should undergo military training: to 
keep from being enslaved, to learn the art of leadership, and “to be master over those who merit 
being slaves.” Aristotle stated that war should be used to capture “those human beings who are 
naturally suited to be ruled but unwilling —this sort of war being by nature just.”36  
Holmes thought that civilization defended the mutual interests of the master and the 
slave, even if that required servile relations between an intellectually inferior master and an 
intellectually superior slave. “Servitude may represent the only organization which will 
discipline, educate, and profitably employ the masses whose development has been retarded by 
the conditions of their previous life and origin; and it may also be the sole method of restraining 
and regulating those who have run through the course of their civilization, and become effete.”37 
In coming to terms with Aristotle’s position on slavery, the professor thought it necessary to 
consider slavery not “as it existed at one particular time, or in one particular community, but in 
its essential and universal characteristics.” Holmes defined slavery in the abstract as “continuous 
and involuntary dependence and service,” but he left “the degree of dependence and its form, and 
the character and extent of the service undefined, as these vary with the varying moods of 
masters, and the fluctuating conditions of society.” Holmes believed that slavery, under this 
broad definition, existed in nearly all “civilized or semi-civilized” societies; indeed, he regarded 
this species of slavery as “a necessary consequence of social organization….” In these terms 
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then, Holmes argued that slavery existed in accordance with nature. The mode of determining 
what exists by nature, and what by convention “is to discover what things are habitually attached 
to political or social organization, in the various stages of its development, but most especially in 
its highest forms.” Holmes believed that the study of the highest forms of society could forestall 
an overemphasis on those transitory institutions necessary for the development of such a 
society.38  
After establishing the extent to which one could regard slavery as in accordance with 
nature, Holmes moved to attack the abolitionists. Assaulting those “free-labor doctors and 
quacks” who rejected slavery because it kept the slave in a debased state, Holmes asserted that 
the free-labour system had the same tendency. In fact, Holmes believed that the free labor system 
destroyed the working classes. Taking the arguments of the abolitionists to their logical 
conclusion, Holmes found a dystopian vision in which the laborers of the world were “quietly 
buried out of sight forever” and the rest of the world was “divided between rich consumers, rich 
manufacturers, rich traders, and the machines which supply the first, employ the last, and enrich 
their owners.”39 He detected a smug note of hypocrisy among those who criticized the ancients 
for their supposed contempt for labor. Admitting that “ancient philosophy and patrician 
literature” had little positive to say about manual labor, he noted that modern “fashionable 
novels” did not celebrate the laborer either. “The ancients openly avowed their disparaging 
opinions; the moderns say one thing and think another.” Turning to Xenophon’s Memorabilia, 
Holmes found Socrates praising manual labor. Holmes counseled the reader to reconsider the 
abolitionist’s utopia: the “recent asservation of the dignity of labor by communists, socialists, 
                                                          
38 GFH, “Observations on a Passage in the Politics,” 194-196. 
 
39 Ibid., 572-573. 
 
 218
and demagogues of every hue” hid their true goal of emancipating “the laborer from the 
necessity of working.” The abolitionist ultimately hoped to eliminate human labor altogether and 
thereby to “destroy the laboring class.”40 
Holmes found a parallel between ancient and modern abolitionism. In both eras, free 
labor drove out slave labor, not vice versa. Free labor is “less costly, more intelligent, and 
therefore more efficient in occasioning the multiplication of products.” Slavery only encroached 
upon free labor in those instances in which there were not enough free laborers to accomplish the 
tasks required by society. Examining the ancient Roman attempt to introduce a free labor 
yeomanry to balance the influence of the aristocracy, Holmes argued that abolitionist historians 
were mistaken in seeing an alliance between the enslaved and the wealthy. Instead, he saw a 
relationship at work between the very wealthy citizens and the poorer laboring masses of ancient 
Rome. In the days of the Gracchi all the social classes of Rome were possessed with “covetous 
idleness.”  A combination of luxury and laziness “impoverished the world, and substituted 
slavery … for the free labor which had already renounced work.” The money for these welfare 
programs came from foreign conquests, giving rise to an ancient warfare/welfare state, with a 
precedent in earlier Athenian models.41 
According to Holmes, these forces destroyed the ancient civilizations, and he believed 
that they would also destroy England, France, and the northern United States. He singled out the 
excesses of popular rule and rapacity as well as the greed and wealth of the upper classes as the 
true causes of social decline. Resisting the argument that slavery had been responsible for the 
decline of ancient societies such as Greece and Rome, Holmes argued that despite the 
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dissimilarities between the various ancient societies, all of the great ones featured slavery, and he 
found it difficult to see how slavery had degraded them. The rise of “pauperism” and 
“mendicancy,” on the other hand, coupled with a “fever of trade and competition,” and the 
“consequent taxation, direct, indirect, and industrial,” had worked to consume the nations of 
Europe “sensualizing one part of the population while it brutalizes the mass.” Modern thinkers, 
such as Malthus, found the problem in overpopulation, but the ancients were concerned that the 
population did not grow fast enough. Among the moderns “[t]he wealthy classes alone listen to 
the prescription, and accept celibacy as the condition and price of luxury and licentiousness.” 
The privileged of the ancient world suffered a similar problem, so much so that some Roman 
Emperors introduced incentives to encourage marriage and the growth of the family. In all 
sensuous societies, the privileged avoid “the expenses and embarrassments of married life, that 
they might indulge themselves in selfishness and sensualism.” Holmes saw slavery as a 
profoundly conservative remedy for such a society in crisis.42 
Most academic thinkers in antebellum Virginia fell somewhere between Bledsoe’s 
critique of modern natural rights and Holmes’s more comprehensive effort to retrieve the ancient 
conception of the master’s right to rule. Holmes’s contingent included a number of prominent 
members. For instance, James P. Holcombe —a law professor and a colleague of Holmes at the 
University of Virginia— made a defense of slavery that demonstrated an appreciation for ancient 
political thought. William Andrew Smith, a professor of philosophy and later president of 
Randolph Macon College also came to espouse Aristotle over Locke. But Holmes found his best-
known convert in the Virginia polemicist George Fitzhugh. In his 1857 book entitled Cannibals 
All! Or, Slaves Without Masters, Fitzhugh recalled his delight in discovering that he had found 
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his way back to Aristotle without even realizing he had done so. Speaking of himself in the 
plural, Fitzhugh noted his surprise at discovering “that our theory of the origin of society was 
identical with his, and that we had employed not only the same illustrations but the very same 
words.” A correct understanding of the origin of society enabled a “true vindication of slavery” 
resting upon Aristotle’s “theory of man’s social nature, as opposed to Locke’s theory of the 
Social Contract, on which … Free Society rests for support.” Thanking Holmes for directing him 
to the writings of Aristotle, Fitzhugh noted how the experience changed his life. “I used to think 
I was a little paradoxical. I now fear I am a mere retailer of truisms and common places.”43 
IV. 
Perhaps more so than any thinker considered thus far, Robert Lewis Dabney’s career 
demonstrates the trajectory of Jeffersonian ideas during this period. As a profoundly evangelical 
and anti-classical thinker, Dabney would not seem a likely candidate for the new system of 
political science. The “new” ideas, however, worked on him slowly, over time. As a graduate 
student at the University of Virginia in the early 1840s, Dabney had approached ancient 
philosophy with the same prejudices manifested by the mature Jefferson. The young Virginian 
found modern literature superior in nearly every way to ancient literature. While admitting the 
usefulness of studying the ancient languages as a means to understand and preserve 
contemporary English, Dabney doubted that the massive effort required to learn the ancient 
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languages well enough to read the masterworks would be worthwhile. He admitted that a 
knowledge of Greek could help the student to grasp the New Testament, but he thought the New 
Testament the only book written in Greek worth reading. The Greek poets, even Homer, he 
found inferior to Milton. He especially despised the claim that one should study the ancient 
languages in order to understand ancient philosophy. The only ancient philosopher Dabney had 
any respect for was Plato, because the Greek received his teachings on morality “in Egypt from 
the reports of the laws of Moses, which lingered in that country.”44 
 Part of Dabney’s animosity towards the ancients seems to have arisen as a result of his 
difficulty learning the ancient languages. He expressed his difficulty regarding Latin and Greek. 
The former, “which I have been so long pretending to learn, I do not even now read with 
sufficient ease to make it agreeable to read Latin works, and as for the Greek, I utterly abhor it, 
and do not suppose that I could, in ten years become master of it.” Dabney claimed that he had 
never met anyone who enjoyed voluntarily reading the ancients, and he therefore concluded that 
entirely too much time had been devoted to their study. “If all the time that I have studied the 
dead languages had been judiciously devoted to other things, I might have been now, a well-
educated man.”45 
 Dabney especially despised the religions of the ancient Greeks and Romans. Describing 
them as “puerile and ridiculous” he contrasted the “imposing and sublime” message of 
Christianity. The Greek deities with their petty adulteries and feuds, could not compare to 
Christianity, which offered “a deity, invisible, omnipresent, ruling over a universe of infinite 
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extent, and embracing infinite numbers of individuals, and an eternity of endless progression in 
wisdom and happiness for the just … and an eternity of unhappiness for the wicked.” In 
Dabney’s eyes, the ancient world offered a constricted view of man’s potential: even the 
landscapes and seascapes known to the moderns were more impressive and inspiring than those 
known to the ancients. He thought the Mediterranean “but a pool compared” to the Atlantic and 
Pacific oceans which “we now ride in security….” Even science remained something to produce 
awe, for “modern astronomy” was better able to inspire profound feelings in the poet than were 
the superstitions of the ancients. Dabney believed that a culture with an inferior religion would 
produce inferior morals, and he professed to find such inferior morals among the ancients. “We 
are told that Demosthenes, the patriot orator visited a prostitute at Corinth; that the virtuous Cato 
exchanged wives with one of his friends, and that this practice was common.” He believed that 
these inferior morals resulted in the mistreatment of women and deprived ancient literature “of 
that exquisite sentiment” that refines and strengthens the passions.46 
 Dabney’s Jeffersonianism resuscitated aspects of Jefferson’s political thought that early 
generations had failed to notice and that present generations have all but forgotten. For instance, 
while he was still a seventeen-year-old undergraduate, Dabney wrote a passionate essay against 
immigration. He argued that European nations sent only paupers to the United States. Their 
object “must be either to injure our government, or to free itself from inconvenience at our 
expense, and in either case the danger is great.” Dabney thought that the governments of the old 
country were trying to get rid of a domestic problem, by sending away “the dregs of the 
European populace.” They did so in order to forestall the social reforms that could put their 
countries into a proper working order, and by so doing they made use of the innate selfishness of 
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the immigrant. If the situation in their home country was so poor, they should stay home and try 
to fix it, instead of making sure to “save their own bacon” and thereby leaving “their poor 
oppressed country to struggle for itself.” Dabney asked a rhetorical question: “In what situation 
should we be, if the heroes of the Revolution had sought refuge in foreign lands, instead of 
resolving to defend their native soil to the last gasp?”47   
Dabney felt assured that these pauper immigrants would become criminals. Noting that 
they barely possessed enough money to pay for their voyage to America, he stated that upon 
arrival they would be chagrined to discover “that they have gained nothing by the voyage.” 
Lacking the “means of support, they wander about the country, and are soon hung or imprisoned 
for a breach of those laws of which they are ignorant.” Dabney feared that immigrants “however 
contemptible they may be in themselves, are liable at every moment to become powerful 
instruments in the hands of any desperado, who has the skill to direct them against the 
government.” He stated that if the Union were to collapse, it would most likely happen in that 
manner. “Indeed, when we glance at the corruption and disorder in New York, chiefly caused 
and supported by this class, we may justly fear that the fatal blow has been struck already.”48 
 Dabney’s anti-immigrant position seems, on the face of it, very different from the 
argument one would expect from an egalitarian such as Thomas Jefferson. Surprisingly, 
however, Dabney had merely radicalized a nativist streak that existed comfortably within the 
modern natural rights tradition favored by the third president. Using modern natural rights as his 
starting point, Jefferson made some surprisingly nativist arguments. He thought a happy society 
must “harmonize as much as possible in matters which they must of necessity transact together.” 
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Arguing that civil government exists for “the sole object of forming societies,” Jefferson 
believed that citizens must conduct their governments upon “common consent.” He found the 
governments in North America to be a unique mixture “of the freest principles of the English 
constitution, with others derived from natural right and natural reason.” Knowing that 
immigrants would come from countries with different political systems, Jefferson feared they 
would either bring their foreign principles to the United States, or, still worse, “exchange them 
for an unbounded licentiousness, passing, as is usual, from one extreme to another.” Jefferson 
did not see the problem ending with the first generation of immigrants: “These principles, with 
their language, they will transmit to their children. In proportion to their numbers, they will share 
with us the legislation. They will infuse to it their spirit, warp and bias its direction, and render it 
a heterogeneous, incoherent distracted mass.” Restricting immigration, according to Jefferson, 
would make America “more homogeneous, more peaceable, [and] more durable….”49 
As a University of Virginia graduate student Dabney did not approve his University’s 
practice of hiring foreigners: “I do not like much to see the high stations conferred on foreigners, 
who have no sympathy with our ways of feeling, and our manner, and no love for our 
institutions.”50 In the case of the Barbados-born George Tucker, however, his foreign birth 
seemed to be only one of many problems. The University had “in some odd corner of its laws,” a 
requirement that students must pass a general exam to prove that they could write English 
correctly. George Tucker ran the exam, and Dabney hated him. Writing to his brother, Dabney 
stated that “if he believed in the transmigration of souls,” he would be certain that Tucker 
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“contains the spirits of all the pettifoggers that ever were born.” According to Dabney, the old 
professor failed about two-thirds of his students. “The granny has a whole raft of whimsical 
notions about the terms in common use,” thus if one had not had occasion to hear his lectures on 
rhetoric, “or found out his hobbies some how or other,” one would stand little chance of 
passing.51 
 George Tucker also taught Dabney in an ethics class and in a class in political economy. 
Dabney was not impressed. Regarding the class in ethics, the young Virginian stated that “our 
old professor, Mr. Tucker, does not pursue very extensively, for he is not so good himself, as to 
be wanting to talk a great deal about our duties.” Regarding political economy, Dabney and one 
of his fellow students from South Carolina hoped to get George Tucker involved in a dispute 
with John C. Calhoun on the theory of tariffs. They believed that, given the occasion, Tucker’s 
“vanity will lead him to attack Mr. Calhoun, for whom he seems to think himself a full match.” 
Dabney had a hard time understanding how Tucker ever got the job at the University of Virginia, 
and he seemed especially shocked that Jefferson himself had worked to get Tucker hired. “The 
only way to account for it is to suppose that he was a man once, and that he is now weakened by 
age, for he is not less than 70 years old.” Dabney feared that “the institution will suffer by his 
imbecility before it gets rid of him, for he seems to be not at all aware of his weakness, and to 
think himself as good a man as ever.”52  
 Dabney found the new law professor, Henry St. George Tucker, more to his liking. He 
had feared that the Board of Visitors would hire one of Judge Story’s students from Harvard, for 
it would be wrong to have a student of Story teaching “federal doctrines under the sanction of an 
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institution founded by the father of State’s Rights.” Dabney thought that the University had 
expanded enough that it could attract first-rate talent. When Henry Tucker got the job, Dabney 
editorialized that “Judge Tucker is going on swimmingly and has a fair proportion of the students 
in his class.” Dabney had heard that Henry delivered “very fine lectures, but does not work the 
students much more than half as hard” as his predecessor did. Henry also published a textbook, 
“which I think looks rather ugly.” Dabney attended Henry Tucker’s inaugural lecture “which was 
very handsome,” but perhaps not good enough to merit publication. “They were firmly resolved 
to lionize him, before he came, and they are only carrying out the notion, by printing his 
address.”53 
  Dabney thought that Henry Tucker did a good job with his own students, but not enough 
to keep the entire campus under control. A masked student during a campus demonstration had 
murdered Henry Tucker’s predecessor in the chair of law, and Dabney thought that the campus 
still needed to be properly set in order.54 He found Judge Tucker too forgiving of student 
lawlessness: “He thinks that he is dealing with men who have gentlemanly feelings that may be 
wakened up, and who are only momentarily overcome by temptation; instead of a parcel of 
absurd, wrongheaded, and selfish rascals, who are willing to sacrifice every motive of affection 
for their parents, of patriotism, and respect for public opinion to their appetites, or to what they 
madly conceive is their honor and independence.” According to Dabney, students at the 
University of Virginia held the professors to be their enemies; therefore, these students aimed to 
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hurt their professors by breaking the laws. “The fools actually think when they get mad with a 
professor that they are revenging themselves by getting drunk and behaving disorderly.” After 
receiving his M.A. degree in 1842, Dabney went on to pursue a doctorate in theology at Union 
Theological Seminary in Virginia. In the years after Dabney’s graduation, the University of 
Virginia became increasingly southern in sentiment. By the early 1850s, the Board of Visitors 
had abandoned the practice of hiring unacculturated foreigners. Instead they offered employment 
to men who knew how to deal with southern undergraduates.55 
At that time, Dabney became a professor at the Union School of Theology, where he 
retained the vocal prejudice against the ancients that he had expressed as an undergraduate. 
There was one ancient book, however, that Dabney espoused unequivocally: the Bible. He 
argued that southerners needed to take a stand “on the fundamental ethical question of the 
justifiability of slavery,” and he believed that the “proper way to argue this ethical question is, to 
push the Bible arguments.” Dabney claimed that philosophical defenses of slavery had little 
effect on the great masses of mankind. “If we want to affect the general current of national 
opinion on this subject … we must go before the nation with the Bible as the test, and the ‘Thus 
saith the Lord,’ as the answer.” He did not think that the biblical argument for slavery could be 
refuted, and, more importantly, he thought it would force the abolitionists “to unveil their true 
infidel tendencies.” Presented with the choice, Dabney believed that the mass of northern 
Christians would chose the Bible over and against the abolitionists. Therefore, southerners could 
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use the Bible to “drive abolitionism to the wall,” thereby accruing “immense political 
advantage.”56  
Dabney thought that he or any other qualified person could make the argument; the 
challenge, on the other hand, would arise from trying to live up to it. Slaveholders needed “to 
recognize and to grant in slaves, those rights which are a part of our essential humanity….” 
Slaveholders had to realize that the “right to hold slaves to labor, does not include a right to 
make them break the Sabbath, or to keep them ignorant of moral and religious duty, or to make a 
husband guilty of the sin of separation from his wife….” To the extent that the laws of Virginia 
or the practices of her slaveholders allowed such abuses, they “are not a part of the scriptural and 
lawful institution, but abuses.” For Dabney, the revealed word of God triumphed over all other 
considerations. And the revealed word of God granted southerners the “moral right” to own 
slaves.57  
Although he did not formally adopt the principles of ancient philosophy, Dabney’s 
stringent conservatism turned him against northern society and resurrected another of his 
youthful concerns. At thirty-one years old, Dabney continued to fear the consequences of 
excessive immigration. He hoped that “a just providence may design to chastise the North by 
means of this foreign emigration, in the monopoly of which she is now glorying.” Looking to the 
future, Dabney speculated that Oregon and California “will be essentially an oriental empire.” 
He thought that these states would turn towards Asia and either break off from the Union, or 
perhaps take everyone’s attention away from slavery and make the South into a “powerful 
minority” that could broker power between the eastern and western states. With the addition of 
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the West, a new sort of sectional equilibrium might emerge. In any case, Dabney thought that the 
North would lose her dominance.58  
He predicted that the newly arriving immigrants would turn the North towards socialism, 
a direction in which the Yankees were already moving with “their government education plans 
and state improvements.” He held out the distant hope that northern society, paralyzed by the 
“infusion of so much vice” might lose focus and call off their attack on “southern institutions….” 
He believed that immigrants were aggravating a northern disposition to “religious heresy.” He 
listed some of these heresies: “Unitarianism, Universalism, Pelagianism,” and, of course, 
“Catholicism.” Dabney believed that without “theological verity” both “public virtue” and 
“private morality” would suffer. According to this vision, the “seed” of corruption had been 
“sown under the surface” of northern society “in false theories of religion and morals.” He 
believed that the moral failures of the North would kill that region’s prosperity, and that the 
advantage would fall to a pristine South. “We may see it made manifest in a few years, that the 
North had, even now, passed the flood tide of public prosperity, and the wave of progress may 
flow southward, giving us the preeminence.” He thought that “moral causes” of the South could 
easily trump Northern “superiority of territory and material resources,” after the space of “a 
generation or two.”59  
Dabney made the southern cause his cause, and he rejected opportunities to move north. 
For instance, in 1859 the faculty of Princeton Seminary in New Jersey offered him a chair in 
Ecclesiastical and Biblical history. They did so because they admired his polemical talents. His 
vocal pro-southern sentiments did not seem to be a problem, perhaps because he publicly stated 
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his dislike of secession, fearing that Virginia would suffer as a result of the rash actions of states 
further to the south. Dabney rejected the chair at Princeton for a number of reasons, including an 
unwillingness to sell his slaves, and a fear that Union Theological Seminary would collapse in 
his absence. Before long the sectional divide would catch up with him, splitting his church, his 
country, and even his state. Not long after the war began, the Assembly of the Old School 
Presbyterian church expelled the southern branch of its membership. Dabney had not attended 
the convention where this occurred, for he knew it would deviate from the traditional meetings 
that had eschewed political issues. With the seminary closed for the summer, Dabney secured a 
four-month chaplain’s commission with the 18th Virginia volunteers. He likened the “bronzed 
and bearded faces” of the yeomen farmers in his regiment to the Roundheads fighting under 
Oliver Cromwell in the English Civil War. Although Dabney served as a messenger in the battle 
of Bull Run, he soon grew tired of the low salary and unsanitary conditions of camp life. 
Planning to return to the seminary at the end of his four month term, Dabney argued that 
southern college students should stay in school. The new nation would need an intellectual class 
capable of defending her interests, and this class would come from the colleges.60 
 But it soon became apparent to Dabney that all the students were off fighting with the 
army, and he decided to join them, accepting a position as chief of staff for General T. J. 
“Stonewall” Jackson. The general warned the professor that he would have to get up early and 
forsake preaching on all days except Sundays, and Dabney conceded. Having almost no previous 
military experience, his appointment as chief of staff proved controversial. Most of the other 
staff officers were considerably younger and thought him to be a rather old and strange 
individual. Dabney did see some military action in his new capacity, but during his brief term as 
                                                          
60 Overy, “Robert Lewis Dabney,” 91-92, 102-105. 
 
 231
chief of staff, he basically served as Jackson’s secretary. Dabney’s military career ended with the 
close of the Seven Day’s Battles of June and July 1862. Confined to bed with typhoid fever, 
Dabney began the job of writing an apologia for the South.61 
 Unfortunately for his cause, these works would not appear until after the end of the war. 
Dabney’s biography of Stonewall Jackson appeared first in 1866, but his definitive statement on 
slavery did not see publication until another year after that.62 In these writings Dabney continued 
to argue that slavery did not violate the natural liberty and equality of man. He stated that the 
abolitionists had appealed to a “radical and disorganizing scheme of human rights….” Noting 
that the enemies of slavery had based their rights theory upon the idea of a social contract, 
Dabney demonstrated an astute eye for the history of political philosophy. He traced the “true 
origin of this theory” to “Hobbes of Malmesbury.” The Virginian also noted, correctly, that this 
theory did not become respectable until John Locke vouched for it. Locke possessed an “amiable 
and pious spirit,” but he was, in reality, “a disguised follower of the philosopher of 
Malmesbury.” Dabney found Locke’s psychology to be “but a system of sensationalism,” and he 
argued that Locke’s theory of ethics “led to the denial of original moral distinctions.” The 
consequences of Locke’s deception, according to Dabney, were costly. He charged the 
Englishman with “all the mischievous and atheistical doctrines developed by Hume in Great 
Britain, and Cordillac in France.”63   
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Perhaps with Henry Tucker in mind, Dabney noted that numerous writers had 
acknowledged the nonexistence of the state of nature and the social compact but nevertheless 
persisted in using the construct “as the implied and virtual source of political power and civic 
obligation.” Unsatisfied with this state of affairs, Dabney argued that the state of nature, as a 
merely theoretical construct, could not serve as the “basis for anything,” and certainly not as the 
“source of practical rights and duties.” The theology professor refused to believe that God ever 
granted humans “such independency.” And even if God had granted it, “there is not a 
government on earth, not the most liberal,” that could allow a subject to claim that he had 
renounced the social contract and therefore no longer lived within the realm of civic obligation. 
Indeed, Dabney went one step further, noting that any society that faced a citizen making this 
claim, would have a “natural right” to destroy him.64  
 Dabney found the social contract philosophy atheistical, because it “affects to treat men 
as though their existence were underived, and independent of any supreme being.” This 
philosophy ignored “the great scriptural fact,” that God “has determined that man shall live 
under social law.” Worse yet, unless the people who determined the original contract wrote their 
contract down, no one would be able to figure out what it said. Under such a contract, one 
unconstitutional act by the rulers would dissolve the entire government. Dabney did not believe 
the right of life and death over the subjects of the government could be properly derived from a 
naturally existing right of an individual. “No man’s life is his own: it belongs to God alone.” 
Following the terms of the social contract philosophy, political philosophers could, according to 
Dabney, reach only one of two conclusions: either they would agree with Hobbes, that outside of 
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society right and wrong do not exist, or they would agree with those abolitionists who argue 
“that all government is immoral.” 65  
In making the case for the social contract, philosophers expected one natural right in 
particular to a carry a great deal of weight. They argued that the right of self-preservation existed 
in the state of nature and in society as well. Dabney agreed that a right to self-preservation 
should exist under any conditions whatsoever. The abolitionists argued that “no restraint of 
government on man’s will can be righteous, which is forcible and involuntary, because the 
obligation of all just government originates in the option of the individuals governed, who are by 
nature sovereign.” Dabney believed that he could forward a better basis for the construction of 
free governments.66  
He began with a number of what he called “natural facts”: that God exists, that human 
existence “proceeds from his act,” and that all people “are his property….” In addition, the 
Virginian believed that any inductive theory needed to begin with the acceptance of man’s fallen 
nature. According to Dabney’s theory, human will meant little. Humans are “the creature of an 
intelligent and moral personal Creator,” and they are therefore incapable of creating a proper rule 
of behavior without divine assistance. Man cannot make himself, he exists by God’s will, and 
thus man is subjected to God. “This subjection is not only of force, but also of moral right.” 
Dabney defined the rights of man as “those things which other creatures are morally obliged to 
allow him to have and to do.” According to Dabney, God’s will enjoins man to exist “under civil 
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government.” The professor believed that man’s “social nature” gave evidence of this 
dispensation.67 
Under these terms, a proper government would be one that “enjoins on its members or 
subjects the doing of those things which are morally right, and the refraining from those things 
which are morally wrong.” Under this political model, the right of leaders comes from God. 
Natural liberty consists in a human’s “privilege to do whatever he has a moral right to do.” 
Freedom to do whatever one wants to do is not liberty, but rather license. Civil liberty, “under an 
equitable government,” is the same as natural liberty, rightly construed. All governments allow 
for some of the privileges of natural liberty. “A perfectly just government would be one which 
would allot to each citizen freedom to do all the things which he had a moral right to do, and 
nothing else.” According to this model, true rights come from God, not from the government. As 
a result, the government cannot take away these rights. He noted that only a correct 
understanding of God could assure liberty. Advocates of the social contract philosophy, 
according to Dabney, would be wise to look to the history of their method of thought: “when we 
turn to the history of opinion, we see that while Locke illogically deduced from this theory of the 
social contract a scheme of liberal government, his greater master, Hobbes, inferred that the most 
complete despotism was the most consistent.” Social contract philosophy, according to Dabney, 
carried within it the seeds of despotism. He believed that “the French and Yankee Jacobins,” had 
sown these seeds. He tersely asserted that their “tree” should be “judged by its fruits.” He 
believed that these “Jacobins” had betrayed the teachings of Christ.68  
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According to the professor, the meaning of the golden rule “is, not that we must do to our 
fellow all that our caprice might desire, if our positions were inverted; but what we should 
believe ourselves morally entitled to require of him, in that case.” He conceded that “one man is 
not morally entitled to pursue his natural well-being at the expense of that of other men, or of the 
society.” Yet from this premise, Dabney deduced that societies must effect “a varied distribution 
of social privilege among the members, according to their different characters and relations.” 
Only those with the power to distinguish between right and wrong action should be given the 
power to act independently. To give everyone the same rights and privileges “would be essential 
inequality; for it would clothe the incompetent and undeserving with power to injure the 
deserving and capable, without real benefit to themselves.” In making the case for the 
naturalness of these restrictions, Dabney began by noting the naturalness of depriving women 
and children of certain rights. He also believed that restrictions should differ from culture to 
culture. “If intelligence and virtue are, on the average, more developed, the restraints of 
government should be fewer; if less cultivated, more numerous.”69   
Dabney argued that even the slave for life possessed a certain amount of liberty: the slave 
had the right to do those things that he was supposed to do. If the slave lacked rights that other 
people possessed, it was because his “inferior character, ignorance, and moral irresponsibility, 
have extinguished his right to do them.” The laws that enforce slavery, should be designed so as 
to “to secure, on the whole, the best well-being of both parties to the relation, servant as well as 
master.” Dabney admitted that some masters abused their slaves, but he refused to concede that 
that fact meant slavery was, of itself, a wrong; after all, many parents abused their children, and 
these abuses did not prove that the authority of the parent over a child was unjust. The proslavery 
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philosophy Dabney constructed, although it made no open nods to ancient philosophy, still bore 
a remarkable resemblance to George Frederick Holmes’s new system of political science. 
Dabney’s proslavery political philosophy survived the defeat of the southern cause on the 
battlefield. Indeed, Dabney would continue to make similar arguments well into the 1880s.70 
V. 
George Frederick Holmes continued his Aristotelian discussions of politics into the latter years 
of the nineteenth century as well. He spent the duration of the war at the University of Virginia, 
largely looking for a productive way to spend his time. Just before the outbreak of the war, he 
convinced the university to grant him money for the formation of an archive containing public 
documents pertaining to secession. Although he received some financial support, no government 
agencies sent any documents, and the project quickly fell apart. In the closing months of 1862, 
Holmes spent much of his time with Bledsoe and the two discussed Lincoln’s Emancipation 
Proclamation. Holmes confided to his diary that it was “very badly written, with many 
Lincolnisms in it.” Already by that year Holmes had given up hope that the Confederacy would 
be able to secure a lasting independence, although he may just have been upset that his attempt to 
give the administration an historian’s advice on the nature of such conflicts had been rebuffed by 
the secretary of the treasury, who argued that nations could learn little from the past.71 
 As late as 1884, Holmes continued his assault on the Hobbesian conception of political 
science, and his partisanship on behalf of the Aristotelian version. Holmes referred to the state of 
nature and the social contract as “unsubstantial dreams…disproved by physiology, by 
philosophy, and by history.” He found the isolation dictated by the state of nature to be 
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“physiologically impossible.” Because children remain virtually helpless for many years they 
need the care of at least one parent; therefore, the “family, not the individual, constitutes the unit 
of humanity.” Holmes believed that an inductive search through the history of the world 
disproved “the fantasy of isolated existence.” Never in any time or place “has any population 
been found consisting of segregated individuals.” According to Holmes, the “essence” of society 
is the “common life” produced for all. “Man is by nature, by constitution, social.” Holmes 
believed that any society based upon a denial of these basic truths would suffer a calamitous 
decline: “Disastrous revolutions, mischievous laws, insane innovations and inoperative 
constitutions have sprung from failure to recognize the natural origins and the natural 
development of societies.”72  
 Twenty years after the end of the Civil War, Holmes continued to find it necessary to 
discuss slavery. He compared slavery to machinery, noting that social progress required the 
development of one or the other or both. He defined slavery and machinery as the “chief agents 
in creating and sustaining wealth and population.” And even when discussing something so 
modern, Holmes continued to call upon the political thought of Aristotle. The professor noted 
that both slaves and machines are “‘labor saving’ and profit-making, or surplus-making 
contrivances.” Citing the ancient philosopher, Holmes noted that Aristotle referred to slaves as 
“‘animated machines,’ (organs) and includes them in the same category with tame animals.” 
Holmes believed that by so doing, the philosopher anticipated “in some measure, the steam 
machinery and the automatic engines of the nineteenth century.”73 Holmes’s interpretation of 
Aristotle on this issue is, once again, plausible. The philosopher argued that a household could 
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not work without possessions. A person skilled at household management must therefore know 
how to acquire and defend possessions. Aristotle described some possessions as animate, and 
others as inanimate, noting that a slave “is a possession of the animate sort.” Aristotle also 
classified the slave as an instrument, like a weaver’s shuttle. Instruments need direction. If an 
instrument could “perform its work on command or by anticipation … so that shuttles would 
weave themselves and picks play the lyre,” then “master craftsmen would no longer have need 
for subordinates or masters for slaves.”74 
Holmes warned, however, against an anachronistic understanding of slavery. He believed 
that slavery needed to be understood in terms of the time in which it existed. The institution may 
have been beneficial and progressive in its inception, and only damaging and retrogressive in its 
dotage. “The abuses of an institution are no disproof of its aptitude and use. They show the need 
of regulation; they do not authorize uninquiring condemnation.” Holmes believed that slavery 
contributed to differentiation and the establishment of social order in most societies. He saw 
slavery as a means of teaching the uncivilized the necessity of labor in order to save them from 
starvation.  
The professor still refused to idealize the practice of paid labor, noting that the 
“transformation of slavery into what has been humorously designated free labor has been a 
gradual and agitated procedure.” He believed that Stoicism and then Christianity had already 
done a great deal to mitigate the condition of people held in bondage before any sort of abolition 
movement had come along. “These influences and the distresses of an expiring civilization did 
not suppress slavery altogether, but altered it profoundly, and prepared the way for the modern 
system of free labor.” He noted the presence of serfs in England until the eighteenth century and 
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the 1861 freeing of the serfs in Russia. He refused to glorify the latter, arguing that serfdom had 
gradually transformed itself into free labor: “Serfdom became service; serfs became servants.” 
Holmes cautioned that the “terms differed but slightly; the relations differed less than is 
ordinarily supposed.” He refused to overlook the unfortunate side effects of free labor. Free labor 
societies offered “no care of the sick, the children, the aged, and the decrepit.” They had their 
own means of compulsion as well, only in a free labor society, “the merciless coercion of 
physical necessities supplants the arbitrary authority of a human owner.”75  
Holmes refused to classify the abolition of slavery as a symbol of moral progress. 
“Slavery has been abandoned, because free labor is less onerous, less costly, and more efficient 
than slave labor.” Religious factors may have played a role, but “the thoughts, feelings, and 
practical creeds of societies run along the line of their supposed interests.” Free labor, according 
to Holmes, provided no panacea. It “has not ensured satisfactory provision for the laboring class, 
and it has thrown modern societies into violent agitation and perilous alarms.” Slave revolts were 
replaced with “dynamite revolt.” Holmes argued that just as slavery gave way to free labor, so 
free labor would give way to machinery. As before, however, he feared the abolition of labor, 
arguing that “the machine enslaves the workman.” Machinery made possible great material 
progress, but not without significant cost: “Great economies, great reduction of cost are secured; 
but they are gained at the expense of the laboring class, and are followed by a swelling train of 
miseries and dangers.” Among these dangers Holmes placed the premature consumption of 
natural resources; resources that “ought to have been reserved for future generations.”76   
While continually keeping one eye on ancient philosophy, Holmes managed to anticipate 
a number of modern concerns. His new system of political science proved durable enough to 
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survive the abolition of the institution that it had been built to defend, the war that had made that 
abolition possible, and the passage of decades of time. 
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Chapter Six: Secession and the Fate of Constitutional Orthodoxy 
I. 
Despite the renaissance of classic natural right, the constitutionalists of Virginia academe 
continued to adhere to a modern natural rights philosophy, but they did so in ways that expanded 
the range of constitutional orthodoxy. This tradition continued to find proponents in the Tucker 
family, the most prominent among them being John Randolph Tucker. Born in 1823, the son of 
Henry, John grew up in Winchester, Virginia. In 1831, when Henry joined the Virginia Court of 
Appeals, young John came along with the rest of the immediate family to Richmond. He 
attended a private academy in that town before matriculating at the University of Virginia in 
1839. Graduating in 1844, John began the practice of law in Winchester one year later, and soon 
became active in politics as a Democratic elector and campaigner against the Know-Nothing 
party.1  
John Tucker’s constitutional theories were closer to those of his Uncle Beverley than they 
were to those espoused by his father. Beverley had been an enthusiastic proponent of secession 
from the early 1830s onward, and although John did not push quite so hard for secession, he 
defended the right with more gusto than his father had ever mustered. John built his theory of 
secession upon the philosophy of modern natural rights, calling himself “an earnest and jealous 
advocate of the power of the States, because I am a zealous friend to the sovereignty of man.” 
According to John, the people formed the various states, and the various states composed the 
federal government. He compared the secession of a state to the expatriation of a citizen. He did 
not, however, describe his political philosophy as a philosophy of modern natural rights. Instead 
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he defined it as the “Virginian idea.”  He regretted that the “the American Idea” had moved so 
far away from the “Virginian idea.”2 
 According to the Virginia idea, the word “people” should mean a group of individuals, 
not a mass. Each person would possess sovereignty, and society would be “a league, based upon 
compact, actual or supposed, between individuals.” Government would serve as the “joint agent” 
of these people. Tucker maintained the modern natural rights tradition, but he attempted to put it 
into an explicitly Christian framework. He believed that such an understanding could best 
support human dignity, for it would put individual humans into the proper relation with their 
creator. Under this dispensation, after the creation of Adam “government was … divinely 
instituted.” The sovereignty of man thus preceded the existence of government. Early 
governments may have been primitive, but they “must have sprung from an original or tacit 
assent”; thus “political science” dictates that all governments derive their validity “from the 
terms of a supposed compact between men.” All of John Tucker’s political thought, throughout 
his life, began with this premise.3 
 Referring to the natural rights of men outside of society as the “liberty of isolation,” 
Tucker asked why people ever bothered to enter society at all. He answered that only “the fear of 
the loss of his rights,” had “driven man from primeval isolation into society.” Mankind’s natural 
love of liberty, bequeathed by God, “impels him to seek its security, its protection, in the shield 
of the government, which the social compact creates.” Tucker did not believe that a person 
surrendered any rights by entering into society. He attributed this misconception to the  
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failure to make a “distinction between the exclusive rights of a perfectly isolated being, and the 
modified rights of a social being.” According to Tucker, Robinson Crusoe could claim to be lord 
of his domain, but had anyone else been there on the island besides him, his claim would have 
acquired their consent. “Thus his exclusive rights, the result of isolation, would be modified and 
abridged by the presence of those, whose rights would be as unlimited as his own.”4 
 A certain duality pervades Tucker’s political thought. On the one hand, he stressed that 
people possess a naturally gregarious attitude, but on the other hand he noted that each person 
possesses “a will which opposes restraint, and restively shrinks from control external to itself.” 
Humans, therefore, are both social and anti-social. The social tendency “finds its best 
development in power,” while the anti-social tendency finds its best development in “liberty.” 
Left without check the social tendency would lead to “despotism,” while the anti-social tendency 
would lead to “anarchy.” According to Tucker, only an equal match between the two could 
produce progress in political affairs. “The most difficult problem in the science of government, is 
the proper arrangement of these two forces.” He believed that each of the two forces needed to 
have its own “distinct and palatable manifestation in the social organism.” History demonstrated 
that “centralism and individualism are the respective modes in which despotism and liberty 
manifest themselves; and that in the struggle between these, is to be traced the history of the 
progress of free institutions.”5   
Tucker described Virginia as “the cradle of American liberty,” and Virginians as the first 
Americans to leave the British Empire and become a separate and sovereign state. He cited 
Edmund Burke’s observation that each colony existed “as a distinct political society.” Even at 
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the time when the states faced an outside danger and needed to act as one, “their jealousy of 
central power and for their exclusive rights, developed itself in every prominent fact which the 
history of the times has left upon record….” Tucker stressed this point in order to counter “the 
bold and unfounded assertion of a certain political school, that prior to the declaration of 
independence, the several colonies were one, and that that declaration was the act of a nation, 
with supreme controlling powers —in contradistinction to its being merely the united act of the 
several colonies, only bound by their separate consent.” Reviewing the facts, Tucker noted that 
the colonies had been established at different times, and often by different countries. They had 
considered and rejected multiple schemes for defensive alliances, maintaining that they made 
their policy independent not only of the other colonies, but of Great Britain itself. “[I]f these and 
other known facts in history do not disprove the assertion of the oneness of the colonies, and do 
not establish their essential separateness as political communities, I confess I am at a loss to 
know what certain conclusions can be drawn from historical facts.” He warned that the triumph 
of the theories of the “Harvard School” over the “Jefferson creed,” would be “the fatal triumph 
of the principles of centralism over those of individualism.”6   
According to John Tucker, Virginia representatives convinced other members of the 
colonies to pass the more comprehensive Declaration of Independence. “From this period the 
tendency became stronger every day for a more centralized federative government.” But the 
Articles of Confederation “distinctly shewed the original character and previous relations of the 
parties to it.” Before the Articles, representatives at Congress acted solely on the basis of the 
orders given them by their home states. The Articles established a league between the states. 
Nevertheless, these Articles explicitly stated that all the new powers arising from this league 
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came as a grant from the individual states. In discussing these powers, Tucker invoked the Whig 
language of speaking out against power: “Power oft invades the paradise of peace, the sanctuary 
of liberty, clothed as an angle of light, and whispers its bright temptation into the ear of its 
innocent and unsuspecting victim.” Admitting the virtues of the Constitution that replaced the 
Articles, Tucker qualified his praise by noting that it “gave increased efficiency and influence to 
the already strongly centralizing tendencies of the Union.” The amendments saved the 
Constitution from being a total loss for individualism, and Tucker argued that Virginians had 
done much to assure their adoption. But the amendments could only do so much. “The history of 
the struggle between central and State power, under the present constitution, is a mournful, but 
soon told story.”7   
He began the story with Alexander Hamilton’s speech at the Philadelphia convention, 
where the New Yorker had argued that corruption, i.e. the power of patronage, held the English 
Constitution together. Hamilton admired the English Constitution, and he did not mean these 
remarks as a criticism. Tucker argued that the peoples’ opposition to Hamiltonian principles 
eventually lead to “the expulsion of the Massachusetts school from power….” According to 
Tucker, the rise of the Jeffersonians allowed the United States to function much more 
effectively; indeed, “it was not until the hereditary enemy of our rights brought war upon our 
border, that the necessity of external security gave colorable justification to the extension of its 
[the federal government’s] powers by construction.” Yet even after the war, and through the Era 
of Good Feelings, the power of the federal government continued to grow and grow. Searching 
for the reason, Tucker noted that the executive branch had a near monopoly on the power of 
patronage. He argued that the president could use this power to literally change the views of the 
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most important citizens of a state. Allied with power of taxation, the patronage power became 
still more ominous. The federal government took much of its money through indirect taxation; 
the people lost their money, but they did not sense its loss. This money could then be sent back 
to them in the form of patronage. The states could try to keep up, but they could only draw their 
money from direct taxation, and the people quickly recognized and protested this form of 
taxation.8 
Centralism clearly possessed great advantages in the fight between power and liberty. 
Tucker searched for potential remedies to be deployed in this unequal contest. He quickly arrived 
at the right of secession. He believed that the Declaration of Independence had made this right 
known to the world. Even if centralism were to triumph, Virginia could still secede and win back 
her old freedoms. Virginia could always “RESUME the powers she has granted, annul the 
compact violated by others, and withdraw from a Union inconsistent with the rights of her 
people and destructive of her honor and her sovereignty.” According to this interpretation, a 
state maintains its right to secede, unless it specifically gives up that right. Believing that the 
states were sovereign before the Constitution came into existence, Tucker defined this 
sovereignty as “that supreme social power which springs from the individuals composing it, and 
dwells in it, as one political society.” Tucker believed that the people possessed sovereignty and 
were incapable of permanently divesting themselves of it. No one could permanently divide the 
sovereignty of the people of Virginia: if that state removed its allegiance from the Federal Union, 
argued Tucker, the laws of that Union would no longer be binding on the people of Virginia.9  
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The “Massachusetts school” claimed that “the people of the United States” had adopted 
the Constitution and that the states were “merely convenient territorial divisions of this one great 
nation.” Tucker proposed a counter-thesis: “the constitution was adopted by, and was and is now, 
binding as a compact, between the States as sovereign contracting parties.” Admitting that during 
the first phase of the Philadelphia convention, “the tendency to a powerful centralism was very 
strong,” Tucker described how, during this first phase, the delegates considered ways of putting 
the states firmly under the control of the federal government. They considered a federal veto on 
state laws, a scheme by which state governors would be appointed by the federal government, 
and a means of stripping the states of all of their military power. The delegates, however, quickly 
voted down each of these proposals. “The jealousy evinced by the small States in struggling for 
their equal voice in the government, and by the Southern States in opposing the power of 
regulating commerce, demanded so eagerly by New England, and of the imposition of restraint 
upon their slave trade, engendered in the Convention a spirit of patriotic opposition to central 
power, and of determined maintenance of the rights of the States.” Tucker noted Gouverneur 
Morris’s sad lament that the states had many representatives at the convention, but America only 
a few. Morris wanted another convention, one that would push through his nationalizing 
program.10  
Morris’s discontent marked, in Tucker’s estimation, the second phase of the convention. 
The forces that so irked the Pennsylvanian assured that “in the administration of its highest and 
most important trusts, the government of this Union is federative, not national.” In other words: 
“States, not men, are units in our federal system.” He described the procedure for amending the 
constitution as “eminently federative.” At the convention “a quorum was constituted, and all 
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votes were taken, not by members, but by States.” Hamilton proposed that the new Constitution 
should first be ratified by Congress, before heading to the state ratification conventions. This 
proposal failed to win the requisite number of votes. In Tucker’s mind this failure marked a 
“decisive action” against recognizing Congress as “a party to the constitution”; it thereby based 
the establishment of Congress “upon that foundation, upon which alone it can rest, the sovereign 
will and pleasure of each state.”11   
Continuing the argument, Tucker turned his attention to the various ways in which the 
states ratified the Constitution. Massachusetts and New Hampshire had referred to it as a 
“compact” in their ratification documents. Most of the other states “expressly affirmed the 
reservation of all powers not delegated to the government;” indeed, “three of them directly 
retained the right to resume the powers delegated in certain specified cases.” Of course, the 
proponents of the centralist thesis found the preamble more important than this assemblage of 
historical facts. “The famous words, ‘We the people of the United States’ in the preamble, have 
been construed to prove one or the other of two conclusions: either that the constitution was 
adopted by ‘the people of the United States’ as a political unit, or that, however originally 
adopted, it constitutes the States, formerly distinct, now and forever one people.” Tucker 
believed that the history of the Constitution’s development and ratification disproved both 
theses. The Constitution made the federal government into “the common agent of all the states.” 
It related the states to each other as “co-contractors upon the terms of the constitutional 
compact.”12  
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Tucker held the Constitution to be “revocable at the will of the principal or contracting 
parties.” Because the Constitution did not grant any federal body the power to decide whether the 
provisions of the compact had been broken, under the provisions of the tenth amendment, this 
power devolved to the states respectively, or to the people. To those who argued that only the 
Supreme Court could decide the constitutionality of a given action, Tucker responded that the 
judiciary only possessed juridical power; thus, the court could only intervene if a specific law 
had been broken. He did not believe that the federal judiciary had the power to decide cases 
between the states and the federal government. Under the Constitution, “persons, not States, are 
regarded as the subjects of its [the federal government’s] action; while States, not persons, are 
the sources of its power.” He found it “contrary to the very nature of sovereignty” that a state 
could be sued. The eleventh amendment only mentioned cases in which the state may be a 
plaintiff, not those cases in which it could be a defendant. “How, then, can that tribunal be an 
arbiter, much less a final arbiter, when it can never decide between the contestants, the United 
States and a State?” The Supreme Court held powers over the states, but it did so only by the 
consent of those states. The Supreme Court “is a judicial power within the Union, but not beyond 
it, or distinct from it.”13  
Tucker did not believe that secession would inevitably lead to war. Even if war did ensue, 
that did not mean that secession was wrong. “Right may often be, and often has been resisted by 
wrong.” Prophetically, Tucker guessed that the government of the United States would have a 
difficult time resisting the secession of a state without recognizing that that state had itself 
seceded. If the federal government were to close the ports of a seceded state or attempt to cut off 
her commerce, it would have a difficult time claiming that that state remained in the Union, for 
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the Constitution forbids the federal government from engaging in such acts. “By their own act, 
the United States would declare her out of the Union!” He knew that in the event that the other 
states failed to accept the secession of a state, that the states would be driven to violence, but he 
did not think that such a strategy could work: “Would you dye the wedding garment with the 
blood of your bride, and lead her to the sacrificial altar of your glorious re-union, the bleeding, 
trembling victim of your brutal violation?” Turning to Madison’s notes of the constitutional 
convention, Tucker demonstrated that the men at that convention had considered whether to give 
the federal government the power to use military force against a state that did not live up to its 
obligations. Madison argued that this proposal should not be considered, on the grounds that the 
use of force against a member of the Union would, by that very action, dissolve the Union. The 
proposal never came up again at the convention. “A system was established in which it was not 
deemed necessary to incorporate this revolting principle; and thus by its rejection is the inference 
made inevitable, that as this Union can only be formed by the free consent of the parties to the 
compact, it can never be held together against that consent by force of arms.”14   
Distinguishing between secession and revolution, Tucker argued that revolutions 
depended upon the actions of individuals, while secession depended upon the action of a state. 
After a revolution the parties in conflict united to become one; after secession the parties in 
conflict became separate forever. “In a revolution the citizen bears his unprotected bosom to the 
storm that rages around him; in secession it is shielded by the aegis of his State, impenetrable to 
the assaults of power upon his life, his liberty or his property.” Some would argue, however, that 
secession could only be a right if it did not bring on violence. Tucker disagreed. He believed that 
those who opposed secession with violence were the real aggressors, and that they had no 
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principle to appeal to other than “the long buried dogma that might makes right….” According to 
Tucker’s reasoning, any individual state could decide that it would like to leave the Union. Even 
if all the other states said that that individual state had no right to leave, an individual state could 
still leave if it wanted to do so. The Constitution did not give the other states any right to keep 
any individual state in the Union. To clarify his point, Tucker employed a reductio argument: 
“the proposition, which would make the right of one to secede depend upon the assent of the 
others, would make the compact dissoluble only by mutual and unanimous consent. Thus the 
dissent of Delaware would make the constitution irrevocably binding upon all the other states.”15  
In the end, however, Tucker became more conciliatory, stating that he would be reluctant 
to assert the right of secession were it not for the fact that he believed this right, paradoxically, 
gave the greatest hope that the Union would continue. He hoped that the right of secession would 
restrain the forces of centralism. He believed that the centralists wanted “absolute and despotic 
power” and that they strove to acquire it “by the assertion and maintenance of the doctrine, that 
the government may construe its own limitation and enforce its construction against the 
delegating authority at the point of the bayonet….” Perhaps the fear of disunion would scare the 
centralizers away from the unchecked application of their power. Some would say that standing 
athwart the juggernaut of centralization was treason, but Tucker echoed Patrick Henry: “‘If this 
be treason, make the most of it!’” The true friend of the Union, according to Tucker, would 
always maintain the sovereignty of the states. He called for the “young men of the South” to 
undertake the “bold and manly defiance of error.” He believed that Virginia made the Union, and 
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that she could save it only by appealing to the premises upon which it had been formed. 
Constitutional orthodoxy would save the union, not destroy it.16 
II. 
John Randolph Tucker emphasized those aspects of constitutional orthodoxy that could be used 
to justify secession. His Uncle Beverley had been one of the first to call upon this aspect of St. 
George Tucker’s teaching. The liberal version of constitutional orthodoxy that Henry Tucker had 
propagated found a new voice not in the writings of John Randolph Tucker, but in another 
member of the Tucker family: Henry Augustine Washington. Born in Virginia in 1820, 
Washington married into the Tucker family in 1852. He had received his bachelor’s degree from 
Princeton University in 1839. Soon thereafter he returned to Virginia and trained for the law at a 
private law academy. After receiving his license in 1841, Washington moved to Richmond to 
practice law. He did not enjoy the experience, for he wished to live in the countryside. Looking 
around at himself and his peers, Washington felt that he seemed to be doing as well as anyone 
else, yet “my receipts do not match my expenditures.” The problem with being a lawyer in town 
was that “partial success entails only poverty.”17   
Washington hoped that by moving back to the country and by mixing agricultural 
pursuits with the practice of the law that he could make enough money to survive without going 
into debt. Perhaps he would even run for political office. Washington believed that in the country 
one could be successful politically, but that it would be very difficult to be a success 
professionally. “Nearly all the great statesmen in Virginia have come from the country, but all 
the great lawyers have resided in Richmond.” Hoping to get money from his father to purchase 
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land in King George County, the young man described his plan to abandon city life. 
Washington’s father did not approve. He called upon his son to try practicing law in Alexandria 
instead of Richmond. He advised against purchasing any land at present, as he foresaw a “a crisis 
near at hand in the money matters of this country” that would drive down all prices and make it 
possible to acquire large plots of land in the near future.18 
By 1848, Washington would have other options before him than rural lawyer and 
politician. He had an offer to become professor of history and political economy at the College 
of William and Mary. Some of his friends advised him against the move on the ground that such 
a position would make it difficult to pursue a career in politics. A political career, they argued, 
would be the best way to become financially secure. As a professor Washington would make 
$1000 a year plus $20 per student, but one friend argued that the “prospects of the college...are 
not good” even though “some revival from its …extremely disrupted state may be expected.” 
Another friend doubted that Washington had the temperament to be a professor: “Unless your 
tastes very decidedly incline you to the duties of a Professor’s chair, to a library life and the 
labors of authorship, I should by no means consider your acceptance as politic or prudent.” 
Washington received opposite counsel from one of the members of the Board of Visitors who 
told him that he had a good chance to get the job and reminded him that Thomas Dew considered 
the chair in History and Political economy “preferable to a place in the Cabinet at Washington.” 
On receiving the unanimous nomination from the Board of Visitors on 30 December 1848, 
Washington gladly accepted the job.19  
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During the seven remaining years of his life, Washington made a number of important 
scholarly contributions. He edited the first complete edition of the papers of Thomas Jefferson, 
and he edited and published Thomas Dew’s Western Civilization textbook, which would 
continue to be published and republished for the next forty years.20 George Frederick Holmes 
had briefly filled Dew’s chair before departing for the University of Mississippi, and Washington 
came in to replace Holmes. Washington’s conception of natural rights was closer to Dew’s than 
to that of his immediate predecessor. Holmes had asserted that the very idea of natural rights led 
“by a necessary deduction to the state of nature advocated by Rousseau and to all the orgies, the 
frenzy and the tyranny which sprung from the principles of the Genevan sophist.”21 Washington, 
by contrast, became the first Virginia professor to distinguish adequately between the three major 
proponents of the state of nature philosophy. Washington began with Thomas Hobbes, praising 
him as “a great bold, original thinker,” and argued that Hobbes’s greatness revealed itself in his 
creation of the “state of nature” idea. The young professor also agreed with Hobbes’s contention 
that humans abandoned the state of nature by forming a “compact.”22  
Washington then noted that John Locke had modified Hobbes’s theory by arguing that  
humans held certain inalienable rights in the state of nature. According to the professor, Locke 
thereby made “for the first time in human history, the suggestion of the idea of natural rights, 
and the universal freedom and equality of mankind in connection with government.” According 
to this theory, humans, by entering society, surrender not their rights, but their “personal 
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privilege of punishing and redressing all violation of those natural rights.” Locke held that this 
power could be transferred or divided, “and that, in England, it had actually been transferred and 
distributed among the different departments of the Government and the different orders of the 
State, in various proportions.” According to Washington, Locke demonstrated that “that the 
ancient constitution of the realm was in strict conformity with the abstract principles of 
government,” and thereby refuted the monarchical ideas of Hobbes. Washington revered Locke, 
asserting “that politics, as a science, has made no progress in that country from that day to 
this.”23  
On the continent, however, Jean-Jacques Rousseau transformed Locke’s political 
philosophy. According to Washington, Rousseau’s version of the social contract came about as 
“the result of unanimous agreement” in a society. Under this conceptualization, every member of 
society served as a party to the contract; the contract arose “not between the people and their 
rulers, but between the people themselves.” According to Rousseau, the power of the entire 
community worked to preserve what was best for each member. Unlike Locke, however, the 
Genevan did not believe that this power could be divided or transferred. The leaders of a society 
existed only as the representatives of the people. According to Washington, Rousseau’s 
philosophy decisively influenced the French Revolution, giving it “its distinctive character” and 
setting it off in the wrong direction. Washington depicted Locke as the healthy mean between 
Hobbes and Rousseau; indeed, he saw the philosophy of Locke as the proper antidote for 
Hobbesian and Rousseauian thought. The philosopher of Malmesbury believed power to be 
transferable but indivisible, thereby making him the philosopher of “absolute monarchy.” The 
Genevan, by contrast, thought the supreme power to be indivisible and non-transferable, thereby 
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making him the philosopher of “pure democracy.” Locke, however, “by maintaining that the 
supreme power was both transferable and divisible, was led to mixed government.”24 
The idea that an individual could have rights that arise independent of the state, rights 
that, indeed, could be held against the state, was, according to Washington, a view “peculiar to 
modern civilization, and the distinguishing glory of modern liberty.” Such a view had “no place 
in the ancient world.” The ancient civilizations had the idea thrust upon them by “northern 
barbarians” who invaded their world and brought the idea with them “from the woods of 
Germany….” Ancient liberty, according to Washington, “was civil, and not personal liberty, 
man’s liberty as a citizen and not as an individual; his franchises and privileges as a member of 
society, and not his rights against society.” The professor described the ancient state as 
something totalitarian. Its powers were not only “civil and political” but “censorial, inquisitorial, 
paternal.” The ancient state saw itself as the parent of the citizen, “directing his whole education 
for him, prescribing what he should eat and what he should drink, when he should marry and 
whom he should marry, which children he should rear and which he should sacrifice….” The 
ancient state “took charge” of the citizen’s “entire existence, public and private, from the cradle 
to the grave; thinking for him, acting for him, doing everything for him, leaving him nothing for 
himself, and calling upon him at every turn, to lay down the deepest instincts of human nature, 
and the dearest affections of the human heart as sacrifice on the altar of an inexorable State 
policy.”25 
Washington fit the societies of the North and South into this structure, arguing that the 
North favored society over the individual while the South favored the individual over society. 
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Washington saw the social system of Virginia as a “sort of anomaly in our times.” The only other 
societies existing at the time to which Washington believed it could be compared were the other 
slaveholding states, and under close inspection all these societies appeared to him as “very much 
like the remnant of an older civilization  —a fragment of the feudal system floating about here 
on the bosom of the nineteenth century.” Favoring man at the expense of society, Virginians took 
a distinct view of human liberty as something belonging to the individual, whereas Yankees 
would stress the importance of “civil, political, or religious liberty —the liberty of the citizen.” 
Virginians, because they held to an individualistic view of liberty, “could not understand why 
they should abridge their natural rights for the improvement of their social relation, when they 
felt society to be a burden, and only desired to be relieved of its trammels.”26  
Yet if a society must lead to one of the two poles, Washington thought that of 
individualism would be best, for he saw northern materialism moving in a direction stultifying to 
the individual. He thought that northern materialism distorted the individual’s ability to move 
towards his telos: “the tendency of the present order of things is to engross men exclusively in 
the miserable work of accumulation, and to chain down their minds to low and perishable 
interests, to the neglect of higher and more enduring interests and the cultivation of those 
spiritual and intellectual faculties which distinguish man from the brute, and connect him, in the 
gradation of being, with the higher intelligences.” He held that a certain amount of 
individualism, particularly an individualism removed from the influences of the city, could be 
beneficial. Who knows, asked the professor, what Jeffersons, Henrys or Washingtons were 
growing up anew “in the bosom of that isolated country life, which still constitutes a 
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distinguishing feature of Virginia society?” According to the professor, individualism best-suited 
Virginia, “for, after all, it is the noble people that make the noble government,” and not vice 
versa.27  
 Despite his praise for the philosophy of Locke and the individualistic philosophy of 
liberty, Washington nevertheless argued that the rights of Virginians arose out of a lived reality, 
and not from philosophical speculation. Washington thought that the Virginia Constitution of 
1776 had done an excellent job of accounting for the traditions and ways of life in Virginia. He 
described this constitution as a collection of  “the ancient and immemorial rights, franchises and 
privileges of the colonists of Virginia, gathered together and bound up in one great system of 
law, order, liberty and justice.” He believed that that constitution guarded the “rights, franchises 
and liberties” that English settlers had brought with them to the New World. In asserting these 
rights as an inheritance, and not as the products of “modern speculation” originating in “any 
abstract theory of human rights and human equality,” Washington stated that the individual 
liberty protected by the Virginia Constitution had a “feudal and aristocratic origin.” He 
described the Magna Charta as the first great enumeration of the rights protected by the Virginia 
Constitution. Inquiring after the source of these rights and liberties, Washington accepted Lord 
Coke’s argument that that charter declared rights that already existed. It merely reaffirmed “those 
ancient rights and franchises, which were the birthright and inheritance of the feudal peerage 
everywhere, but which the English barons had lost by the usurpations of the crown during the 
first century after the conquest.”28  
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Washington noted that the English aristocracy, although militant and imperious to those 
outside their order, were a “turbulent democracy” within their own circle. The aristocrats did not 
think the King to be better than any of them individually, and they only adhered to his leadership 
so long as he maintained their rights and liberties. Washington disputed the popular notion that 
the people of England were a party to the Magna Charta. He believed that only the King and his 
Barons were represented in it. The free humans referred to in the Charter “were, beyond all 
doubt, the feudal barons.” Washington painted a picture of England at this time in racial terms, in 
which the French-speaking Normans lorded it over the Saxons. Over time, he argued, the two 
races merged to form the “Commons.” According to this interpretation, the English Constitution 
became more open over time, by receiving “different portions of the subjugated races within its 
exclusive and aristocratic pale.” In these terms, historical progress had made it possible to give 
the rights of noblemen to normal people. Washington defined the English Constitution as an 
“enlarged, liberalized, and generalized” form of the Magna Charta. The English Constitution 
transformed itself in this direction in order “to meet the progress of society, and the development 
of the different classes.” Washington took this thesis one step further, arguing that all American 
Constitutions are also “that same great Charta, still more enlarged, still more liberalized to meet 
the yet greater progress of American society, and the more rapid growth among us of the 
principles of equality.”29  
Washington then reiterated his theory that American constitutional liberties came not 
from an “abstract theory of human rights and equality,” but were rather an inheritance of a 
“haughty and exclusive aristocracy….” The task for Virginians of his day, clamed Washington, 
would be “to reconcile ancient liberty with modern equality.” He then advanced his thesis yet 
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another step. He argued that liberty, wherever and whenever it had existence, always grew from 
an aristocratic privilege to something held by the general run of men: “society always begins in 
inequality and tends toward equality….” To prove his point, Washington considered the ancient 
Greeks, arguing that, like the English, their civilization had been based upon conquest. The 
ruling classes of Greece had ruled by the sword, and treated their subjects imperiously, but 
among themselves, they were a democracy. Indeed, they were more democratic than the English 
in that they did not yet have a King. When the time came to go to war they had to elect one. 
“Starting from this point, the student of Grecian history may trace her institutions through all the 
stages of their subsequent development; he may see the bigotry of race gradually yielding before 
the pride of wealth; the pride of wealth before the spirit of equality.” Washington described these 
changes as part of an inexorable historical force, holding that the history of liberty in ancient 
Greece was not “the offspring of theory or speculation.” According to this interpretation, the 
ancient aristocracies passed liberty down as an inheritance to the common people. “The idea that 
it was founded in nature —that it was an inalienable right due in common justice to all mankind, 
has no place in the ancient world.”30  
True liberty, according to Washington, has it roots in the privileges of aristocratic 
conquerors. Over time, the conquered come to share the privileges of their rulers. “Society, as I 
have said, always begins in inequality and tends towards equality, and he only deserves the name 
of a statesman who sees that its institutions keep pace with its progress, and that the Constitution 
opens, from time to time, to admit class after class, successively, as they are prepared to enter it.” 
Washington believed that nations grow the same way that children grow, “and to suppose that 
the early institutions of a nation are adapted to it throughout all the stages of its progress, is as 
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absurd as to suppose that the swaddling clothes of the infant are adapted to the proportions of the 
full-grown man.” Only a fanatic would overthrow society in favor of a theoretically perfect 
order, but only a bigot would oppose all reform, thereby preparing “the way to inevitable 
revolution.”31  
 Despite this profession of constitutional liberalism, Washington argued against the 
universal right of self-government. He believed there to be “but one universal principle of 
government, which is, that every people are entitled to those institutions which will make them 
most happy, most prosperous, and most contented.” The professor described government as a 
practical affair, and one that differed from place to place, and from time to time. What worked 
best to secure contentment and prosperity in one part of the world might be a complete failure in 
another part of the world. But Washington argued that in all times and places, the “prosperity of 
the governed” should be the goal, “and that every people have a right, (a natural right if you 
please), to that form of government which will secure that end.” Some peoples have a “natural 
right” to democracy, while others have a “natural right” to despotism. Washington would not 
have supported the exportation of democracy at the point of a gun: “I am not bigot enough to 
suppose that our institutions are adapted to all times and nations, and that all governments 
proceeding upon other principles, must necessarily be illegitimate and in derogation of natural 
rights.” Washington quoted the English historian Thomas Babington Macaulay to the effect that 
a good government is like a good coat, it should fit the person who wears it.32  
 Although Washington believed that English liberties had evolved without the aid of 
theoretical speculation, he disagreed with those thinkers who argued that “speculative politics” 
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would inevitably lead to disaster. Admitting that the idea of speculative equality had, in the past, 
been pushed to extremes, Washington nevertheless argued that “the evil is one which, in the 
nature of things, must soon correct itself, and it is manifest that the reaction has already 
commenced.” The professor maintained his confidence “that modern civilization will not fail in 
the accomplishment of its great work of reconciling the principles of equality with the principles 
of liberty.” Noting that “scientific, moral and religious” doctrines allowed for both theory and 
fact, Washington asked rhetorically why the realm of politics should be any different. Fearing 
that “the despotism of prescription” could be every bit as dangerous as “the despotism of 
theory,” Washington asserted that the doctrine of equality could be safely expanded. Over time 
he hoped that “those ancient and high-born rights, privileges and franchises, of which I have so 
often spoken, may be extended with safety and infinite benefit to the humblest citizen who toils 
and sweats in the field, the work-shop, the factory, or on the highway.”33 
 Had he survived to experience the Civil War, Washington might very well have sided 
with the Union cause. His thesis concerning the gradual extension of equality and his argument 
that the true statesman aids society in this transformation sounds much like the postwar 
justifications used by Lincoln partisans. But the professor did not survive to see the war. He had 
long been a sick man. His biographer believes that Washington contracted “chronic dysentary” 
while still a law student. The illness compelled him to resign his professorship in 1857. That 
summer Washington moved to Baltimore hoping to find better medical care than that available in 
Williamsburg. By December his health had improved somewhat, and he relocated to Washington 
D.C. where he lived with his parents and occasionally observed congressional sessions. His 
brother gave him an “airgun” as a present, and Washington used it in an attempt to eliminate the 
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pigeons that would fly up and land on the roof of a shed near his room. In 1858, Washington’s 
servant found him sprawled upon the floor with blood streaming from his eye. “It was evident at 
a glance that in bending over to see into the yard, without exposing himself more than necessary 
to the current of air, the fringe of his shawl had caught the trigger of the gun, and the contents 
were discharged into the brain through the eye.” Thus ended the career of liberal constitutional 
orthodoxy in Virginia academe.34 
III. 
The untimely death of Henry Washington left John Randolph Tucker as the most prominent 
expositor of constitutional orthodoxy in the Tucker family. John became attorney general for the 
state of Virginia in 1857. He continued to serve in this capacity throughout the Civil War. He had 
hoped that God would look favorably upon the Union, and assure that that body remained loyal 
to its first principle: the sovereignty of the states. But when the war came, Tucker defined it as a 
war of “national independence.” Believing this objective to be “right in the sight of a just God,” 
Tucker noted that the states had always reserved the right to leave the Union. Even from within 
the Union, “all powers not delegated, were reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” 
Tucker argued that these abstract questions had important practical consequences: “The 
preservation in proper equilibrium of the granted powers and the reserved rights, was the law of 
life to the union.” Tucker believed that the states themselves had the right to determine if their 
reserved rights had been violated, “for it is obvious, that if the right, finally to decide such an 
issue, resided in the Government exercising the disputed power, its delegated authority would 
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become unlimited, and despotic, which was never intended; and would have made the 
reservation of all ungranted power, an empty form, and of no effect.”35  
Tucker provided his own narrative of the events that led to the South leaving the Union. 
“Forty years ago, the North violated the Constitution, as the Supreme Court of the United States 
has recently decided, by excluding the South, with its social institutions, from lands purchased 
with the common treasure of the country.” Tucker believed that Northerners promoted this step 
in an effort to increase their political power. In the 1830s, the North “flooded Congress with 
petitions for interference with slavery in the South.” Southerners denounced this action; they 
believed that Northerners were trying to exercise an unconstitutional power. When the Union 
acquired a great amount of land from Mexico, the North attempted to shut the South out of this 
area as well. “This was a deep wrong! It was a gross insult!” Tucker believed that southerners 
had been used to acquire land that the North then deemed them “unworthy to enjoy.” With the 
accomplishment of this act, the South fell to the mercy of the northern majority. The South held 
on, hoping to use political parties in such a way as to secure justice from their new masters. “But 
the North, from the moment the balance of power was disturbed, began to consolidate parties in 
that section, and abolitionize the whole.” The “Abolition party” nearly won in 1856. Then, in 
1859, Virginia, the oldest state in the Union and one which had done so much for the cause of 
that Union, “was the scene and the victim of an Abolition raid, designed to raise her slaves to 
insurrection, and to devote her homes to flame and desolation and outrage!” Some northerners 
could still be brought to denounce John Brown in those days before the war, but Tucker argued 
that those northerners were hypocrites, for they now “equal him in brutality of purpose and 
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surpass him in its successful execution.” Tucker believed that the Northern response to the 
Brown raid had helped to put Lincoln in office.36  
In Tucker’s mind the Brown raid indicated that the United States had already split in half: 
“They became in fact, two nations in sentiment, linked together by a feeble political bond.” He 
thought it would be easier to keep France and England under the same government. Lincoln had 
asserted that those who deny freedom to others do not deserve to have it for themselves, but 
Tucker turned that theory back upon the president. The North “has denied freedom to the South, 
and has lost it; it has struck a blow at the liberty of the South, and has fatally pierced its own.” 
Tucker offered an extended block quote from a speech made by William H. Seward, Lincoln’s 
secretary of state. In this speech, Seward stated that he would not rest until slavery was on the 
way to extinction. Tucker noted that Lincoln had made similar comments as well. “All this was 
proposed to be done under a Constitution which recognized and protected slavery —and treated, 
as equals, free and slave states— and by a Government formed and bound to protect, defend and 
advance each and all the States, in their interests and institutions.” According to Tucker, a 
government that existed to protect the entire country had declared war on half of it; thus the 
South had no choice but to secede, if they wished to protect themselves from revolution.37 
According to Tucker’s interpretation of the United States Constitution, the southern states 
had “acceded” to the Union in peace, and they had similarly “seceded” from it in peace. “In 
February, 1861, these States adopted a new constitution differing but little from the old, and 
formed a new Confederation.” The states did so because they “sought only to be independent.” 
Even after the adoption of a new constitution, the Confederate States did not declare war. This 
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Constitution kept the Mississippi free to northern navigation. Furthermore, it asserted that 
immediate steps would be taken to resolve disputes over public property and public debt. Making 
real this proclamation, the Confederacy sent delegates to Washington D.C., but the Lincoln 
government refused to meet with them. Tucker supplied a verse from scripture: “‘if thou wilt 
take the left hand, then I will go to the right….’” He believed the South had been reasonable. 
“But Pharaoh was resolved not to let the people go!” He described the Federal Government’s 
attempt to indict twelve million people, arguing that in such a situation, the people of Virginia 
had no choice. Either Lincoln would force them to fight against the South, or they could choose 
to side with their southern brothers in a fight for self-determination.38  
Tucker believed that Northerners had violated “international law” in their destructive war 
against the South. The worst crime committed by the northern states, in Tucker’s view, involved 
the federal government’s war upon the very Constitution that she clamed to be upholding. “The 
Federal Government refuses to recognize our independence, and still claims these states as 
members of the Federal Union.” That would be fine, argued Tucker, but for the fact that “at 
every step of this contest, that Government … tramples under foot the Constitution its officers 
are sworn to support, and which it falsely professes a purpose to restore.” Without the authority 
of the South the Union would never have existed in the first place, and yet the Union blockaded 
her ports, “which the Constitution guaranteed should be open and free.” Tucker enumerated a 
further series of these violations: The federal government took away southern property without 
due process of law, and the president unconstitutionally suspended habeas corpus. Military 
courts tried citizens even in areas where the civilian courts remained in operation. The federal 
government “muzzled the press, abridged the freedom of speech, and… prohibited the free 
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exercise of religion, even in the Northern States.” The president emancipated the slaves with an 
“imperial edict” thereby destroying three billion dollars worth of property “without 
compensation and for no public use!” The federal government gave “freedom to the slave, and 
put chains upon his master, without warrant of law, and beyond the hope of relief.” Furthermore, 
this same government made war upon women and children and destroyed southern food supplies. 
It then required southern men “to take its oath of allegiance, as a condition for the privilege of 
purchasing needful supplies for their families, thus compelling to perjury, or condemning to 
starvation.”39  
The federal government therefore, according to Tucker, “defeated every object for which 
it was formed.”  
It has done gross injustice, though formed ‘to establish justice.’ It has stirred up 
servile insurrection, though formed to ‘to ensure domestic tranquillity.’ It has made 
fierce war upon us, though formed ‘to provide for our defense.’ It has spread ruin 
and desolation in its march, though formed ‘to promote our welfare.’ It has destroyed 
liberty of thought, of speech, of action; liberty of the press —liberty of religion— 
though formed ‘to secure the blessings of liberty to us and our posterity.’ It has 
destroyed our lives, confiscated our property, invaded our homes, [and] engendered a 
war of races in our midst.  
 
Anticipating the charge that the South had brought these misfortunes upon herself by seceding, 
Tucker argued that the war had only sped up the Republican project to destroy the South. He 
asserted that even without the secession of the southern states, the Republicans would have 
worked to carry out this same project: “Hatred of the South has been felt for years —and only 
waited a fit occasion, to ripen into the deadly fruits of a war of desolation, plunder and ruin.” In 
the Union or without, the “civil liberty” and “constitutional freedom” of the South would have 
been attacked.40   
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IV. 
Tucker made a powerful case for secession. But the southern armies failed to win a lasting 
independence for their people, and with their defeat the Confederates had to leave all hope of 
independence on the battlefield. Because of this changed situation, constitutional arguments had 
to change shape as well. An indictment of the federal government must needs be very different 
from a defense of the constitutionality of a failed war for independence. Albert Taylor Bledsoe 
would be one of the first in the South to take on the new task.  
Before the war had begun, Bledsoe had grown impatient with Virginia’s slowness in 
moving to declare her independence: “Virginia was slow, exceedingly slow, and tried almost 
beyond endurance, the patience of many of her noblest sons.” Virginians failed to act because 
they failed to understand “the Yankee character.” They did not “comprehend the perfidy of its 
designs, nor the malignity of its purposes.” Bledsoe classed General Robert E. Lee, at the time 
serving as the commander in charge of all the soldiers in Virginia, as one of this class of 
southerners. Bledsoe wrote to Jefferson Davis that Lee’s public comments “are calculated to 
dispirit our people.” According to this interpretation, Lee did not know “how good and how 
righteous our cause is, and consequently lacks the one quality which the times demand.”41   
When the war finally began, Bledsoe left his post as professor of mathematics at the 
University of Virginia and accepted a commission as a colonel in the Confederate States Army. 
In that capacity he served as the Chief of the War Bureau in Richmond. In the words of 
Bledsoe’s biographer, this agency “functioned largely as a coordinating and clerical agency for 
the Secretary of War.” Unfortunately, Bledsoe had poor relations with the secretary. The  
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professor would later describe the War Bureau as a “purgatory” —a place where he single-
handedly had to face off against “swarms of politicians and office seekers, all bent on their own 
private little ends,” grasping at his “elbows, sides, brain, and nerves, and never permitting him to 
devote the little sense he had to the most glorious cause the world has ever seen….” After just 
over a year at the Bureau, Bledsoe returned to the University of Virginia.42 
There he spent a year teaching before traveling to England in the hope of writing a 
defense of the Confederate cause. Bledsoe should have made a point of securing university leave, 
but because he did not, this trip ended his career as a university professor. He did, however, set 
off with letters of introduction from a variety of notable southerners. Bledsoe would later insist 
that he had not actually asked for the letters, and that he did not present them to anyone “because 
I went to England to work, and not to see Lords.” He claimed to have received numerous 
invitations from English aristocrats desiring a visit, but he “declined them all on the ground of 
duty to the South as a writer, till they ceased to be given.” For a person hoping to contribute to 
the Confederate cause, Bledsoe certainly could have done a better job as a cultural ambassador. 
Although he occasionally splurged and enjoyed a whist party or some other type of social 
function, he nevertheless insisted that he “could not keep up with these parties and write.”43  
Bledsoe’s defense of the Confederate cause did not appear in time to help the war effort. 
During the war, a British publication had offered to serialize the book, but the former professor 
declined the offer because it would have taken more than two years to publish the entire work in 
that manner. When the war eventually ended, Bledsoe changed the stated goal of the book, 
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publishing it in an effort to win clemency for an old friend: Jefferson Davis. The former 
professor entitled the work, Is Davis a Traitor; or, was Secession a Constitutional Right 
Previous to the War of 1861?44 Bledsoe would later regret that he had lost most of the letters 
from Jefferson Davis’s lawyers respecting the treason trial. “When Davis begged me to publish 
the book, just before the time set for his trial, he said he knew that no one would analyze and 
discuss the subject as I had done; and both Reed and O’Conor, the two most eminent of his 
counsel, admitted that I opened and cleaned up the great theme to their mind.” Posterity has to 
some extent shared the supposed verdict of these lawyers. Richard Weaver, one of the early 
scholars of the so-called “Lost Cause” theory, called Bledsoe’s book “the masterpiece of 
Southern apologias.”45 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Bledsoe had little patience with the first premise 
of modern natural rights theory. In his defense of Davis, he continued his attack on the state of 
nature idea, describing it as “one of the darkest metaphysical theories of Europe….” Bledsoe 
chastised those who conflated the “vague and visionary” social compacts of the Old World with 
the historically real compacts of the New. Unlike other foundings in history, the American 
founding was not mythical, but “historical and real.” The social contract philosophy, in other  
words, held no validity to Bledsoe except to the extent that it could be used to explain American 
constitutionalism. Defining the prewar Constitution as a compact between free and independent 
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states, Bledsoe argued that the old Union had been based on consent and not conquest. He 
thought that the war, though it saved the United States as a geographical entity, had destroyed the 
very nature of the old Union. Bledsoe argued that the new Union was “no longer a government 
by consent, but a government of force. Conquest is substituted for compact, and the dream of 
liberty is over.”46  
Bledsoe believed that a conspiracy existed to keep the right of secession hidden from 
public view. The greatest obfuscations, according to this account, came from Daniel Webster and 
Joseph Story. In 1833, Webster delivered his famous speech “The Constitution is not a Compact” 
and Story published a similar argument in his Commentaries on the Constitution. Both men 
admitted that if the Constitution were, in fact, a compact, then secession would be permissible. 
Bledsoe demonstrated that even an adamant nationalist like Gouverneur Morris did not hesitate 
to call the Constitution a compact before, during and after the convention. Both Hamilton and 
Madison referred to the Constitution as a compact in the Federalist Papers. And even Webster 
himself, only three years before his speech inveighing against the term, referred to the document 
of union as a “Constitutional compact.” Bledsoe believed that Webster and Story had been 
deliberately duplicitous. The North wished to control the Union, and “like every other despotic 
power, it must, of course, have its sophists, its sycophants, and flatterers, to persuade it that it can 
never violate its compacts, because it has never made any compacts to have violated.”47 
Bledsoe assembled a virtual clearinghouse of arguments in defense of secession, but he 
put one at the center. He asked a rhetorical question: where in the Constitution did the “free 
sovereign and independent states … delegate, surrender, or give away… the right to secede from 
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the Union?” Bledsoe believed that the South had had the great body of precedent on its side: 
“The creed of the fathers, the creed of all sections in 1787, the creed of all the States for more 
than thirty years after the formation of the ‘more perfect Union;’ was substantially the creed of 
the South in 1861.” In being the last to follow the creed of the fathers, the South “did dislocate 
the Union, and breed fiery discord; but then, this was simply standing still, and refusing to follow 
the rapid revolution of New England.” Bledsoe alluded to a speech made by Abraham Lincoln in 
1848, in which the future president articulated the right of “any people whatever to abolish the 
existing government, and form a new one that suits them better.” Bledsoe claimed that when 
Lincoln had been asked why the North did not just let the South leave the Union, the president 
had replied: “Let the South go? Where, then, shall we get our revenue?” According to Bledsoe, 
the North had coerced the South back into the Union, and then taxed her without allowing her 
any representation in Congress. Alluding to the cry of “no taxation without representation,” 
Bledsoe dryly remarked that the “Union waged a seven years war to establish that right, and a 
four years war to demolish it.”48   
As a master polemicist, Bledsoe did not restrict himself to northern opponents. He 
attacked the former vice president of the Confederacy as well. In his debate with Alexander 
Stephens, Bledsoe manifested considerable resignation. He believed that the great masses of the 
people, even the southern people, had failed to understand the meaning of the southern cause. 
Consequently, politicians of both the North and South had been forced to resort to demagoguery 
in order to manipulate the people in the direction they needed them to go. According to the 
former professor, much of this demagoguery had been expressed regarding the issue of slavery. 
Before the war, Stephens had been one of the many political men to agitate on this issue. 
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According to Bledsoe, Stephens had little choice, for the great masses of people would never 
have been willing to fight were it not for slavery: “A fight between two game-cocks would have 
done more to arouse their warlike passions, than a conflict between two political theories about 
which they knew little and cared less.” As a savvy politician, Stephens realized that only slavery 
could mobilize the great masses for war. Thus at the beginning of the war, the Georgian had 
made slavery out to be the sole cause of the fight. In his famous “Cornerstone Address” of 1861, 
Stephens argued that the Union had been built on a “sandy foundation” of racial equality, and 
that this fact had proven its downfall.49  
According to Bledsoe, Stephens had been a mono-causalist before the war when he 
regarded slavery as the only topic of contention, and a mono-causalist after the war as well, when 
he neglected to discuss slavery as one of the issues leading up to the conflict. Accusing the 
former vice president of neglecting to mention slavery in his post war volumes, Bledsoe argued 
that Stephens had staked his entire interpretation of the war on a single political theory. By 
focusing on just one cause, Stephens produced “a big book for the times” instead of “a great 
book for eternity.”50 Worse yet, Bledsoe found Stephens unreliable on the one issue that mattered 
most: secession. In his post-war work, the former vice president portrayed himself as having 
opposed the policy of secession but not the right of secession. Bledsoe, however, returned to 
Stephens’s prewar speeches and demonstrated that the Georgian had misrepresented his 
antebellum position. Bledsoe believed that Stephens failed to understand secession properly, 
even in his postwar volumes. According to the former professor, Stephens conflated the right of 
secession with the right of revolution. Bledsoe distinguished between the two: the right exercised 
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in 1776 was the right of revolution, but the right exercised in 1861 was that of a sovereign state 
seceding rightfully from a federal compact.51  
In the contest with Stephens, Bledsoe, perhaps growing cynical, had backed down from 
his old claim that the creed of the South had been the same as the creed held by the framers of 
the Constitution. The Georgian had argued that the framers all upheld the right of secession and 
that most scholars and public men held the same view up until the 1830s. Bledsoe disagreed this 
time, stating that no one discussed the right of secession between 1789 and 1826. The subject, 
according to Bledsoe, did not seem to have been on anyone’s mind at the time. Stephens mocked 
this statement, asking: “Did not Judge Tucker’s Commentaries appear during this period? Did 
not he clearly maintain the right?” Indeed, Alexander Stephens did not allow any of Bledsoe’s 
charges to go unanswered. He vociferously disagreed with the former professor’s contentions 
that he failed to distinguish between the right of revolution and the right of secession and that he 
had somehow wavered on the secession issue. Stephens defined secession as the right of a 
sovereign state, not a constitutional right. Stating that he did not always approve of secession as a 
remedy for a wronged state, the Georgian nevertheless maintained that he had always defended 
the right of a state to secede.52 
In response, Bledsoe continued to maintain that secession existed as a constitutional right, 
and he continued to assert that Stephens believed secession to be a constitutional wrong. “Many 
things are called legal rights, not because they are expressly given or conferred by, but because 
they are consistent with the law.” Bledsoe described secession as a right of this type. In an abrupt 
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volte-face from the position that he had upheld in his defense of Jefferson Davis, Bledsoe 
reiterated his claim that the framers of the Constitution had opposed the idea of secession. He 
cited Hamilton’s statement in the twenty-second Federalist as well as a letter that James 
Madison wrote to Daniel Webster. Bledsoe conceded Stephen’s point that scholars had long 
upheld the right of secession. He specifically mentioned, in this regard, the writings of St. 
George Tucker. But he discounted the fact on the grounds that “[n]ot one in a hundred thousand 
of the people had ever heard of the work of … Tucker, until it was noticed in the Commentaries 
of Kent or Story, even if they have ever heard of it to this day.” Bledsoe attempted to downplay 
the importance of the Hartford Convention as well: “what has that secret Convention, and its 
unpublished resolutions, to do with the discussion of anything ‘by the public men of the 
country?’” Believing that the war had forever defeated the cause of constitutional orthodoxy, 
Bledsoe had nevertheless continued, for a time, to defend the old principles. By the time of  his 
debate with Stephens, however, the former professor had succumbed to an ever more querulous 
cynicism. Bledsoe died in 1877, just as the Reconstruction he so hated came to an end.53 
V. 
John Randolph Tucker, unlike Bledsoe, never abandoned the cause of constitutional orthodoxy. 
Indeed he labored valiantly to fit the faith of his grandfather into the changed political situation 
brought about by the end of the war. Soon after defeat, Tucker moved to Middleburg, Virginia, 
his wife’s hometown. He practiced law there until 1869, when he moved to Baltimore to serve as 
counsel for the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company. One year later he won a professorship at 
Washington College in Virginia. From that point on, Lexington would be his hometown. He 
taught law through lectures and examinations, the newer case law method having not yet been 
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introduced to the South. In 1872, the residents of the Lynchburg district elected him as their 
representative to Congress. Tucker would serve twelve terms in that capacity. During this time 
he served on the Ways and Means Committee as well as the Judiciary Committee.54 
 Tucker took up a variety of causes during his tenure in the House of Representatives. On 
one occasion, he refused to vote for a grant of money to finance an exhibition in Philadelphia. He 
feared that the “general welfare” clause could easily be misconstrued in such a manner that every 
costly pork barrel scheme would seem constitutionally reasonable. In the contest between 
Rutherford B. Hayes and Samuel Tilden, Tucker supported the creation of an Electoral 
Commission to decide the contests in Louisiana and Florida. Once this commission had been 
established, Tucker argued before it on behalf of the Tilden electors from Florida. Throughout 
his congressional career, the professor consistently fought against protective tariffs. Believing 
that people do best when they can decide things for themselves without the aid of government, 
Tucker articulated a general principle: governments should have “the minimum of power,” and 
citizens “the maximum of liberty,” that could consistently be held while maintaining “the order 
and safety of society.” On certain issues he believed the government should intervene to restrict 
natural liberty. For instance, in his last congressional battle Tucker argued on behalf of a bill for 
the abolition of polygamy in Utah. In this debate he defined marriage as “a civil status, the jural 
result of a contract between one man and one woman for perpetual cohabitation and mutual 
support, looking to the procreation and nurture of children under the security of certain 
parentage.”55 
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 In Congress, Tucker generally refused to retaliate in kind against his Republican 
colleagues who enthusiastically waved the bloody shirt in remembrance of the late war. Noting 
that he looked back at the war with sorrow, the Virginian stated that he had “no palinode to 
sing.” When the war began, Tucker noted, southerners believed their cause to have been the right 
one. “Claiming nothing which I do not accord to our then opponents, I think we may each 
respect the conscientious beliefs that impelled us into that unhappy conflict.” Admitting that the 
question of slavery had been a driving influence behind the war, Tucker noted that the 
Reconstruction amendments, and indeed the war itself, had permanently settled that question. He 
therefore declared it his purpose as a representative from the state of Virginia “to make this a 
glorious Union among the nations of the earth and this Government a great and noble one for the 
security of the liberties, the independence, and prosperity of all these united Commonwealths.” 
He referred to the late war “as nothing but the convulsive throes of the infant Hercules in his 
cradle —marking growth, development and progress.” Believing that Americans were 
responsible for the progress of humankind, Tucker worked to make sure that the American 
“experiment” continued to operate.56  
 Tucker believed that constitutional orthodoxy had survived the adoption of the 
Reconstruction amendments. He noted that at the time of the framing of the Constitution, the 
representatives of the various states had agreed that Congress could eliminate the international 
slave trade after 1808. According to this interpretation, the states had imposed this restriction 
upon themselves, in the interests of preserving the Union. Tucker placed the thirteenth 
amendment in this same tradition. Eight southern states had ratified it. Even the states that did 
not ratify it, “had bound themselves to agree to amendments of the Federal Constitution,” once 
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three-quarters of the states had ratified. Slavery had been the “apple of discord” between the 
northern and southern states, but the thirteenth amendment made abolition “a matter for 
reasonable agreement and compact between the States….” Therefore, the thirteenth amendment 
“sustains and supports” constitutional orthodoxy to the extent that it upheld the traditional 
interpretation “of the relations of the Union to the States pre-existent to the war and this 
amendment.”57  
 The fourteenth amendment, according to Tucker, played a similar role. It granted 
citizenship to anyone born in the United States. This amendment overturned the decision of Dred 
Scott v. Sandford, which had held, according to Tucker’s interpretation, “that no negro was a 
citizen within the meaning of the judicial clause of the Constitution which gave jurisdiction to 
the Federal courts in suits between citizens of different States.” The professor believed that the 
elimination of slavery with the thirteenth amendment necessitated the addition of the fourteenth 
amendment. “It is obvious that the above-cited provision of the fourteenth amendment, as to who 
should be citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside, was proper to be 
adopted, in order to settle the questions which had arisen prior to the war and prior to the 
abolition of slavery.” But the fourteenth amendment had other provisions as well. It declared that 
no state could pass a law that would “‘abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States.’” This provision implied, according to Tucker, that without it “a State might 
abridge the privileges of a citizen of the United States, and that it was necessary to prohibit this 
abridgment by an amendment ratified by the States themselves.”58  
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Tucker inquired into the nature of these privileges and immunities. He noted that the 
rights of a citizen of the United States were not the same thing as the rights of a citizen of an 
individual state. For instance, one may be a citizen of the United States, but not have the right to 
run for election in an individual state, on the grounds that one has not established residency 
there. According to his estimation, the Slaughter-House Cases provided “a very full 
consideration of the character of the fourteenth amendment.” Based upon this decision, the 
professor argued that each American holds citizenship under two governments: that of the Union, 
and that of his state. According to Tucker, the Slaughter-House Cases validated this reading of 
the Reconstruction amendments, namely, that these amendments in no way altered the main 
features of the Constitution. The Virginian believed the fourteenth amendment to be little more 
than a clarification of the privileges and immunities clause in the original Constitution.59 
Tucker had been an early advocate of the theory that the fourteenth amendment 
incorporated the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution and the first ten 
amendments, making this argument before the Supreme Court in 1887. One year after ending his 
congressional career, Tucker returned full-time to his professorship at Washington and Lee 
College. From that base he accepted the occasional high-profile legal case. His best-known case 
from this period involved the defense of August Spies, a member of a group of Chicago 
anarchists charged with the murder of several policemen during the famed Haymarket riots. The 
professor had been one of three members of an improbable legal “dream team” that included the 
infamous former military governor of New Orleans, Benjamin F. Butler. Together they spent two 
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days before the Supreme Court petitioning for a writ of error so that Court would review the 
verdict handed down by the Supreme Court of Illinois. Their effort failed, but during the course 
of their appeal, Tucker made the argument that the fourteenth amendment gave the Supreme 
Court the jurisdiction for such a writ. When questioned about the case in later years, Tucker 
would always reply the same way: “I do not defend anarchy, I defend the Constitution.”60 
 The third and fourth clauses of the fourteenth amendment presented Tucker with more of 
a challenge. He recognized that they condemned the secession of the southern states. These 
clauses described secession as “insurrection and rebellion” and “created a disability in the part of 
those who participated in the same….” According to Tucker, this part of the fourteenth 
amendment sanctioned the “theory that the compact between the States is permanent, and that no 
State can be absolved from it but by the consent of the States or through rebellion.” He therefore 
accepted that the fourteenth amendment had settled “the conflict of opinion which honestly 
existed among men prior to 1861….” Admitting that the Reconstruction amendments had 
“increased the powers of the general government to some extent,” and that they had  “abridged 
the powers of the States,” the professor nevertheless held “that in all essentials, the system of our 
Constitutional Union, its structure and its fundamental principles have not been changed.” States, 
according to Tucker, still composed the Union. The Constitution still existed as the only bond 
between these states, and the federal government still exercised only those powers delegated by 
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the states. The powers “not so delegated nor forbidden to them” still belonged to the state 
governments and to the people of the states.61  
 Tucker had less to say about the fifteenth amendment, although he noted that it gave 
black men the power to defend their right of personal freedom through suffrage. He found this 
right unproblematic. Indeed, he completely accepted the Reconstruction amendments and the 
implications commonly drawn from them at the time: “To these results, as parts of our 
constitutional system, I bow without reservation, and yield to them the obedience due by a 
citizen of Virginia to the supreme law of the land.”62 With these amendments in place, Tucker 
believed that young Southerners could continue their adherence to “the profound political 
philosophy” of the South. He described this political philosophy as “the Inductive Philosophy” of 
“political science” and labeled it “the peculiar product of Southern thought….” The professor 
asserted that this political philosophy had made possible the United States Constitution. 
Contesting the thesis that the war had overthrown constitutional orthodoxy, Tucker referred to 
this thesis as a “political heresy” and noted that if it were true “then liberty is dead, and 
despotism is supreme.” The thirteenth amendment ended slavery, and the fourteenth amendment 
ended the right of secession. “But it is false to assert that the reserved powers of the States have 
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otherwise been impaired, or the delegated authority of the federal government been increased so 
as to bring within its reach the essential rights of the several states.”63   
 Asking what the Old South could teach the New South, Tucker sought after a nexus to 
unite the two. He did not think that everything the Old South “ever believed and wrought out by 
its great intellects and its social and political virtue” should be simply thrown away. For “in all 
the history of civilized man, every seemingly extinct order has contained the seeds of that which 
succeeds it, and the rubbish of the past is but its circumstances, its incidents.” Tucker believed in 
progress, and he therefore stated that the New South would carry on the best things about the Old 
South. “When Rome crushed political Greece beneath its iron heel, the seed of Greek art, 
philosophy, and polity sprang from underneath it to teach the victor the ideas of a civilization 
which had filled the modern world with its immortal glory.” In turn, the Romans spread this 
Greek legacy to Europe where it served “as at once the creator and protector of all that the 
modern world values as civil and political liberty.” The real battles, according to Tucker, would 
be fought not on the battlefield but “within the human soul,” and the individual soul could hold 
out indefinitely. The only conqueror in affairs of the soul, according to Tucker, is “Truth!” He 
did not think that the New South could be great, or even prosperous, if she were to repudiate “the 
political philosophy of her ancestry,” or abandon herself “to the greed of gain,” by adopting 
“political principles which will prostitute federal power to the promotion of schemes of general 
plunder, in which she is to win her reward by taking her share of the dishonorable spoils.”64 
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According to Tucker, the Union as a whole faced a new set of challenges. He feared that 
the rights of individuals had come to be threatened by centralized power, both public and private. 
He feared that corporations, although “valuable in themselves and important and in some 
respects essential,” to the economy, might someday occupy “all the avenues of social industry in 
exclusive or injurious competition with individual energy and personal right.” Defining the 
corporation as a creature of the law, the professor argued that the law must make sure that 
corporations “shall not invade the sanctity of the rights of the free man.” He believed as well, 
that the obverse of this danger existed in the form of political centralization. Both the state 
governments and the federal government demonstrated a “tendency to control, regulate, and 
direct the industry and enterprises of individual men.” Tucker feared this regulation because he 
did not think that it worked as intended. The government claimed to exercise a paternal regard 
for the individual, but it quickly lost sight of the needs of the people in favor of “the few fawning 
parasites, who crowd the lobby and swarm the corridors of legislative bodies.” He feared that 
“class legislation” would make a minority rich at the expense of the many. In general terms, 
Tucker continued to believe that the world would do better with less government rather than with 
more.65       
 Tucker held that the governmental powers that had to exist needed to be kept responsive 
to the people. He continued to fear that the patronage powers of the presidency had perverted the 
constitutional order and made the government less responsive to the people. The framers had 
designed the electoral college so that the states could use their electors to choose the president. In 
the event that these electors could not decide on a single candidate, the House of Representatives 
would do so, with each state given one vote. “National conventions of partisans, however, now 
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dictate the person to obedient electors, and the eventual power of election by states is thus 
defeated.” In practice, believed Tucker, the old system had been abandoned. The men who 
composed these conventions were usually office seekers, “whose greed for the spoils too often is 
the sum of their zealous patriotism.” Under such a system the powers of the president increased 
to the extent that he “centralizes public sentiment as to public measures, and practically controls 
all action in both houses of congress, and the President thus becomes the representative center of 
all opinion and the index of all political action.” Pitching his case to a northern audience, the 
professor argued that the “rottenness of corruption” produced under such a system of patronage 
was “more dangerous to liberty than the anarchy of disunion!”66 
 The framers of the Constitution had created, and the men that fought for southern 
independence had kept alive, “the equilibrium between the delegated and reserved authority —
between the powers of centralization and the powers of the states.” Tucker wanted the younger 
generation to continue to keep these values alive, but he feared that technological innovations 
and the greater unity produced by these innovations would turn the young away from the legacy 
of their fathers and produce in their place “a feeling of paternity for the federal government….” 
If the young began to view the federal government as a paternal symbol, politicians would 
concoct schemes that might seem to be for the benefit of all, but that would actually favor only a 
selected few. Similarly, technology produced luxury and a “miraculous increase of wealth,” 
thereby leading many young people to abandon the “primitive and republican simplicity” of their 
forefathers. To set the right example, John turned to the writings of his own father, Henry 
Tucker. Praising the “conscientiousness” with which his father approached constitutional 
questions, John nevertheless noted that Henry had backed down from constitutional orthodoxy in 
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the years after the War of 1812. That war had caused many men of the “Jeffersonian school” to 
neglect “the strict canons of construction,” and Henry had been “affected in the views which he 
then took by the general departure of the mass of his party from the ancient doctrines.” Looking 
for the true faith, John instead turned to the writings of his grandfather, St. George Tucker.67  
Noting that St. George had written the first major post-ratification commentary on the 
United States Constitution, John returned to this work to find the proper lessons for the new 
generation. A tribute to “the originality as well as to the ability of the work,” could be found in 
the fact “that all subsequent controversial disquisitions have appealed to him as authority, or 
have attempted to overthrow his doctrines.” John conceded that his grandfather had been proven 
wrong on a number of matters, but he attributed this defeat to the fact that St. George wrote his 
commentary in the years  “before the decisions of the great Chief Justice” John Marshall had 
been written. Nevertheless, the constitutional orthodoxy espoused by St. George had managed to 
survive. Summarizing the tenets of this orthodoxy, John noted that St. George “was jealous of 
centralism, and a firm believer in the reserved powers of the States as essential to the liberty of 
the citizen.” Much like his grandfather before him, John Tucker saw the rights of states “as the 
guardians appointed by heaven’s wisdom to save liberty from centralism.” Because the 
governance of a state by an outside power “divorces power from right, instead of wedding power 
to right,” the statesman should attempt to steer between “the Scylla of anarchy and the Charybdis 
of centralism —dissolution and despotism.” With the former danger no longer a threat, John 
carried forth constitutional orthodoxy by focusing on the latter.68
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Conclusion 
 
St. George Tucker left behind a variety of legacies. He inaugurated an academic debate about 
slavery, a debate that continues to this day. He offered an interpretation of the United States 
Constitution in which he delineated in greater detail than anyone before him the way in which 
the founding generation understood that document. He raised and trained two sons who 
demonstrated the diversity of approaches one could take on constitutional issues while remaining 
faithful to the letter and spirit of the Constitution. But perhaps St. George Tucker’s most 
important contribution involved his perpetuation of the Whig theory of liberty. His offspring 
carried these views forward, taught them to their children and they, in turn, passed them on to the 
next generation.  
For instance, as late as 1949, one of John Randolph Tucker’s students, a man named John 
Davis, moved “to apply to present day problems some of the lessons of Mr. Tucker’s teaching.”  
Briefly noting the many changes that had taken place in the more than fifty years since his 
teacher’s death, Davis admitted that Tucker could not have predicted the world wars that the 
United States had fought. Yet Davis did not believe that human nature had changed in the 
meantime. Tucker had turned his students towards the “monumental ideas” of the past, and in 
America, that meant a  return to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. In Davis’s day every 
lawyer had to take an oath to protect the Constitution, and he would perhaps have been amused 
that even graduate assistants at public universities take such an oath today. Davis argued that 
upholding the oath meant opposing the exercise of any governmental power that went against the 
Constitution. Some argued that the Supreme Court possessed the sole right to interpret the 
Constitution, but Davis did not agree. According to his understanding, everyone who takes an 
oath to defend the Constitution thereby has to interpret the Constitution. Therefore he believed 
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that everyone who takes the oath should follow the precedent set forth by the Tucker family: 
everyone should become “a constant student of that which he has sworn to support.”1  
Chagrined by the rise of collectivist social movements and the threat they represented to 
the Constitution’s theory of limited government, Davis returned to the lessons he had learned 
from John Randolph Tucker. Dismissing the idea that collectivism began with the moderns, 
Davis noted that the “idea of the supremacy of the state and the unimportance of the individual is 
as old, perhaps older, than the pyramids of Egypt and the Pharaohs who built them.” To combat 
the danger arising from this mentality, Davis offered up the Whig theory of liberty he had 
learned from Tucker: “If America as a nation and a people has any sufficient excuse for its 
existence it must be found in a belief unshaken and unshakable, in the freedom of man as the true 
end and aim of all government, the well-spring of all progress.” Davis thought Franklin 
Roosevelt’s four freedoms an inadequate summary of the Bill of Rights. These four freedoms did 
not include “the right of ‘self-use’ as Mr. Tucker called it, the inherent right of every individual 
to use at his own will and for his own advantage those powers and facilities given him by nature 
or by nature’s God.” Believing that without the right of self-use men become slaves, Davis 
argued that government could only operate on a military model: “It is not in the nature of 
governments to persuade; they can only compel, and between freedom and compulsion there is 
an unending conflict.”2  
 Ultimately, the Whig theory of liberty and limited government provides the best check 
against all theories of slavery. During the uncertain times of the early nineteenth-century, the 
modern natural rights philosophy presented few challenges to the continuance of slavery, but at 
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least this philosophy provides little support for the reintroduction of any form of servitude. More 
importantly, the modern theory of natural rights makes possible the Whig theory of liberty. The 
Whig distrust of power makes it possible for the scholar to take ancient philosophy seriously 
without having to worry about losing modern liberty. The Whig theory of politics supplies the 
antidote to the dangers of classic natural right. As C. S. Lewis phrased the matter: “Aristotle said 
that some people were only fit to be slaves. I do not contradict him. But I reject slavery because I 
see no men fit to be masters.”3   
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